Stephen Cole

Why Sociology Doesn't Make Progress Like the Natural Sciences

Pour comparer la nature des progres realises en sociologie dune part, et en sciences naturelles dautre part, lA. distingue deux types de connaissances : un « coeur » theorique, admis par tous et servant de reference constante, et une « peripherie » constituee de travaux recents le plus souvent non encore reconnus. Ayant constate, par letude des manuels dintroduction aux differentes disciplines, que la sociologie est pratiquement denuee de « coeur » theorique, lA. explore la specificite de la sociologie qui se nourrit de phenomenes fluctuants et dont letude, ou le chercheur est egalement participant, doit souvent sappuyer sur des criteres a caractere non cognitif

Why fewer women become physicians: Explaining the premed persistence gap

Previous research indicates that the answer to the question of why fewer women become physicians lies in the “premed persistence gap.” Women are no less likely than men to enter undergraduate premed programs, but they are less likely to complete the program and apply to medical school. This article presents data from a study designed to test four plausible explanations of the persistence gap that are consistent with the structural barriers, normative barriers, and cognitive differences theories of gender inequality. The findings do not support the “perception of discrimination” hypothesis, the “discouragement” hypothesis, the “self-derogation” hypothesis, and the “anticipated role conflict” hypothesis. Rather, the evidence suggests another explanation — the normative alternatives approach. This approach holds that contemporary gender norms offer women fewer disincentives to changing or lowering their high-status career goals when encountering hardship, self-doubt, and the possibility of failure.

LITTLE SCIENCE, BIG SCIENCE REVISITED

One of the basic dependent variables in the sociology of science is the rate at which scientific knowledge advances. Sociologists of science have in the past assumed that the rate of scientific advance was a function of the number of talented people entering science. This assumption was challenged by Derek Price who argued that as the number of scientists increased the number of “high quality” scientists would increase at a slower rate. This paper reports the results of an empirical study of changes in the size of academic physics in the U. S. between 1963 and 1975. In each year we count the number of new Assistant Professors appointed in Ph. D.-granting departments. During the early 1960s there was a sharp increase in the size of entering cohorts followed by a sharp decline. A citation analysis indicates that the proportion of each cohort publishing work which was cited at least once in the first three years after appointment was relatively constant. This leads to the conclusion that the number of scientists capable of contributing to the advance of scientific knowledge through their published research is a linear function of the total number of people entering science.

Determinants of Faculty Support for Student Demonstrations

In the spring of 1968, education at Columbia University was disrupted by a massive student sit-in and strike. This paper presents data on how faculty support was influenced by non-professional statuses, which guided the development of faculty opinion as the crisis progressed. Religion, political affiliation, fathers occupation, age and sex were all correlated with attitudinal support of the demonstration. The effect of the first three of these non-professional statuses was substantially reduced when we controlled for general political orientation. We conclude that a faculty members attitude toward student demonstrations is more influenced by his experience before entrance to the profession than by experience after entrance. Nonprofessional statuses tend to be important in influencing behavior on professional issues for which there is little precedence. Conversion of attitudinal into behavioral support was largely dependent on the attitudes of ones faculty colleagues and students in the professors department and university division. In the absence of social support, less than half of the faculty members acted in accord with their own attitudinal predisposition. STUDENT PROTESTS, STRIKES, and demonstrations rapidly are becoming a normal part of life on college campuses. Although there has been some research on why students become involved in this type of political activity, there has been little or no investigation of the reaction of faculty members to these student demonstrations. The success or failure of these demonstrations and the extent to which they disrupt academic life often depend upon the degree of faculty support they receive. Therefore, the determinants of faculty support form an important area of inquiry. In what ways do faculty members who support demonstrations differ from those of their colleagues who oppose demonstrations? Under what conditions will favorable attitudes toward demonstrations be converted into active support? The study of faculty reaction to student demonstrations is relevant for a more general sociological problem: under what conditions will the attitudes

Americans’ Attitudes toward War: Trend Analysis of Public Opinion for the Iraq War

This article presents the results of an analysis of public attitudes toward war for the contemporary Iraq War. In total, 23 surveys conducted by the Gallup Organization starting March 2003 and ending in February 2006 were analyzed. This article examines the social characteristics of those people who are more or less likely to oppose war. The research reported here was arrived at answering the following question: Are there some groups (e.g., women) who are more likely to oppose the war? Using binary logistic regression methods, this research analyzes why some groups are more likely than others to oppose or support war. This cross-sectional analysis studies groups by age, education, gender, race, religion, party identification, and political ideology, in their general likelihood to oppose war. Several traditional expectations on war attitudes, including a “gender gap” and an “education gap,” were unfounded. In some cases where correlations were found, the relationship could be explained predominately by the correlation of demographic characteristics with partisanship. This study has demonstrated just how much more powerful party identification has become in the United States. This trend analysis is the closest look at U.S. public opinion on war since the groundbreaking and prize-winning work of John Mueller (1973).

