Stephen J. K. Walters

Market size, pay, and performance - a general model and application to major league baseball.

The authors construct a general model of fan behavior and team revenues to study compensation and competitive balance issues in professional sports. Baseball data from 1995 to 1999 support the models prediction that market size and expected team performance interact to positively and significantly affect the marginal value of extra wins. Ceteris paribus, baseball teams in the largest markets will value a given player six times more than those in the smallest. Within each market, achieving contending status can raise a players value sixfold. Based on these findings, simple revenue sharing should depress player salaries but may not enhance competitive balance.

Academic research productivity, department size and organization: Further results

Abstract Data published by the Conference Board of Research Councils are employed to extend our previous work concerning the research productivity of academic economists to a wide range of academic disciplines. While there are substantial differences in publication rates across fields, joint tests that incorporate data from all 23 academic disciplines in the sample support conclusions that publishing activity is higher in private institutions and increases with department size at a diminishing rate.

Effects of Department Size and Organization on the Research Productivity of Academic Economists.

Abstract Data gathered from four earlier surveys ranking economics departments by their output of published research are used to assess whether department size or organization as public or private are significantly related to average research productivity. We find that private institutions are associated with greater average productivity, a conclusion that holds across all time periods, department and journal samples, and productivity measures utilized. There is also some support in the data for the idea that research productivity is positively affected by department size, but that this effect diminishes as size increases.

Unions and productivity: Evidence from academe

In order to test competing hypotheses about the effect of unions on labor productivity, we examine research performance in a sample of 889 Ph.D.-granting departments (175 unionized) in public universities. We find no support for the hypothesis that unions enhance productivity in academe. If we compare union and nonunion departments endowed with (sample) mean amounts of labor and capital, we find that unionization is associated with a 17 percent reduction in output of published articles and a 9 percent reduction in peers’ survey evaluations of a department’s level of scholarly achievement.

Academic research productivity: Reply, still further results

Abstract In this reply to Golden and Carstensen [1992, Econ. Educ. Rev. 11(2), 153–160], we extend our earlier research on faculty research productivity by (a) employing a superior proxy measure of longterm research performance and (b) considering two additional inputs in the production of research. We find that research performance is enhanced by department size (at a diminishing rate), private organization, grant support, a larger pool of graduate students and a quality research library.

Uncertain Prospects: Rates of Return in the Baseball Draft

This study uses a unique data set and valuation method to quantify returns to teams in baseball’s high-stakes, high-risk amateur draft. Thanks to teams’ monopsony power over draftees and low-seniority players, payoffs on successful picks far outweigh losses on unsuccessful ones: the expected annual yield on the median first-round draftee is 44%. However, the pattern of returns is inconsistent with market efficiency. Expected yields are lower for high school draftees than collegians (36% vs. 57%), lower for pitchers than position players (34% vs. 52%), and decline for later-round long shots.

Book Review: Playbooks and Checkbooks: An Introduction to the Economics of Modern Sports, edited by Stefan Szymanski, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009. 225 pp.

least, an attempt to reveal the faults of academic capitalism. Despite his call for significant change in the NCAA’s governance of college athletics, Sack’s arguments consistently remind the reader that he ultimately serves as an advocate for college athletics and its athletes. Although Sack casts a wide net to garner support for his position, his argument fails to address several important opposing viewpoints. The first is the cost of implementing a system that defines and treats college athletes as university employees. Should universities extend full benefits to all their athletes? Only a fraction of an institution’s college athletes actually contribute to the revenue that supports college athletic programs and most of those programs operate in a deficit. In addition, Sack suggests that college athletes be provided the opportunity to endorse products and engage in revenue sharing but does not explain how this type of free agency fits into college athletics. Sack’s arguments speak to a small portion of college athletes, primarily elite football and basketball players in nationally ranked programs. Although this issue clearly warrants discussion, it is important to discuss and understand the impact of the athletes’ right model on nonrevenue sports and its relationship to Title IX. Providing a cost analysis of the revenue-sharing model and detailing the implementation and impact of the athletes’ rights model could significantly improve his argument. Counterfeit Amateurs provides a unique perspective to the changing culture of American college athletics. The book highlights changes in college sports and addresses issues that threaten the welfare of college athletes. This book is an interesting read that could be enhanced by further exploring the impact of implementing Sack’s athletes’ rights model.