Stephen Galoob

Intentions, compliance, and fiduciary obligations

This essay investigates the structure of fiduciary obligations, specifically the obligation of loyalty. Fiduciary obligations differ from promissory obligations with respect to the possibility of “accidental compliance.” Promissory obligations can be satisfied through behavior that conforms to a promise, even if that behavior is done for inappropriate reasons. By contrast, fiduciary loyalty necessarily has an intentional dimension, one that prevents satisfaction through accidental compliance. The intentional dimension of fiduciary loyalty is best described by what we call the “shaping” account. This account both explains the conscientiousness that loyalty demands and improves on other accounts of the intentional dimension of loyalty. Our analysis challenges two of the most prominent ways of conceptualizing fiduciary obligations. “Contractarianism” configures fiduciary obligations as a species of contractual duties. The view that we call “proscriptivism” reduces fiduciary obligations to the juridical prohibitions that apply to fiduciaries. Neither of these approaches is satisfactory, because each neglects the intentional dimension of fiduciary loyalty.

The core of fiduciary political theory

“Fiduciary political theory” applies norms developed within fiduciary law to public officials and political institutions. Fiduciary political theorists contend that these fiduciary norms describe or, at least, offer insights into the political authority of states and other major questions of political morality. However, many fiduciary political theorists disagree about methodology—specifically, how directly to apply fiduciary norms to the realm of politics. This chapter has two goals. The first goal is to describe the core of fiduciary political theory by identifying features of fiduciary norms (some more familiar than others) that apply in both private law and political contexts. Part I sketches these features, illustrating them by reference to several recent cases in the United States. The second goal is to show that these core features of fiduciary norms can transcend methodological disagreements among fiduciary political theorists. In Part II, we briefly describe these disagreements, contending that they threaten to distract attention from the substantial common ground among different fiduciary political theories. Our analysis, if correct, provides a framework for analyzing the actions of political officials and the structure of political institutions, regardless of how literally one thinks that fiduciary norms do (or should) apply to the political realm. Bracketing these methodological disagreements provides firmer ground for developing the most distinctive and powerful aspects of fiduciary political theory as an intellectual enterprise.

Coercion, Fraud, and What is Wrong With Blackmail

Several theorists argue that blackmail is morally wrong because the blackmail proposal is coercive. These coercion-based views are promising but incomplete. A full explanation of blackmails immorality must address both the blackmail proposal and the blackmail agreement. I defend what I call the complex account , on which blackmail is morally wrong because blackmail proposals are coercive and blackmail agreements are fraudulent. The complex account avoids difficulties that beset other coercion-based views and provides a stronger case for why blackmail should be criminalized.

The ethical identity of law students

ABSTRACT This paper uses measures of values, moral outlook and professional identity to explore the ethical and professional identity of law students. We do so in two jurisdictions, surveying 441 students studying in England and Wales and 569 students studying in the US. The survey covers the first and final years of an undergraduate law degree and the postgraduate vocational stage in England and Wales, as well as students in all years of the JD programme in the US. We explore whether law students towards the end of their legal education have ethical identities predictive of less ethical conduct than those at the beginning of their legal education; whether law students intending careers in business law have values and profiles consistent with less ethical conduct than those intending to work for government or individuals; and what factors might explain these differences in ethical outlook. Our findings suggest that ethical identity is strongly associated with gender and career intentions. They also suggest weaker moral identities for students intending to practise business law. Ultimately, our findings support a conclusion that is more nuanced than the predominant theses about the impact of legal education on student ethicality which tend to suggest legal education diminishes ethicality.

How Do Roles Generate Reasons? A Method of Legal Ethics

Philosophical discussions of legal ethics should be oriented around the generative problem, which asks two fundamental questions. First, how does the lawyer’s role generate reasons? Second, what kinds of reasons can this role generate?Every extant theory of legal ethics is based on a solution to the generative problem. On the generative method, theories of legal ethics are evaluated based on the plausibility of these solutions. I apply this method to three prominent theories of legal ethics, finding that none is based on a fully satisfactory solution to the generative problem.This method has important implication for the study of legal ethics. Philosophically, it moves theoretical debates about legal ethics closer to other debates about the sources of normativity, like those concerning promises. Further, this method identifies a real-world dimension to these theoretical debates. Focusing on the generative problem allows for the empirical verification of hypotheses about legal ethics that have, to date, largely been conjectured.(This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the paper, which will be published in volume 15 of Legal Ethics)