Stéphane Lefebvre

The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation

Stéphane Lefebvre is a former Strategic Analyst at the Canadian Department of National Defence and a former Marcel Cadieux Policy Planning Fellow at the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The views expressed here are the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of any governmental or nongovernmental organizations with which he is or has been affiliated. An earlier version of this article was presented at the Colloque Renseignement et Sécurité internationale, Laval University, Quebec City, Canada, on 20 March 2003.

Russia and the Intelligence Services of Central Asia

The role and activities of intelligence services in most advanced democracies are routinely subject to media scrutiny and independent oversight or review of one kind or another. While considered essential to the national security of these countries, their powers are not without limits and are often challenged in court. The situation was the exact reverse in the former Soviet Union, where the Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti—KGB) wielded enormous power and influence. Although the dissolution of the Soviet Union effectively marked the death of the KGB, its different components survived in various forms, either as new agencies, such as those in Russia, or identical to the old KGB with a new name, such as those in Central Asia. While more scrutiny was being paid to the newly formed Russian intelligence agencies, elsewhere former KGB officials found their way into the entire state structure, including the presidency, thereby preventing the type of reforms and accountability practices found in advanced democracies from fully developing. In Central Asia, where governance and state institutions are relatively weak, the authoritarian leaderships have used their former republican KGBs ‘‘as

Intelligence Aspects of the 2008 Conflict Between Russia and Georgia

This article discusses the status and recent evolution of Georgian intelligence agencies, and in particular how well they have performed with respect to the Russian challenge since President Saakashvili assumed power in 2004. The article also discusses Georgian intelligence with respect to its international engagement, and recommends options for NATO that would assist Georgia in reforming and professionalizing its intelligence agencies along the lines of advanced or more mature democracies.

The Russian 10 … 11: An Inconsequential Adventure?

While the use of illegals was thought to be a relic of the Cold War, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki—SVR) has continued to use them throughout the post–Cold War period. Two were caught in Finland and returned to Russia as early as 1992. In 1996, Canada unmasked two illegals, and ten years later unmasked another. These publicly known cases served as stark reminders to Western countries that espionage in the pursuit of a state’s national interests is as important in the post–Cold War era as it had ever been. Yet, the world was surprised by the exposure of a new network of SVR-trained illegals in the United States last year.

The Czech Republic and National Security, 1993–1998: The Emergence of a Strategic Culture

In this article, through an examination of the discourse by the elites and public opinion, I discuss how the Czech Republic conceived of its place and security in the world in the first five years following its independence. In doing so, I argue that how the Czechs have collectively conceived of themselves had an impact on the strategic choices the Czech Republic had to make to adjust to international change resulting from the end of the Cold War, and on the type of armed forces it decided to develop. The emerging Czech security identity and strategic culture observed during that period indeed brought connections to policy choices, and as such made NATO membership a policy priority, and the development, within evolving financial constraints, of capable armed forces taking active part in Alliance activities the number one defense priority.

Russian Intelligence Activities in Canada: The Latest Case of an “Illegal”

This article discusses Russias use of “illegals” for espionage purposes, using the recent Canadian case of one “Paul William Hampel.” Unmasked in November 2006, his case of was reminiscent another one a decade earlier which involved two Russians who also operated under false Canadian identities. Although we do not know how much of a role simple luck or poor Russian tradecraft played in Hampels case, that Russia is still using Canada for espionage purposes should not come as a surprise. One of the few tools Russia has absent a strong economy and rejuvenated armed forces, is its intelligence apparatus. Hampels case should serve as a warning to all well-established advanced democracies: espionage is as important today as it ever was in the pursuit of a states national interests. *The views expressed in this article are the authors own and do not reflect the official position of the government of Canada or any of its departments and agencies.

Spying on Friends?: The Franklin Case, AIPAC, and Israel

On 4 August 2005, U.S. Department of Defense official Lawrence Franklin and former American–Israeli Political Action Committee (AIPAC) staffers Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman were indicted on one or several of the following counts: conspiracy to communicate national defense information to persons not entitled to receive it; communication of national defense information to persons not entitled to receive it; and conspiracy to communicate classified information to agents of a foreign government, publicly identified as Israel. Franklin pleaded guilty and cooperated with the authorities, and was subsequently sentenced to a 12-year prison term. As of this writing, Rosen’s and Weissman’s trial was scheduled to start in August 2006. When the story of an investigation into Franklin’s communication of classified information to Rosen and Weissman surfaced, the immediate widely held assumption was that Israel was the ultimate beneficiary. This belief was reinforced with the disclosure that the compromised classified information was related to issues of immediate interest to the Jewish state, including Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the situation in Iraq. But doubts were expressed, to the effect that the cozy relationship between Israel and the United States would hardly necessitate such an intelligence-gathering operation on U.S. soil. Nevertheless, the question of Israel’s precise role in the affair remains unanswered, but for the exception that Franklin told the U.S. District Court in Alexandria, Virginia, that he had, in fact, given

The Czech and Slovak armed forces immediately before the CSFR split: notes from Canadian classified diplomatic records

A recent Access to Information Act request to the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and international Trade resulted in the release of 256 pages of text concerning Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) defense and security issues. A close look at the available records reveals some of the subjects of interest to the Canadian government as well as the relative importance given to various security and defense issues. The material also offers information which is not usually very accessible to researchers. From the pages that were released, I conclude that the Canadian government, in the last year preceding the end of the CSFR did not have a very good appreciation of what was happening within the armed forces and that its reporting and, particularly, its analysis on security and defense were rather superficial. Of course, this is only based on a limited sample of the records. This conclusion will only stand as long as the remaining classified records is kept under wrap. However, I believe that the records released under the act could be of assistance to researchers attempting to piece together the history of the dying days of the Czechoslovak armed forces. This story has yet to be written.

The U.S. Counterintelligence Corps and Czechoslovak Human Intelligence Operations, 1947–1972

The National Archives & Records Administration (NARA) maintains a U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) Collection, consisting of U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Commands (INSCOM) Investig...

Difficult times for the Russian air force, 1992–2002

The Russian Air Force (Voyenno‐vozdushnyye Sily‐VVS) is no longer the feared instrument that it was in Soviet times. The past ten years have proven to be very challenging, if not disquieting. The problems encountered today by the VVS stem from an economy in reconstruction, a new strategic environment, and parochial interests. Lack of financial resources has affected readiness, training, maintenance, research and development, modernization, the purchase of new weapons systems, logistical support to aircraft, flight safety, and the resolution of social problems. Given its lingering problems, a modern Air Force with a professional and technically proficient staff is not likely to emerge until 2020.