Stephen Mark Rosenbaum

Modes of foreign entry for professional service firms in multi-partner projects

Choice of foreign entry modes is especially crucial for professional service firms because extensive knowledge-sharing with partners and clients is necessary. This is particularly pertinent for firms involved in multi-partner projects. The objective of this paper is to review the literature from this specific viewpoint and to develop propositions which may provide possible courses of action for future research. The article argues that high control entry modes will be preferred when the amount of tacit knowledge shared is high, when the service is customized and involves co-production, when external uncertainty is high, when projects are of a more temporary nature, and when partners are unfamiliar and/or large in number.

Design of contracts between knowledge-intensive service firms in comparative property right settings

Purpose – This article aims to explore how knowledge-intensive service firms design inter-firm contracts to govern the exchange of highly intangible and inseparable knowledge under varying degrees of property right protection. Design/methodology/approach – This research uses a multiple case study of management consulting firms domiciled in Serbia and Albania. Findings – Firms domiciled in relatively weak property right settings prefer more informal contracts, whereas those in settings of superior property right protection favour greater formality as a means of encouraging the creation and sharing of knowledge, whilst concurrently mitigating the threat of opportunism. Research limitations/implications – This article contributes new knowledge with regard to the design of inter-firm contracts to govern the sharing of highly intangible and inseparable knowledge. In terms of theory, it employs a transaction cost economics approach in which inter-firm contracts are decomposed into five requisite provisions, whi...

Private virtues, public vices: social norms and corruption

Purpose - – Corruption has traditionally been associated with an absence of pro-social norms such as trust and altruism. This paper challenges this view by examining market corruption – one-shot exchange transactions between strangers in the shadow of the law. The paper aims to propose that in the absence of repeat interactions and legal remedies to prevent contractual violations, acts of market corruption will require strong norms of generalized trust and altruism. As such, pro-social norms facilitate, rather than mitigate, market corruption. Design/methodology/approach - – The paper utilizes meta-analysis to examine the relationship between pro-social behavior in economic experiments and prevailing corruption levels. Findings - – The results from meta-analyses of both trust- and dictator game experiments show positive, significant relationships between pro-social norms and prevailing corruption levels. Research limitations/implications - – The findings of the paper suggest the need for further research into the relationship between societal norms and different types of corruption. Practical implications - – Policymakers should be wary about attempting to combat corruption through bottom-up policies designed to strengthen pro-social norms. Such policies may be counter-productive in that they are likely to provide the breeding ground for more acts of market corruption. Originality/value - – Conventional wisdom suggests a negative association between pro-social norms and corruption levels. The paper proposes that the relationship is not that simple. Indeed, the meta-study findings suggest the reverse relationship in the case of petty (market) corruption.

Safeguarding common-pool resources in transition economies: Experimental evidence from Central Asia

Abstract Empirical evidence suggests that the propensity to cooperate in common pool resource dilemmas is higher for small, homogeneous groups with efficacious monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms. Given that transition from socialist to market economies is associated with larger, more heterogeneous groups with diluted opportunities for monitoring and sanctioning, individuals in later-stage transition economies may be expected to be less cooperative than their early-stage counterparts. However, evidence from experiments conducted with subjects in two economies at different stages of transition suggests that this may not be the case. These findings have implications for both theorists and practitioners alike.

Income inequality and cooperative propensities in developing economies: Summarizing the preliminary experimental evidence

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of income inequality on cooperative propensities, and thus the ability of individuals to resolve collective action dilemmas. Design/methodology/approach The paper presents a meta-study of 32 developing country lab experiments correlating cooperative behaviour with prevailing Gini coefficients. Furthermore, the paper conducts standard dictator- and public goods game (PGG) experiments with culturally and demographically similar subject pools in two West African countries characterized by high and persistent variation in national income inequality. Findings The meta-study findings of a significant negative relationship between income inequality and contribution levels in the PGG are corroborated by the own laboratory experimental findings that participants in more unequal Nigeria are significantly less altruistic and exhibit significantly lower propensities to cooperate than their more egalitarian Ghanaian counterparts. Moreover, the latter findings are robust when controlling for personal income levels. Practical implications The findings have nontrivial implications for collective action theorists and practitioners seeking to elicit tacit cooperation in developing countries. Originality/value The major contributions of this paper are the novel meta-analysis and the first attempt to examine the influence of personal income levels on cooperative behaviour in societies characterized by differential levels of income inequality.