Steve Gove

Managerial Constraint: The Intersection Between Organizational Task Environment and Discretion

Managerial constraint is a central theme in strategic management research. Although discussed using a variety of labels (including choice and determinism) and theoretical perspectives (including resource dependence and population ecology), the common question is the degree to which executives have choices or options when making decisions. Two of the most commonly used approaches for discussing constraint are organizational task environments (Dess & Beard, 1984) and managerial discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). These two papers share substantial commonalities in both their theoretical background and operationalization, raising the question of whether discretion and task environment are indeed separate constructs. This chapter reviews both conceptual and methodological issues associated with the use of task environment and discretion. Drawing on a review of published studies and original data analysis, we offer methodological suggestions for future research.

Walk the talk : Developing personal ethical agency through a business partnership program

This article proposes a pedagogical approach dedicated to help students develop personal ethical agency—the ability to make decisions that involve ethical dilemmas consistent with an individual’s ethical standards and professional standards of practice. The approach presented involves a tripartite gathering of students, business executives, and faculty in discussions of cases embedded with ethical dilemmas. Sessions highlight ethical issues that closely correspond with core components from courses. The article provides a description of personal ethical agency, the developmental stages of the Walk the Talk program, and assessment of the program and concludes with plans for future program development and expansion.

Methodological rigor of corporate governance studies: A review and recommendations for future studies

Manuscript Type Article/Review Research Question/Issue This study presents the results of a longitudinal content analysis of governance articles published in both CGIR and other leading management outlets. Our aim with this review is to identify problematic areas, as well as opportunities to improve the methodological rigor of governance studies. Research Findings/Insights We examine key design aspects of corporate governance articles. We identify and compare trends (1) over time and (2) across publishing outlets. Specifically examined are the geographic scope of samples, design characteristics (i.e., single- versus multi-year data, the use of archival, survey, experimental, and qualitative designs, data sources, and reliance on concurrent versus longitudinal data), survey response rates and the use of tests for non-response bias, the statistical analysis techniques used, reporting of results (number and proportion of hypotheses supported, non-significant, and counter-significant, use of statistical power analysis, reporting of descriptive statistics and correlations, use and significance of control variables, and endogeneity controls), and the sophistication of the models tests (i.e., mediation and moderation). Theoretical/Academic Implications Based on the results of the review, recommendations for academic researchers are offered in the following areas: (1) designing theoretical tests which both incorporate and go beyond main effects; (2) evaluating a research designs analytical parameters on an a priori basis to maximize reliability, validity, and the potential for publication; (3) incorporating assessment of sensitivity and robustness checks into the analysis; and (4) comprehensive reporting of results including post hoc power analysis, complete and expanded correlation matrix(es), reporting and assessing counter-results, and avoiding HARKing.

Do Executive Departures to Signal the End of a Scandal Create or Reduce Uncertainty? An Examination of Market Reaction in Stock Option Backdating Scandal Events

This study examines events at the conclusion of the 2006 stock option backdating scandal: the departures of C-level executives from firms implicated in backdating. The authors ask whether removing executives brings closure to the scandal, or if executive turnover creates greater uncertainty. Using a sample of 236 executive departures, the authors find that although overall market reaction to executive departures is negative, those departures involving a firm’s CEO or CFO ameliorate the market reaction. The authors also find that market reaction worsens when the CEO “resigns,” versus being terminated, and when the firm involved has been previously identified as socially responsible. Results suggest that firms, by shaping who and how executives depart, may amplify or dampen the damage of existing scandalizing events.