Stephen Leeds
University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee
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Featured researches published by Stephen Leeds.
Philosophy of Science | 1999
Stephen Leeds
I defend the interpretation of the Aharonov-Bohm effect originally advanced by Aharonov and Bohm, i.e., that it is caused by an interaction between the electron and the vector potential. The defense depends on taking the fiber bundle formulation of electrodynamics literally, or almost literally.
Philosophy of Science | 2003
Stephen Leeds
This paper is a discussion of David Albert’s approach to the foundations of classical statistical menchanics. I point out a respect in which his account makes a stronger claim about the statistical mechanical probabilities than is usually made, and I suggest what might be motivation for this. I outline a less radical approach, which I attribute to Boltzmann, and I give some reasons for thinking that this approach is all we need, and also the most we are likely to get. The issue between the two accounts turns out to be one about the explanatory role probabilities play in statistical mechanics.
Philosophy of Science | 2006
Stephen Leeds
David Malament has recently responded to David Albert’s argument that classical electrodynamics is not time‐reversal invariant by introducing a novel conception of time reversal, which supports the conventional view that under time reversal the magnetic field changes sign but the electric field remains unchanged. I will argue here that Malament’s transformation has both passive and active versions. I will claim that the passive version is not relevant to Albert’s argument, and the active version does not lead to the conventional transformation.
Entropy | 2012
Stephen Leeds
I defend the idea (“Interventionism”) that the fact that no system is entirely isolated can be used to explain the successful use of the microcanonical distribution in statistical mechanics. The argument turns on claims about what is needed for an adequate explanation of this fact: I argue in particular that various competing explanations do not meet reasonable conditions of adequacy, and that the most striking lacuna in Interventionism – its failure to explain the ‘arrow of time’ – is no real defect.
Philosophy of Science | 1989
Stephen Leeds
Philosophy of Science | 1995
Stephen Leeds
Philosophy of Science | 1990
Stephen Leeds
Philosophy of Science | 1981
Stephen Leeds
Australasian Journal of Philosophy | 2008
Stephen Leeds
Noûs | 2007
Stephen Leeds