Stephen Pratten

The nature of transaction cost economics

(1997). The Nature of Transaction Cost Economics. Journal of Economic Issues: Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 781-804.

Structure, agency and Marx's analysis of the labour process ∗

From the persepective of the transcendental realist account of science and critical realist elaboration of the relationship between human agency and social structure, this paper examines the methodological approach Marx adopts in his analysis of the labour process. The agency-structure relation as detailed by critical realism is set out and placed in the context of wider debates surrounding the notion of structure. In particular the transcendental realist position, which has emerged in recent controversies in the philosophy of science and which underpins critical realism, is considered. The links between Marxs method and critical realism are then explored as a preliminary to the discussion of his analysis of the labour process. The main contention of the paper is that Marxs analysis of the labour process is in line with critical realism and that it can be viewed as a useful example of what a substantive analysis consisitent with this perspective can look like.

Quasi Markets, Transaction Costs, and Trust The Uncertain Effects of Market Reforms in British Television Production

Broad cast ing in Brit ain has expe ri enced con sid er able insti tu tional and reg u la tory change since the mid-1980s. Many of these reforms have been jus ti fied on the grounds of extend ing mar ket, or mar ket-like, rela tions to the broad cast media. Ref er ences to the devel op ment of an inter nal mar ket within the Brit ish Broad cast ing Cor po ra tion (BBC) have become famil iar. How ever, other sig nif i cant forms of marketization include the require ment that the major ter res trial broad cast ers buy 25 per cent of their pro grams from the inde pend ent pro duc tion sec tor, and the use of an auc tion pro cess to allo cate the ITV tele vi sion fran chises. In addi tion, the 1990 Broad cast ing Act required Chan nel 4 to com pete with the ITV com pa nies in the sell ing of air time and pro vided for the estab lish ment of an inde pend ent cen tral sched uler (the ITV Net work Cen tre), the devel op ment of which has been shaped by the per ceived need to ensure that, in prin ci ple at least, all ITV

The “Closure” Assumption as a First Step: Neo-Ricardian Economics and Post-Keynesianism

Abstract In this paper I accept that just as mainstream economics can be characterized by its insistence upon a deductivist method, so the least contentious, most widely accepted aspects of Post-Keynesianism can be accounted for by its anti-deductivist stance and more specifically by its tacit commitment to something like critical realism. I argue that neo- Ricardian economics, to the extent that it takes closure for granted as a natural and useful starting point for analysis, retains an underlying commitment to deductivism and so is difficult to reconcile with Post- Keynesianism. By providing a criterion for assessing whether neo- Ricardianism belongs within a coherent Post-Keynesianism I also clarify why the nature of this rclationship has for so long remained unresolved. Not until it was recognized that coherence within Post-Keynesianism turns upon methodological issues, and essentially involves the abandon- ment of the deductivist framework, could progress in understanding its relationship with neo-Ri...

The Conflict Between Formalism and Realisticness in Modern Economics: The Case of the New Institutional Economics

The Elgar Companion to Economics and Philosophy aims to demonstrate exactly how these two important areas have always been linked, and to illustrate the key areas of overlap. The contributors are well-known and distinguished authors from a variety of disciplines, who have been invited both to survey and to provide a personal assessment of current and prospective future states of their respective areas of philosophical interest.

Needs and wants: the case of broadcasting policy

In this article I identify two broad perspectives on broadcasting policy, each deploying very different assumptions regarding the role of policy in facilitating human well-being. I argue that in increasingly influential wants-based position draws upon an impoverished social ontology which is unable to sustain the distinction between wants and underlying needs. I also argue that the previously dominant beyond-wants perspective failed to elaborate its own contrasting presuppositions sufficiently. Drawing upon a perspective developed within economics under the heading of critical realism, I emphasize that needs can be formulated as goals only under definite historical conditions. As such, they may be poorly and even misleadingly formulated. Specifically, real needs can be manifest in a variety of historically contingent wants, which may then be met by any of a multitude of potential satisfiers. The point insisted upon here is that the two, real needs and expressed wants, should not be conflated. By maintaining this distinction it is possible to evaluate broadcasting systems not simply in terms of their ability to match outputs to wants but in terms of criteria beyond wants.

Realism, closed systems and abstraction

The particular use made of the terms ‘open and closed systems’ by proponents of critical realism has generated some critical commentary in recent years. In this paper it is shown how debates about open and closed systems provide a perspective from which to address certain fundamental questions in economic methodology. It is argued that the meaning and significance that advocates of critical realism attach to these terms can be clarified by understanding the context within which they were developed. The paper shows how the limitations associated with dominant perspectives both in the philosophy of science and within economics could more effectively be revealed once the terms ‘open and closed systems’ had been elaborated upon. A partial comparison with the work of Nancy Cartwright is developed.

Essentialism and the social

In this paper I show that two senses are often assigned to essences in frameworks that award them a significant ontological status. There is both a defining sense and a more concrete-explanatory sense. Once this distinction is recognized, competing forms of essentialism can be differentiated and their implications more easily explored. As an example of work where the defining and the concrete-explanatory senses of essence are tied closely together I consider the essentialism outlined by Rom Harré as part of his analysis of the practices of natural scientists. As an illustration of a position where the two senses are de-coupled and priority given to the defining sense I examine the essentialism Charles Peirce develops in his mature account of natural classes. I show that arguments concerning the scope of essentialism and its relevance for the study of social phenomena depend heavily on the sense of essence prioritized. The focus on these two senses of essence facilitates a better understanding of the forms of essentialism defended by Harré and Peirce and helps identify the challenges contemporary realists face as they seek to defend an essentialism that applies to the social.

The New Competition in Broadcasting: Trick or Treat?

The broadcasting reforms of the 1990s attempted to combine increased competition with the preservation of the public service ideal. The reforms were called into question when it became clear that the production quality was being undermined by poor information flows and excessive transaction costs. For competition in broadcasting to flourish, closer attention needs to be paid tothe institutional preconditions of effective contracting.

Positioning and the Nature of Social Objects

In opposition to the ontological neglect that characterizes so much economics a group of researchers based in Cambridge in the UK argue that method and substantive theory can benefit if informed by explicit, systematic and sustained social ontology. This paper sets out key elements of the general socio philosophical ontology that this Cambridge group outline and explores how within this approach social reality is understood as being constituted through the emergence and transformation of social totalities. A particular focus is on the importance placed by the Cambridge approach on processes of social positioning and in exploring what this involves. The paper highlights that it is this general socio philosophical ontology that provides the basis for the critique of the dominant methods of modern economics since these presuppose an implicit ontology quite inconsistent with both it and indeed any realistic conception. This implicit ontology is also shown to constrain the way economic objects are characterized within mainstream economics. Finally the paper provides an illustration of how powerful accounts of specific social existents can be developed that are consistent with the broader social ontological conception that the Cambridge group defend by sketching one account of the firm and the modern corporation recently forwarded that draws systematically upon the notion of social positioning.