Stephen E. Henderson

The Cambridge Handbook of Surveillance Law

The two European Courts (the European Court of Human Rights, ECtHR and, to a lesser degree, the European Union Court of Justice, EUCJ) have contributed greatly to the development of a legal framework for surveillance by either law enforcement agencies in the criminal law area or by secret services. Both courts put great emphasis on a system of control ex ante and post hoc by independent supervisory authorities. A complex and controversial issue remains whether the human rights to privacy, respect of communications, and to an effective remedy (enshrined in Article 8 and 13 of European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)), requires judicial review as a necessary safeguard for secret surveillance or alternatively, at which conditions, parallel systems of non-judicial review can be accepted as adequate safeguards against illegitimate interference in citizens’ private life. The European Courts have not yet established a clear doctrine in determining suitable thresholds and parameters. In particular, the ECtHR has a flexible approach in interpreting article 8 and 13 ECHR, depending on several factors (“vital” interests at stake, political considerations, etc.). In general terms, the Court has shown a preference towards judiciary oversight, but in the European legal order there are several examples of alternative oversight systems assessed positively by the Court, such as the quasi-judiciary systems (where the independency of the supervisory body, its wide jurisdiction, its power to data access and its power to effective reactions are proved) or the system of oversight set by Data Protection Authorities in the EU member states. However, in recent judgements of the ECtHR and the EUCJ we see an increasing emphasis on declaring the necessity of a “good enough” judicial (ex ante or post hoc) control over surveillance, meaning not simply a judicial control, but a system of oversight (judicial, quasi-judicial, hybrid) which can provide an effective control over surveillance, supported by empirical checks in the national legal system at issue.

Search, Seizure, and Immunity: Second-Order Normative Authority and Rights

Abstract A paradigmatic aspect of a paradigmatic kind of right is that the rights holder is the only one who can alienate it. When individuals waive rights, the normative source of that waiving is normally taken to be the individual herself. This moral feature—immunity—is usually in the background of discussions about rights. We bring it into the foreground here, with specific attention to a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Kentucky v. King (2011), concerning search and seizure rights. An entailment of the Courts decision is that, at least in some cases, a right can be removed by the intentional actions of the very party against whom the right supposedly protects the rights holder. We argue that the Courts decision is mistaken. The police officers in the case were not morally permitted, and should not be legally permitted, to intentionally create the very circumstances that result in the removal of an individuals right against forced, warrantless search and seizure.