Stephen F. Walker

A brief history of connectionism and its psychological implications

Critics of the computational connectionism of the last decade suggest that it shares undesirable features with earlier empiricist or associationist approaches, and with behaviourist theories of learning. To assess the accuracy of this charge the works of earlier writers are examined for the presence of such features, and brief accounts of those found are given for Herbert Spencer, William James and the learning theorists Thorndike, Pavlov and Hull. The idea that cognition depends on associative connections among large networks of neurons is indeed one with precedents, although the implications of this for psychological issues have been interpreted variously — not all versions of connectionism are alike.

Is human language just another neurobiological specialization

One can disagree with Muller that it is neurobiologically questionable to suppose that human language is innate, specialized, and species-specific, yet agree that the precise brain mechanisms controlling language in any individual will be influenced by epigenesis and genetic variability, and that the interplay between inherited and acquired aspects of linguistic capacity deserves to be investigated.

How general is a general theory of reinforcement

Both the title of the target article and its contents invite comparison with the mathematically formulated principles put forward by Hull (1943, 1952) which were intended to apply to all behaviour but which were stated precisely enough for their lack of generality to be eventually demonstrated. The first paragraph refers to the “wideranging implications” of the principles presented, and section 5 is headed “A General Theory of Reinforcement.” There is a proviso in section 9.3.1 that the present paper “addresses only distance along the dimension of homogeneous operant responses”, but it is implied that this is an example which will be capable of extension. One of the strengths of the theory presented is that it contains parameters which are good candidates for explanations of differences between responses categories and between species. I shall therefore comment first on questions of the relevance of the theory to data outside its base of homogeneous operant responding, and second on whether the theory is sufficiently powerful even within this base.

Brain circuits ancient and modern

I support the application of the “evolution as tinkering” idea to vocalization and emphasize that some of the subcortical parts of the brain circuits used for speech organs retain features common to nonprimate mammals, and in some cases to lower vertebrates, pointing up the importance of cortical evolution as suggested by MacNeilage.

Bartering old stone tools: When did communicative ability and conceptual structure begin to interact?

Wilkins & Wakefield are clearly right to separate linguistic capacity from communicative ability, if only because other animal species have one without the other. But I question the abruptness of the demarcation they make between a period when hominids evolved enriched conceptual representation for other reasons entirely, and a subsequent later stage when language use became an adaptation.

Neurobiology of comparative cognition: R.P. Kesner and D.S. Olton (eds.) (Hillsdale, NJ and London, 1990) pp. xii + 476, £19.96 (paper) £25.00 (hardback).

In terms of the chapters themselves, these are best described as variable. Some spend considerable time taking the reader through very elementary psychology before focusing on sport (e.g. Chapters 4 and 5); others move quickly from overviews to comprehensive and up-to-date presentations of the sport psychology literature (e.g. Chapter 2 and 6). For psychologists working in each of these areas, this material may be interesting but the theoretical frameworks are not likely to provide inspiration. The introductory chapter dwells largely on the place occupied by the sport psychologists within sport, but spends less time dealing with the nature of sport psychology as a discipline. The actual practice of sport psychology is left for Chapter 7, which is perhaps unfortunate as this material would have usefully placed much of the cited research in context for those without a background in sport psychology. Few of the chapters hold genuine surprises, although each can be used to overview current trends, issues and priorities in that particular area, warts and all. Whether the book succeeds in accurately representing the current state of sport psychology is debatable. Certainly, there are large areas within the discipline (e.g. gender, group processes) which are either completely ignored or only mentioned in passing. The different emphases of both books make direct comparison difficult. As a stark example, stress only warrants a handful of mentions in Sport Psychology: Concepts and Applications. What is encouraging in both books is that in some (but certainly not all) instances, the theories which are being introduced and discussed are those which also inform contemporary debate within psychology as a whole. These signs of a closer interaction between sport psychology and psychology have been a long time coming, and are surely to be welcomed by us all, and these books certainly represent part of this continuing process of integration.