Do Individual Characteristics Matter? An Analysis of Americans’ Opinions toward the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq Wars

This article presents the results of an analysis of public attitudes toward war for the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and Iraq wars. In total, 61 surveys conducted by the Gallup Organization starting in August 1950 (near the beginning of the Korean War) and ending February 2006 (middle of the Iraq War) were analyzed. This article examines the social characteristics of those people who are more or less likely to oppose war and is a continuation of our earlier work analyzing the Iraq War. The research reported here was arrived at answering the following question: Are there some groups (e.g., Democrats) who are more likely to oppose war? Using binary logistic regression methods, this research analyzes why some groups are more likely than others to oppose or support war. This cross-sectional analysis studies groups by age, education, gender, race, religion, party identification, and political ideology, in their general likelihood to oppose war. In addition, this analysis studies respondents’ attitudes toward war, which includes whether the respondent was a hawk or a dove, an internationalist or isolationist, and optimistic or pessimistic about the wars outcome. Several traditional expectations on war attitudes, including a “race gap” and a “liberal–conservative gap,” were unfounded. In some cases where correlations were found, the relationship could be explained predominately by the correlation of demographic characteristics with partisanship. This study has demonstrated, over time, just how much more powerful party identification has become in the United States. This trend analysis is the closest look at U.S. public opinion on wars after World War II since the ground-breaking and prize-winning work of John Mueller (1973, 1994).

An Analysis of Under what Conditions Americans Support the Use of Military Force Abroad in Terrorist and Humanitarian Situations

This exploratory research presents the results of a March 2011 survey of a random sample of 217 adults on their attitudes towards the use of force as a foreign policy alternative. This research note examines the social characteristics of those people who are more or less likely to support intervening in hypothetical foreign conflicts in situations in which the United States’ national interests may or may not be at stake. The research reported here was aimed at answering several questions including: Are there some demographic groups who are more likely to support intervening in foreign conflicts even when U.S. national interests are not necessarily at stake? We find that dispositional preferences interact with opinion about the geopolitical situation to determine whether military force is an acceptable option. The survey incorporates various foreign policy and terrorist scenarios. Findings include the following: We support the findings of others in that Democrats, liberals, and women are less likely to support military force as a foreign policy option. We also find support for the casualty hypothesis. In general the more casualties mentioned in a scenario the less likely Americans are to support the use of force. We also find this is true for civilian casualties.

Some problems of the discipline: Note from the editor

Unfortunately, this will probably be the last issue of Sociological Forum that will appear under my editorship. Although I would like to have served another three-year term, my pending move to the University of Queensland in Australia has made this impossible. I wish my successor1 all the best in presiding over a journal that I think is becoming one of the most respected in the field. The keynote of my editorial policy has been to try to change Sociological Forum from a journal whose major beneficiaries are the contributors to one whose major beneficiaries are the readers. The three major journals in the field, American Sociological Review (ASR), American Journal of Sociology (AJS), and Social Forces (SF), publish work that is generally of interest to only a small segment of the readership. Their primary function is to help the careers of their contributors. Many of the articles published by Sociological Forum have been similar, but here we have increasingly emphasized interest to a wide audience as the primary criterion in determining which among deserving articles should be published. We have also tried to solicit articles that we believe would be of interest to a wide segment of our readership. I think this policy has paid off as I have received innumerable compliments about Sociological Forum and the direction in which it is going. I do not want to be misinterpreted. I am not saying that journals like ASR, AJS, and SF are not absolutely necessary for the advance of knowledge in any discipline. We need places where high-quality papers that are of use to people working in particular specialties can be published. But the field should also have room for the type of journal that I wanted Socio-

Progress in the natural and social sciences: A reply to wallace

In my contribution to the June 1994 special issue of Sociological Forum, Whats Wrong With Sociology? I try to show how sociologys failure to make the kind of progress characteristic of natural sciences, such as physics, is a result in part of differences in the type of phenomena studied and the fact that sociologists are more likely than physicists to use noncognitive criteria in selecting both their research problems and the solutions to those problems. It is an honor to have such a distinguished theorist as Walter L. Wallace see my paper as important enough to merit a critical reply. Unfortunately, I do not find his critique to be convincing or to much advance the debate. Some of his points I would define as quibbles and I continue to disagree with his main point that lack of progress results primarily from sociologists failure to agree upon definitions of key concepts. In this reply I concentrate on two main points; first, the extent to which political and social values play a role in contemporary sociology, and second, Wallaces argument for standardized definitions. First, let me examine a few of the points that I consider to be quibbles. In my original article I say that sociologists study phenomena that they participate in, and this, rather than theoretical significance, determines their scientific interests. Wallace argues that cosmologists, astrophysicists, and geophysicists also study phenomena in which they participate. However, since all human beings participate in the same cosmological events, differential participation will not be a factor in determining scientific interests. Also, cosmologists do not participate in the phenomena they study in the same personal way as those of us who study gender discrimination, racial discrimination, poverty, health care, sexual behavior, etc., participate in the phenomena that we study.

Why Are Professors Liberal and Why Do Conservatives Care

sense of sexual agency and were focused on their future. They saw successful navigation of safe sex as part of their identity as good students. They saw themselves as socially mobile young women whose academic achievement was particularly hard won. Rather than viewing sexual activity as being at odds with their future orientation, their concern with safe sex was integral to their identity as savvy young women. Through these examples, Garcia showed that Latina teens faced challenges to their sexuality that were particular to their race and ethnicity, class, and generation. The girls in her study constructed sexual subjectivities that maintained their status as respectable women of color, yet expanded the space for their sexual agency. Importantly, the author was not interested in judging the strategies the women used. Instead, she showed that teen sexuality is not created in a vacuum. Latinas constructed their sexual identities in response to white supremacy as well to gendered expectations within their own community.