Stephen Darwall

Welfare and Rational Care

Acknowledgments ix CHAPTER I: Welfares Normativity 1 CHAPTER II: Welfare and Care 22 CHAPTER III: Empathy, Sympathy, Care 50 CHAPTER IV: Valuing Activity: Golubs Smile 73 Notes 105 References 123 Index 133

Reason and value

Introduction - the problem 1. Desire and motivation 2. Motivating reasons and grounding reasons 3. Desire and the good 4. Objective value (part one) 5. Objective value (part two) 6. Hedonism 7. Good and evil 8. Meaning, value and practical judgements References Index.

The Value of Autonomy and Autonomy of the Will

It is a commonplace that ‘autonomy’ has several different senses in contemporary moral and political discussion. The term’s original meaning was political: a right assumed by states to administer their own affairs. It was not until the nineteenth century that ‘autonomy’ came (in English) to refer also to the conduct of individuals, and even then there were, as now, different meanings. Odd as it may seem from our perspective, one that was in play from the beginning was Kant’s notion of “autonomy of the will,” as Kant defined it, “the property of the will by which it is a law to itself independently of any property of the objects of volition” (4:440). That’s a mouthful, to say the least. And interpreting

Authority and Reasons: Exclusionary and Second‐Personal*

In The Second-Person Standpoint, I argue that a distinctive kind of reason for acting, a second-personal reason, is an ineliminable element of many central moral categories, including rights, moral responsibility, moral obligation, the dignity of (and respect for) persons, and the concept of moral agent or person itself. Second-personal reasons are distinguished from reasons of other kinds by their conceptual connection to authority and to authoritative claims and demands that must be able to be addressed to those to whom they apply. I call these reasons second-personal to highlight this relation to address, which is necessarily always to someone (an addressee) and so in that sense second-personal, even when the addressee is oneself, the public at large, or anyone at all, real or imagined. More specifically, I argue that there are four interdefinable, irreducibly second-personal notions that together define a conceptual circle: the authority to make a claim or demand, a valid (authoritative or legitimate) claim or demand, accountability or responsibility to someone (with the relevant authority), and a second-personal reason for acting (that is, for complying with an authoritative claim or demand and so discharging the responsibility). Each of these notions entails the other three, and no proposition that does not already involve one of these

Moore, Normativity, and Intrinsic Value*

Principia Ethica set the agenda for analytical metaethics. Moore’s unrelenting focus on fundamentals both brought metaethics into view as a potentially separate area of philosophical inquiry and provided a model of the analytical techniques necessary to pursue it. Moore acknowledged that he wasn’t the first to insist on a basic irreducible core of all ethical concepts. Although he seems not to have appreciated the roots of this thought in eighteenth-century intuitionists like Clarke, Balguy, and Price, not to mention sentimentalists like Hutcheson and Hume, Moore gave full marks to Sidgwick. According to Moore, Sidgwick was the “only . . . ethical writer” to have clearly seen the irreducibility of ethics’ defining notion. Nevertheless, twentieth-century meta-

Because I Want It

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Reply to Korsgaard, Wallace, and Watson

To say that I am grateful to Christine Korsgaard, R. Jay Wallace, and Gary Watson for the care they have taken with my work and for their insightful comments and criticisms is understatement. Permit me, though, to pause over this point of professional indebtedness to reflect on its philosophical significance. Gratitude is a Strawsonian reactive attitude, one that is, in my terms, second personal. As Thomas Reid pointed out, the concept of a favor to which gratitude responds involves the idea of an intentional benefit that goes beyond anything one is owed in justice or, as I would put it, beyond anything one has any authority to claim or demand. As a result, I am now in my critics’ debt, which, as I analyze it, gives them an authority to make claims and demands of me and makes me answerable to them. Actually, I am twice answerable. By being so bold as to put ideas before the philosophical community and the “learned world” at all, one incurs an obligation to defend them in the public space. But when colleagues take the time and trouble to get inside and appreciate one’s ideas as my commentators have, especially when one has been party to an invitation to them to do so, one becomes more specifically answerable to them. In what follows, I attempt, however feebly, to begin to discharge these obligations.

Honor, history, and relationship : essays in second-personal ethics II

Acknowledgments Introduction I. HONOR, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1. Respect as Honor and as Accountability 2. Smiths Ambivalence About Honor 3. Justice and Retaliation 4. Ressentiment and Second-Personal Resentment II. RELATING TO OTHERS 5. Responsibility Within Relations 6. Being With 7. Demystifying Promises III. HISTORY 8. Grotius at the Creation of Modern Moral Philosophy 9. Pufendorf on Morality, Sociability, and Moral Powers 10. Fichte and the Second-Person Standpoint 11. Kant on Respect, Dignity, and the Duty of Respect Works Cited Index

Justice and Retaliation

Abstract Punishment and Reparations are sometimes held to express retaliatory emotions whose object is to strike back against a victimizer. I begin by examining a version of this idea in Mills writings about natural resentment and the sense of justice in Chapter V of Utilitarianism. Mills view is that the ‘natural’ sentiment of resentment or ‘vengeance’ that is at the heart of the concept of justice is essentially retaliatory, therefore has ‘nothing moral in it,’ and so must be disciplined or moralized from without by the desire to promote the general welfare. I argue to the contrary that if ‘reactive attitudes’ like resentment and moral blame are understood as Strawson analyzed them, as essentially ‘interpersonal’ or ‘second personal’, they have a different content and function. They implicitly demand respect in a way that also expresses respect for the victimizer as a member of mutually accountable community of moral equals. Some implications of this idea are discussed for the ‘expressive theory of punishment’ and ‘civil recourse’ theories of torts.

Authority, Accountability, and Preemption

In The Second-Person Standpoint,1 I argue that practical authority of the sort that can legitimate claims, demands, and directives and create a duty to comply must be understood within a network of mutually entailing, irreducibly ‘second-personal’ concepts: those of legitimate claim or demand, responsibility to (an authority) for compliance, and a distinctive kind of reason for complying that I call ‘second-personal’ because it is conceptually related to legitimate claims and demands that are addressable to those who thereby have the reason. In two recent essays,2 I consider a challenge to my claim that might be posed from the perspective of Joseph Raz’s influential normal justification thesis (NJT), according to which claims to practical authority can be established by showing that an ‘alleged subject’ is likely to comply better with reasons that apply to him independently already if he accepts an alleged authority’s directives as binding and follows them for this reason than he would if he were to act on his own assessment of independent reasons.3 In the first of these essays,4 I argue that because practical authority entails accountability to the authority for compliance, it cannot be established in the way the NJT supposes, since the fact that we would do better in complying with reasons if we treated someone’s directives as authoritative cannot make us accountable to that person for compliance. In the second,5 I put aside the question of whether accountability is intrinsic to practical authority and argue that the NJT also fails as a standard for establishing the kind of ‘pre-emptive’ and ‘exclusionary’ reasons that Raz has (2011) 2(1) Jurisprudence 103–119