Stefan Weishaar

EU Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and Competition Law

This chapter, from a monograph on climate change and European emissions trading, reviews European Union (EU) greenhouse gas emissions trading and competition law that arise under the UE Emissions Trading System (ETS). The author also comments on the proposed 2008 amendment to Directive 2003/87/EC that emphasizes auctioning and benchmarking. Topics covered include distortions that influence firms propensity to collude and abuse, cartelization, how the State aid provision of EC Competition law guides States to select the least distortive allocation format, grandfathering systems, and State aid derogations. Regarding cartelization, little guidance has been found as to how the joint application of the Articles of the EC Treaty is interpreted in the absence of pre-existing agreements. In addition, grandfathering systems are liable to constitute State aid will Performance Standard Rate (PSR) systems should not. The required level of environmental benefit as a precondition for the granting of aid is lower for a PSR system than for grandfathering. The author concludes that the current jurisprudence is unlikely to prevent Member States from taking measures that create incentives for undertakings to engage in anticompetitive practices.

The European emissions trading system: auctions and their challenges

This chapter, from a monograph on climate change and European emissions trading, explores the use of auctions as a format for allocation of emission allowances. The author identifies challenges that legislators may face in implementing the currently proposed auctioning scheme in the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The author first discusses basic elements of auctioning tradable rights as being defined in economic theory, then identifies the main challenges that must be addressed in order to implement auctioning in the EU ETS. Auctions are expected to successfully address the problems of windfall profits and new entrants as well as to lead to the generation of auction revenues. The author concludes that auction theory is best utilized in situations of single-unit objects that are sold; thus, insights that are gained may not be directly transferable to multiple-unit auctions such as that to be used under the EU ETS. The European Commission will have to decide what kinds of regulations to set up to create strongly harmonized and simple auctioning rules that reduce costs or whether it wants to create a system that grants Member States a larger degree of discretion. The author briefly discusses how each of these options will impact bidders, particularly smaller bidders.

Administrative Monopolies, State Aid, Barriers to Entry and Market Integration: Challenges for the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law

This unique book considers competition policy and regulation in light of the recent introduction of the anti-monopoly law in China. It addresses the relevance of competition policy for China from a broad theoretical and practical perspective, bringing together lawyers and economists from China, Europe and the US to provide an integrated law and economics approach.

The Legal Regime Preventing Predation in the People’s Republic of China: A Law and Economics Analysis

This unique book considers competition policy and regulation in light of the recent introduction of the anti-monopoly law in China. It addresses the relevance of competition policy for China from a broad theoretical and practical perspective, bringing together lawyers and economists from China, Europe and the US to provide an integrated law and economics approach.