Stephen J. Silvia

Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgeberverbände

Fur die deutschen Gewerkschaften sind die Arbeitgeberverbande die wichtigsten Adressaten, um die Entlohnungs- und Arbeitsbedingungen in den Betrieben mitgestalten zu konnen. Denn im Gegensatz zu Landern, in denen die primare Lohnfindung auf der betrieblichen Ebene erfolgt, dominiert in den wirtschaftlich bedeutendsten Sektoren in Deutschland, trotz teilweise starker Ruckgange, noch immer der durch Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgeberverbande ausgehandelte Branchen- oder Multibranchentarifvertrag. Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgeberverbande sind jedoch unter den Bedingungen des koordinierten deutschen Kapitalismus, in dem sie eine Art „Konfliktpartnerschaft“ (Muller-Jentsch) praktizieren, nicht nur durch den sogenannten Flachentarifvertrag verbunden. Daruber hinaus gibt es weitere Kooperationsbezuge wie die gemeinsam verantwortete Struktur des dualen Berufsbildungssystems und ihre institutionalisierte Mitarbeit in den Sozialversicherungen. Das Verhaltnis zwischen Gewerkschaften und Arbeitgeberverbanden kann gewissermasen als System kommunizierender Rohren im Ordnungskontext der sozialen Marktwirtschaft gedeutet werden.

The Social Charter of the European Community: A Defeat for European Labor

This study examines the failure of the effort by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and its national affiliates to obtain a uniform and binding set of regulations for Europeanwide collective bargaining within the European Communitys 1989 Charter of Fundamental Social Rights. The trade unions were prompted to act by the program to create a single European market by the end of 1992. The author argues that labors weak position economically and politically in the late 1980s and early 1990s, particularly at the national level, prevented the ETUC and its member confederations from winning support for their version of the Social Charter, since they could neither credibly threaten recalcitrant governments with social unrest nor convincingly offer them electoral aid.

Is the Euro Working? The Euro and European Labour Markets

Now that four years have passed since the introduction of the euro as a commercial currency, it has become possible to assess many arguments made in the abstract during the 1990s about the implications of monetary union. This contribution does precisely that. In brief, the euro zone still falls short as an optimal currency area in most respects. In particular, an empirical analysis of labor-market developments shows no progress toward flexibility or integration. The findings undercut assertions that the euro will force a liberalization of labor markets, so that they can serve as the principal vector of adjustment in the new currency area. Instead, a “rigidity trap” has developed in the euro area—which consists of relatively tight monetary policy, forced fiscal consolidation, and the virtual elimination of the gap between the real and the nominal wage—making structural adjustment in labor markets more difficult.

The Alliance for Jobs: Social Democracy’s Post-Keynesian/Process-Oriented Employment Creation Strategy

A Texas wag once remarked, “Oilmen are like cats. You can’t tell from the sound of them whether they’re fighting or making love.” German industrial relations are not much different. In the heat of collective bargaining, the Federal Republic’s “social partners” (that is, trade unions and employers’ associations) frequently exchange vitriolic barbs in public, while simultaneously engaging in pragmatic, professional negotiations behind closed doors. Similarly, public declarations of labor-management harmony— which are typically the product of government initiatives—all too often only briefly paper over intractable differences between trade unions and employers’ associations. Tripartite talks have only rarely changed the face of the German economy. If successful, however, the Bundnis fur Arbeit (Alliance for Jobs) talks launched by the new Social Democratic Party (SPD)—Alliance ‘90/Greens coalition government in December 1998 would. They therefore warrant close analysis. The single most important issue of the 1998 German national election was unemployment. Success in reducing joblessness will also largely determine the odds that the new “red-green” coalition will win reelection in 2002. During the 1998 electoral campaign, the SPD’s chancellor candidate Gerhard Schroder asserted that, if elected, he would form an Alliance for Jobs to attack unemployment. This forum would consist of a small circle of top representatives from organized labor, management, and the federal government. It would meet regularly to formulate initiatives to reduce unemployment. Once elected, Gerhard Schroder immediately asked his labor minister, Walter Riester (former vice-president

An ounce of prevention? The reform of the German trade union Federation

This article investigates the causes and content of the ongoing reform of the German Trade Union Federation (DGB). We argue that problems predating German unification ‐ in particular, a skewed demographic profile, financial crisis and waning political clout ‐ are the central factors that led German unionists to undertake reform and have largely determined the reforms content. German unification acted simply as a catalyst rather than the cause prompting union reform. German unions can only retain their prominent economic and social position if they promote genuine democratic reform within their ranks. Otherwise unions will never attract employees from the high technology and service sectors that are essential to the union movements survival in the coming century. German unions should also resist the temptation to take on all of the problems plaguing German society. They must instead concentrate on the essential tasks of all labour movements: discerning the ever‐changing wants of todays increasingly hete...

The Fall and Rise of Unemployment in Germany: Is the Red-Green Government Responsible?

This article investigates the causes of recent German labour market developments. Contrary to the claims of the German chancellor, the analysis shows that the principal factors responsible for the decline in joblessness between 1998 and 2000 were not government policies, but favourable demographic developments and a strong demand for exports. Many initial government actions actually made reducing unemployment more difficult. Later measures, however - in particular, the 2000 tax reform - should have a positive impact on the labour market in coming years, but they cannot have produced past improvements because they were enacted after unemployment had declined. Similarly, the recent softening in the labour market is not the result of government policy. The Schröder government will only permanently lower structural unemployment if it enacts reforms that reduce the relative cost of labour.

Left behind: The social democratic party in Eastern Germany

Four long‐term structural complications have prevented the Social Democratic Party of Germany from establishing a large party membership in eastern Germany since unification: the injurious legacy of Nazi and communist rule, the contradictions that arose in the 1980s out of the SPDs Ostpolitik, the flawed birth and development of the eastern SPD, and continuing tensions between the eastern and western wings of the party. Since none of these structural problems is likely to change quickly, the SPD will remain impaired in the East for the foreseeable future. This in turn will make it extremely difficult for the SPD to win federal elections.

The United Auto Workers’ Attempts to Unionize Volkswagen Chattanooga:

The author examines attempts by the United Auto Workers (UAW) to unionize the Volkswagen (VW) plant in Chattanooga, Tennessee. These efforts were a pivotal test of labor’s ability to organize in the South. The UAW failed to organize the entire plant, despite an amenable employer, because of heavy intervention by external actors, the union’s failure to develop community support, and a paragraph in the pre-election agreement that promised wage restraint. VW management’s fear of losing state subsidies and their desire to not alienate the local business and political establishment took the card-check procedure for recognition off the table. VW management’s adoption of an accommodating position toward unionization for the entire plant, but resistance to it for the small skilled-mechanics unit, suggests that the company was willing to accept unionization only as a means to the end of creating a works council rather than out of a commitment to collective bargaining as a practice.