Steve W. J. Lin

Institutional block-holdings of UK firms: do corporate governance mechanisms matter?

Using a sample of UK firms, we find that institutional block-holding is negatively associated with directors’ ownership and is positively associated with board composition, suggesting that institutional block-holders regard directors’ ownership and board composition as substitute and complementary control mechanisms, respectively. We also show that UK institutional block-holders prefer smaller firms and firms with a shorter listing history. The presence of institutional block-holders is associated with smaller boards and lower trading liquidity. Finally, our results indicate that the investment preference of UK institutional block-holders varies with the level of their shareholding.

Corporate Sell-offs in the UK: Use of Proceeds, Financial Distress and Long-Run Impact on Shareholder Wealth

This study examines the long-run return performance following UK corporate sell-off announcements. We observe significant negative abnormal returns up to five years subsequent to sell-off announcements. Our finding is robust to various specifications, irrespective of the intended use of proceeds. We also find a significantly positive association between long-run abnormal returns and the magnitude of cash proceeds for sellers reducing corporate debt as well as for sellers with deeper financial distress or higher growth prospects. Overall, we find that UK corporate sell-offs are associated with declines in subsequent shareholder wealth.

Is Other Comprehensive Income Reported in the Income Statement More Value Relevant? The Role of Financial Statement Presentation

This study examines (a) whether other comprehensive income (OCI) is more value relevant when reported in a more prominent and transparent location in financial statements, (b) how economic condition affects value relevance of OCI reported in different locations, and (c) whether value relevance of OCI is affected by the implementation of Accounting Standard Update (ASU) 2011-05, which requires reporting OCI in either a combined statement of income and comprehensive income or a separate statement of comprehensive income (SCI), and prohibits reporting OCI only in the statement of changes in shareholders’ equity (SSE). Using manually collected data for the period 2000-2012, we find that investors consistently priced OCI reported in the SSE during the entire test period. We also find that investors priced OCI reported in the SCI only during recent financial crisis period (2007-2009) when the magnitude and volatility of OCI significantly increased. Further evidence shows that this finding is not driven by the investment bias of transient investors. Finally, we find that value relevance of OCI decreases for firms that changed the reporting location of OCI from SSE to SCI following the implementation of ASU 2011-05 compared with firms that did not change the reporting location. As investors are expected to be more capable of incorporating information reported in a more transparent location into price, this study explores some plausible explanations for the puzzling finding and calls for future research.

A test of the market’s pricing of nontransitory dirty surplus flows

This study examines whether the market correctly prices nontransitory dirty surplus flows. Unlike the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principle (GAAP) and International Accounting Standards, Taiwanese Company Law allows employees’ bonuses under the profit-sharing scheme to be directly taken to retained earnings, bypassing the income statement. We find that these compensation costs are positively associated with share price and return, indicating that the market values the incentive effect of the profit-sharing scheme. More importantly, we find that the market correctly prices the persistence of these compensation costs. Overall, this study indicates that investors are able to correctly price nontransitory dirty surplus flows.