Stephan Heuser
Technische Universität Darmstadt
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Publication
Featured researches published by Stephan Heuser.
security and privacy in smartphones and mobile devices | 2011
Sven Bugiel; Lucas Davi; Alexandra Dmitrienko; Stephan Heuser; Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi; Bhargava Shastry
In this paper, we introduce a security framework for practical and lightweight domain isolation on Android to mitigate unauthorized data access and communication among applications of different trust levels (e.g., private and corporate). We present the design and implementation of our framework, TrustDroid, which in contrast to existing solutions enables isolation at different layers of the Android software stack: (1) at the middleware layer to prevent inter-domain application communication and data access, (2) at the kernel layer to enforce mandatory access control on the file system and on Inter-Process Communication (IPC) channels, and (3) at the network layer to mediate network traffic. For instance, (3) allows network data to be only read by a particular domain, or enables basic context-based policies such as preventing Internet access by untrusted applications while an employee is connected to the companys network. Our approach accurately addresses the demands of the business world, namely to isolate data and applications of different trust levels in a practical and lightweight way. Moreover, our solution is the first leveraging mandatory access control with TOMOYO Linux on a real Android device (Nexus One). Our evaluation demonstrates that TrustDroid only adds a negligible overhead, and in contrast to contemporary full virtualization, only minimally affects the batterys life-time.
computer and communications security | 2014
Markus Miettinen; Stephan Heuser; Wiebke Kronz; Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi; N. Asokan
We present ConXsense, the first framework for context-aware access control on mobile devices based on context classification. Previous context-aware access control systems often require users to laboriously specify detailed policies or they rely on pre-defined policies not adequately reflecting the true preferences of users. We present the design and implementation of a context-aware framework that uses a probabilistic approach to overcome these deficiencies. The framework utilizes context sensing and machine learning to automatically classify contexts according to their security and privacy-related properties. We apply the framework to two important smartphone-related use cases: protection against device misuse using a dynamic device lock and protection against sensory malware. We ground our analysis on a sociological survey examining the perceptions and concerns of users related to contextual smartphone security and analyze the effectiveness of our approach with real-world context data. We also demonstrate the integration of our framework with the FlaskDroid architecture for fine-grained access control enforcement on the Android platform.We present ConXsense, the first framework for context-aware access control on mobile devices based on context classification. Previous context-aware access control systems often require users to laboriously specify detailed policies or they rely on pre-defined policies not adequately reflecting the true preferences of users. We present the design and implementation of a context-aware framework that uses a probabilistic approach to overcome these deficiencies. The framework utilizes context sensing and machine learning to automatically classify contexts according to their security and privacy-related properties. We apply the framework to two important smartphone-related use cases: protection against device misuse using a dynamic device lock and protection against sensory malware. We ground our analysis on a sociological survey examining the perceptions and concerns of users related to contextual smartphone security and analyze the effectiveness of our approach with real-world context data. We also demonstrate the integration of our framework with the FlaskDroid architecture for fine-grained access control enforcement on the Android platform.
financial cryptography | 2015
Christoph Busold; Stephan Heuser; Jon Rios; Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi; N. Asokan
Today, cross-device communication and intelligent resource sharing among smart devices is limited and inflexible: Typically devices cooperate using fixed interfaces provided by custom-built applications, which users need to install manually. This is tedious, time consuming, bears security and privacy risks, and contrasts the idea of Internet of Things (IoT) where intelligent devices operate in concert to enrich the overall user experience by sharing resources and capabilities.
financial cryptography | 2015
Alexandra Dmitrienko; Stephan Heuser; Thien Duc Nguyen; Marcos da Silva Ramos; Andre Rein; Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Today, most smartphones feature different kinds of secure hardware, such as processor-based security extensions (e.g., TrustZone) and dedicated secure co-processors (e.g., SIM-cards or embedded secure elements). Unfortunately, secure hardware is almost never utilized by commercial third party apps, although their usage would drastically improve security of security critical apps. The reasons are diverse: Secure hardware stakeholders such as phone manufacturers and mobile network operators (MNOs) have full control over the corresponding interfaces and expect high financial revenue; and the current code provisioning schemes are inflexible and impractical since they require developers to collaborate with large stakeholders.
privacy enhancing technologies | 2017
Stephan Heuser; Bradley Reaves; Praveen Kumar Pendyala; Henry Carter; Alexandra Dmitrienko; William Enck; Negar Kiyavash; Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi; Patrick Traynor
Abstract The majority of people across the globe rely on telephony networks as their primary means of communication. As such, many of the most sensitive personal, corporate and government related communications pass through these systems every day. Unsurprisingly, such connections are subject to a wide range of attacks. Of increasing concern is the use of metadata contained in Call Detail Records (CDRs), which contain source, destination, start time and duration of a call. This information is potentially dangerous as the very act of two parties communicating can reveal significant details about their relationship and put them in the focus of targeted observation or surveillance, which is highly critical especially for journalists and activists. To address this problem, we develop the Phonion architecture to frustrate such attacks by separating call setup functions from call delivery. Specifically, Phonion allows users to preemptively establish call circuits across multiple providers and technologies before dialing into the circuit and does not require constant Internet connectivity. Since no single carrier can determine the ultimate destination of the call, it provides unlinkability for its users and helps them to avoid passive surveillance. We define and discuss a range of adversary classes and analyze why current obfuscation technologies fail to protect users against such metadata attacks. In our extensive evaluation we further analyze advanced anonymity technologies (e.g., VoIP over Tor), which do not preserve our functional requirements for high voice quality in the absence of constant broadband Internet connectivity and compatibility with landline and feature phones. Phonion is the first practical system to provide guarantees of unlinkable communication against a range of practical adversaries in telephony systems.
financial cryptography | 2016
Stephan Heuser; Marco Negro; Praveen Kumar Pendyala; Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Smart mobile devices process and store a vast amount of security- and privacy-sensitive data. To protect this data from malicious applications mobile operating systems, such as Android, adopt fine-grained access control architectures. However, related work has shown that these access control architectures are susceptible to application-layer privilege escalation attacks. Both automated static and dynamic program analysis promise to proactively detect such attacks. Though while state-of-the-art static analysis frameworks cannot adequately address native and highly obfuscated code, dynamic analysis is vulnerable to malicious applications using logic bombs to avoid early detection.
usenix security symposium | 2013
Sven Bugiel; Stephan Heuser; Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
usenix security symposium | 2014
Stephan Heuser; Adwait Nadkarni; William Enck; Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Archive | 2012
Sven Bugiel; Stephan Heuser; Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Synthesis Lectures on Information Security, Privacy, and Trust | 2014
N. Asokan; Lucas Davi; Alexandra Dmitrienko; Stephan Heuser; Kari Kostiainen; Elena Reshetova; Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi