Steven D. Hales

Endurantism, Perdurantism and Special Relativity

There are two main theories about the persistence of objects through time. Endurantists hold that objects are three-dimensional, have only spatial parts, and wholly exist at each moment of their existence. Perdurantists hold that objects are four-dimensional, have temporal parts, and exist only partly at each moment of their existence. We argue that endurantism is poorly suited to describe the persistence of objects in a world governed by special relativity, and it can accommodate a relativistic world only at a high price not worth paying. Perdurantism, on the other hand, fits beautifully with our current scientific understanding of the world. We use only the implications of the Lorentz transformations, without appeal to geometrical interpretations, dimensional analogies or auxiliary premises like temporal eternalism.

Nietzsche on Logic

Nietzsches criticisms of logic occupy a most peculiar place in the history of philosophy. In the 100-plus years since the onset of his insanity, knowledge of and sensitivity to logic has become for many a sine qua non of philosophizing. This fact, coupled with the renaissance in Nietzsche studies, leads one to expect the secondary literature to contain a number of careful evaluations of his criticisms. However, there is not one article devoted to Nietzsches treatment of logic among the 1912 entries in Hilliards Nietzsche Scholarship in English: A Bibliography 1968-1992, nor is there even anything among the 4566 entries in Reichert and Schlectas International Nietzsche Bibliography of 1968!1 Even in the standard texts about Nietzsche, there is precious little regarding logic. Kaufmanns Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist is silent on the issue, and Nehamass Nietzsche: Life as Literature is nearly so.2 In the books by Clark, Danto, and Schacht there are but a few pages each addressing Nietzsches concerns.3 The paucity of secondary literature is strange enough, but Nietzsches own knowledge of logic seems a bit quirky. As a classical philologist Nietzsche was certainly aware of traditional Aristotelian logic, at one point explicitly launching a reducio ad absurdum against an opponent (BGE 15).4 And of

Motivations for Relativism as a Solution to Disagreements

There are five basic ways to resolve disagreements: keep arguing until capitulation, compromise, locate an ambiguity or contextual factors, accept Pyrrhonian skepticism, and adopt relativism. Relativism is perhaps the most radical and least popular solution to a disagreement, and its defenders generally think the best motivator for relativism is to be found in disputes over predicates of personal taste. I argue that taste predicates do not adequately motivate relativism over the other possible solutions, and argue that relativism looks like the most promising approach when disputants cannot even agree on the meta-evidence for a contested proposition.

Moral relativism and evolutionary psychology

I argue that evolutionary strategies of kin selection and game-theoretic reciprocity are apt to generate agent-centered and agent- neutral moral intuitions, respectively. Such intuitions are the building blocks of moral theories, resulting in a fundamental schism between agent-centered theories on the one hand and agent-neutral theories on the other. An agent-neutral moral theory is one according to which everyone has the same duties and moral aims, no matter what their personal interests or interpersonal relationships. Agent-centered moral theories deny this and include at least some prescriptions that include ineliminable indexicals. I argue that there are no rational means of bridging the gap between the two types of theories; nevertheless this does not necessitate skepticism about the moral—we might instead opt for an ethical relativism in which the truth of moral statements is relativized to the perspective of moral theories on either side of the schism. Such a relativism does not mean that any ethical theory is as good as any other; some cannot be held in reflective equilibrium, and even among those that can, there may well be pragmatic reasons that motivate the selection of one theory over another. But if no sort of relativism is deemed acceptable, then it is hard to avoid moral skepticism.

Abortion and Fathers’ Rights

In this chapter I argue that three widely accepted principles regarding abortion and parental rights are prima facie jointly inconsistent. These principles are probably accepted by most who consider themselves feminists, so the conundrum posed is particularly acute for them. There is one obvious way of resolving the inconsistency. However, as will be made clear, this solution is prevented by a fourth principle—that fathers have an absolute obligation to provide material support for their children. I argue that this principle is false, that fathers have no such absolute obligation, and thereby provide a way of making the first three principles consistent.

Thinking Tools: You can Prove a negative

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces tips and pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously.

Self-deception and belief attribution

One of the most common views about self-deception ascribes contradictory beliefs to the self-deceiver. In this paper it is argued that this view (the contradiction strategy) is inconsistent with plausible common-sense principles of belief attribution. Other dubious assumptions made by contradiction strategists are also examined. It is concluded that the contradiction strategy is an inadequate account of self-deception. Two other well-known views — those of Robert Audi and Alfred Mele — are investigated and found wanting. A new theory of self-deception relying on an extension of Mark Johnstons subintentional mental tropisms is proposed and defended.

A Relativist’s Rejoinder

I am honoured and grateful that such fine philosophers as Professors Otávio Bueno, Henry Jackman, and Jonathan Weinberg have given my book a close and careful reading. Furthermore, I am pleased that my critics are evidently in agreement with, or are at least sympathetic to, most of the central theses of the book. None has raised concerns with (1) the analysis I give of the structure of analytic rationalism as taking intuition-generated beliefs as non-inferentially basic and then constructing theories in an effort to achieve wide reflective equilibrium, (2) the complaint that we are unable to show that intuition is more truth-conducive than religious revelation or the ritualistic use of hallucinogens, (3) the argument that we are then faced with a trilemma problem for philosophical knowledge, namely that we should be either sceptics, nihilists, or relativists about the knowledge of philosophical propositions, or (4) the modal model I give of relativism and the demonstration that relativism is internally consistent. Instead Bueno, Jackman, and Weinberg focus on my treatment of scepticism and naturalism. Let me try to assuage some of their concerns.

More on Fathers’ Rights

I am grateful for the opportunity to clarify my position on paternal rights and to rebut the criticisms leveled by Professor Humber. To briefly restate my basic position, I regard a woman’s right to an abortion as a morally permissible way of avoiding certain future duties with respect to parenting. For fathers I argue for a right of refusal as a morally permissible way of avoiding certain future duties with respect to parenting. In principle (1) I offered a very liberal reading of this right—that women may get abortions at their discretion for basically any reason. I presented an extreme version of this right for dialectical purposes, in the hopes that my basic argument would be most clearly delimned by a simplistic version of (1). The only thing really crucial in (1) is the clause that women may make unilateral decisions as to whether to abort. In all other respects (1) can be abridged with no damage to my central thesis. Perhaps in the best future theory about abortion it will turn out that we need assorted qualifications and restrictions on abortion rights; qualifications having to do with whether the mother has made binding commitments to others with respect to the disposition of the fetus, when (if ever) the fetus becomes a person, the motives of the mother, and so on. These qualifications can be written into principle (1) without harm to my claims about the rights of fathers. A father’s right of refusal will just be qualified analogously.

Dispositional optimism and luck attributions: Implications for philosophical theories of luck

ABSTRACT We conducted two studies to determine whether there is a relationship between dispositional optimism and the attribution of good or bad luck to ambiguous luck scenarios. Study 1 presented five scenarios that contained both a lucky and an unlucky component, thereby making them ambiguous in regard to being an overall case of good or bad luck. Participants rated each scenario in toto on a four-point Likert scale and then completed an optimism questionnaire. The results showed a significant correlation between optimism and assignments of luck: more optimistic people rated the characters in the ambiguous scenarios as more lucky while more pessimistic people rated the same characters in the same scenarios as more unlucky. Study 2 separated the good and bad luck components of the study 1 scenarios and presented the components individually to a new group of participants. Participants rated the luckiness of each component on the same four-point scale and then completed the optimism questionnaire. We found that the luckiness of the bad luck component could be significantly predicted by their level of optimism. We discuss how these findings pose problems for philosophical accounts that treat luck as an objective property.