Stephen J. Cimbala

Sun Tzu and Salami Tactics? Vladimir Putin and Military Persuasion in Ukraine, 21 February–18 March 2014

Vladimir Putin used a composite of ancient and modern methods of military persuasion in first destabilizing, and then annexing, Crimea in February and March of 2014. Putin’s use of military persuasion through Russian and proxy forces enabled him to annex Crimea and to set the stage for further imposition of Russia’s will on Ukraine’s eastern provinces. Russia’s determination to resist excessive Westernization by Ukraine, especially the possibility of Ukrainian membership in NATO, exceeded the willingness of the U.S. and its allies to reverse Putin’s gains in Crimea.

New START or Not? U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Reductions in Perspective

The New START agreement signed by U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in April 2010 could be the basis for further nuclear arms reductions as well as U.S.-Russian cooperation and leadership on nuclear nonproliferation. Obamas ambitious agenda of nuclear limitation includes possible reductions in NATO and Russian substrategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, a revised U.S. missile defense plan for Europe, and forward progress on Prompt Global Strike conventional weapons—as well as nonproliferation initiatives within a subtext of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, post–New START progress on arms control and disarmament is not guaranteed, given the complexities of the political and military issues and the uncertainties of U.S. and Russian domestic politics.

A New Cold War? Missile Defenses, Nuclear Arms Reductions, and Cyber War

This study inquires whether the United States and Russia might be headed toward a new Cold War, at least with respect to certain aspects of their diplomatic-strategic behavior. Those aspects have to do with missile defenses, nuclear arms control, and conflict in cyberspace. Arguments pertinent to these three domains or issues are not necessarily transferable, as interpretations of trends in U.S.-Russian relations, to other aspects of their diplomacy and national security affairs. For example, one cannot necessarily infer the outcome of Russian-American relations over Syria, Ukraine, or Afghanistan based on prevailing tendencies in nuclear arms control or cyber war. Nevertheless, the examination of missile defenses, nuclear arms control, and cyber conflict may yield important insights about near- and longer term prospects, because: (1) each of these issues has been identified by both states as a matter of vital national security interest; (2), each issue offers a challenging mix of technical judgments and policy prescriptions; and (3) U.S.-Russian cooperation is a necessary condition for amelioration of the security risks in each of these issue domains, as well as in their possible areas of overlap.

Cyber War and Deterrence Stability: Post-START Nuclear Arms Control

Nuclear deterrence and cyber war are often discussed as separate worlds of research and military-strategic practice. To the contrary, a certain degree of overlap between nuclear deterrence and cyber conflicts is a plausible expectation for several reasons. First, future deterrent challenges will include regional nuclear arms races accompanied by competition in information technology and other aspects of advanced conventional command-control and precision strike systems. Second, cyber-attacks may be used against opposed nuclear command-control systems and weapons platforms as well as against infrastructure for the purpose of mass disruption during a crisis or war. Third, cyber capabilities support escalation dominance or escalation control, depending on the objectives of states and on the transparency of identification for cyber friends and foes.

Anticipatory Attacks: Nuclear Crisis Stability in Future Asia

Anticipatory attack includes both preemptive and preventive attacks. Anticipatory attacks cannot be excluded as options for policymakers and military planners. On the other hand, preemption and preventive options must be used with care. Even when they are employed with favorable military results, anticipatory attacks can have undesirable political side effects. Nuclear anticipatory attacks raise issues in addition to conventional ones. Deterrence based on preemptive threat of nuclear attack is less fault-tolerant than deterrence based on the threat of conventional preemption.

The US NATO and military burden sharing: post-Cold War accomplishments and future prospects

ABSTRACT NATO burden sharing has become an especially timely issue in the past several years as a result of a number of factors, including Russian annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine in 2014. This article argues that alliance unity among the great democracies of Europe and North America is indispensable to peace and stability on the Eurasian continent. A fractured NATO, and especially, a large divide in purposes or commitments as between the United States and its European security partners, invites aggression and the possibility of inadvertent escalation. Past successes and failures in US-involved multinational peace and stability operations, within and outside of Europe, show that mission accomplishment requires give and take, including the occasional acceptance of unequal costs and benefits among the members, in order to achieve peace and security objectives.

Putin and the Nuclear Dimension to Russian Strategy

ABSTRACT Nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy have found themselves as parts of the discussions among expert and other commentators about the future of Russian President Vladimir Putin and about Russia’s military-strategic options in Europe following its annexation of Crimea and destabilization of Eastern Ukraine. This study considers some of the nuclear-related aspects of Putin’s and Russia’s survivability with respect to: (1) principal challenges for NATO in the face of improving Russian military capabilities and plausible strategies, (2) the future relationship between Russia’s conventional military and nuclear capabilities and military-strategic priorities, and (3) assessment of Russia’s threat perceptions in the context of its ‘strategic history’.

Nuclear cyberwar and crisis management

ABSTRACT The political and military dexterity required for nuclear crisis management during the Cold War was sufficiently stressful for policymakers and military advisors. Even more uncertain is the information environment of the twenty-first century and the “second nuclear age” with respect to its implications for the use of nuclear forces in coercive bargaining. Nuclear crisis management requires a degree of transparency about ongoing military operations and political maneuvers and, in addition, a certain amount of mutually shared trust in the negotiating process itself. Cyberwar undertaken by disputants before or during a nuclear crisis could introduce additional uncertainty and doubt into the reciprocal process of bargaining for an agreed settlement short of war.

Revisiting the Nuclear ‘War Scare’ of 1983: Lessons Retro- and Prospectively

Between 1979 and 1983, relations between the United States and NATO and the Soviet Union deteriorated gradually due to disagreements and controversies growing out of Cold War rivalry. Some Soviet leaders apparently convinced themselves that there was a nontrivial likelihood of a US or NATO nuclear first use or first strike in the near future, and Soviet intelligence agencies were tasked to anticipate it. A NATO exercise in the autumn of 1983 taking place in this hothouse atmosphere possibly lent itself to misperceptions of American and NATO intentions on account of its realism and some Soviet mind sets. The following discussion revisits the 1983 ‘war scare’ episode by: (1) reviewing high water marks in the political context leading up to the 1983 ‘war scare’ situation; (2) considering quantitative evidence on US and Soviet strategic nuclear force structures and possible operational performances; and (3) deriving from this analysis certain conclusions about the ‘war scare’ of 1983 and its wider significance.

Missile Defense Malpractice: U.S.-Russian Relations and Nuclear Fallacy

U.S.-Russian political relations took a turn for the worse in 2011–2012, especially in the latter year, a presidential election year in both the United States and Russia. Among the issues in contention as between Washington and Moscow was the American and NATO plan for phased deployment of missile defenses in Europe. Some prominent Russian officials and military experts regarded the proposed European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) plan for European missile defenses as a prospective threat to Russias strategic nuclear deterrent. Russias objections to NATOs missiles defenses are as much political as they are military-technical, and the 2012 return of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency renders uncertain the future of the U.S.-Russian ‘reset’ launched during the early years of the Obama administration.