Stephen Macedo

Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism

International organizations are widely believed to undermine domestic democracy. Our analysis challenges this conventional wisdom, arguing that multilateral institutions can enhance the quality of national democratic processes, even in well-functioning democracies, in a number of important ways: by restricting the power of special interest factions, protecting individual rights, and improving the quality of democratic deliberation, while also increasing capacities to achieve important public purposes. The article discusses conflicts and complementarities between multilateralism and democracy, outlines a working conception of constitutional democracy, elaborates theoretically the ways in which multilateral institutions can enhance constitutional democracy, and discusses the empirical conditions under which multilateralism is most likely to have net democratic benefits, using contemporary examples to illustrate the analysis. The overall aim is to articulate a set of critical democratic standards appropriate for evaluating and helping to guide the reform of international institutions.

The Federal Marriage Amendment and the Strange Evolution of the Conservative Case against Gay Marriage

The idea for a Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA) did not suddenly dawn upon Senate Republicans in the summer of 2004, when debate on the amendment began in earnest on the floor of the U.S. Senate. Despite the passage of the federal Defense of Marriage Act in 1996, conservatives have long worried about what they believe are the threats to traditional heterosexual marriage posed by the courts. Their fears peaked in 2003, when the courts struck twice: the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Lawrence v. Texas that state homosexual sodomy laws are unconstitutional, while the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health ordered state officials to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.

Reassessing the sixties : debating the political and cultural legacy

Basic conflicts came to the fore in that decade and continue to define our politics: more egalitarian race and gender relations; a new openness with respect to sexuality; greater concern for the environment; higher rates of divorce, drug abuse, and crime; and a greater willingness to challenge authorities of all sorts. For some, American finally took seriously its founding commitments to freedom and equality in the 1960s. For others, the cultural changes wrought by that decade are destroying the moral infrastructure on which a healthy liberal democracy depends. All agree that America was irrevocably changed as a result of this tumultuous period. This collections brings together original essays by Americas leading political thinkers on such topics as gender roles, sexuality, the family, education, and race. They take stock of the deep changes brought about by the 1960s and assess the impact of these changes on the health of America. The juxtaposition of these commentaries spanning the ideological spectrum makes for highly provocative and engaging reading.

Rational Reasonableness: Toward a Positive Theory of Public Reason

Abstract Why is it important for people to agree on and articulate shared reasons for just laws, rather than whatever reasons they personally find compelling? What, if any, practical role does public reason play in liberal democratic politics? We argue that the practical role of public reason can be better appreciated by examining the confluence of normative and positive political theory; the former represented here by liberal social contract theory of John Rawls and others, and the latter by rational choice or game theory. Citizens in a diverse society face a practical as well as a moral problem. How can they have confidence that others will reciprocate their commitment to supporting governing principles that depart from their own ideal conceptions of truth and value in order to be reasonable to all? Citizens face a practical problem of mutual assurance that public reason helps them solve, and solve as a matter of common knowledge. The solution, on both views, requires citizens’ reciprocal commitment to basing law on a system of shared reasons. Both views place public reason at the core of liberal democratic politics in conditions of diversity, and for quite similar reasons. Our argument illustrates the (often) complementary roles of positive and values-based analysis in constitutional design.

Constitutional Democracy and World Politics: A Response to Gartzke and Naoi

According to our constitutional conception, modern democracy is multidimensional: it incorporates the values of faction control, minority rights protection, and informed deliberation, as well as political accountability. The impact of multilateral organizations (MLOs) on democracy is often not straightforward: it requires careful analysis of how particular MLOs interact with preexisting domestic political institutions within specific issue-areas. Thus we reject the conventional wisdom that MLOs are necessarily democracy-degrading simply because they are not directly participatory. Gartzke and Naois critique misstates our views on some fundamental issues. We clarify our analyses of the multidimensional nature of constitutional democracy; the relationship between democracy and multilateralism; the Madisonian distinction between interest groups that support the general interest and those that do not; and our understanding of the current state of research. We suggest possibilities for further elaborating our argument, theoretically and empirically.

Liberal Virtues, Constitutional Community

Liberal constitutionalism embodies an aspiration to public moral justification. The practice of liberal politics, on this view, is bound up with an ongoing effort to justify our political arrangements to one another, an effort that must not be collapsed into the mere affirmation of community standards or conventions. This ideal of public justification lends support to judicial review, an institution that helps make constitutional government a publicly principled enterprise. But it also suggests the value of drawing the “political” branches into the interpretive project: the Supreme Court is not the final interpreter of our Constitutions liberal public morality. The “political” branches of the national government, and citizens themselves play a crucial role in the interpretive process. Viewed in this way, the theory and practice of constitutionalism embody ideals of virtue, citizenship, and community that add up to positive rejoinders to liberalisms communitarian and republican critics.

Introduction Constitutional Boundaries

Our large theme is failure and success in constitution making, or the limits of constitutional democracy. The convergence of recent scholarly work in political science and law and political events throughout the world make this a timely project inside and outside of the academy. The number of new constitutional texts written in support of regime formation in the past thirty years is astonishing. The profusion of ideas and scholarship on constitution making also marks a milestone for social science, which had long neglected the study of laws and constitutions, and for legal studies, which recently added the study of constitutional design to its usual emphasis on constitutional interpretation and analyses of court doctrine. This worldwide effort in political and academic arenas is, however, marked by a kind of ambivalence. On the one hand, there is considerable optimism that constitutional democracy represents a high point, if not a culmination, in the history of political life. The attractiveness of this political idea is so powerful that even countries such as Russia, whose long anticonstitutional pedigree continues to shape politics as it is experienced there, claim to be constitutional democracies. On the other hand, for all the attractiveness of the idea of constitutional democracy, establishing it in practice has proved difficult in many new regimes throughout the world, as the Russian case and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan vividly illustrate. Constitutional democracy is at once an attractive idea and a daunting enterprise. There are limits to the possible establishment, to say nothing of the flourishing, of the idea of constitutional democracy. This book takes up the concern about the limits of constitutional democracy by returning to its most basic questions: What is constitutional democracy? What does it mean for constitutional democracy to succeed or fail? To address issues so fundamental that they are often overlooked or taken for granted means that one can no longer assume the attractiveness of the idea of constitutionalism but must interrogate the meaning, limits, and appeal of the constitutional idea. Our usual way of talking about the limits of constitutional democracy is to discuss the variety of indigenous circumstances—ethnic and tribal traditions, lack of 2 Copyrighted Material INTRODUCTION. TULIS AND MACEDO commitment to a rule of law, religious strife—that hinder its development. For many who adopt this usual approach, constitutional democracy itself is unlimited in its appeal, but circumstances limit its establishment. In this book, we reverse …