Steven H. Ott

Commercial Real Estate Valuation, Development and Occupancy Under Leasing Uncertainty

A model of commercial property valuation is developed where individual property owners are price takers and tenants randomly arrive and depart. Spot lease and tenant reservation prices are stochastic and correlated and can divert from but eventually revert back to market equilibrium. Within this framework we examine built property values and vacancy rates for varying parameter sets representing differing markets and economic conditions. We also examine how potential and existing vacancies, spot lease prices and tenant reservation prices feed back into development decisions. We demonstrate how preleasing acts as a hedge to the developer against the risk of leasing uncertainty.

Real Options and Real Estate: A Review and Valuation Illustration

The traditional capital budgeting and valuation framework for a land development investment opportunity involves determining the project’s net present value (NPV). The first step in an NPV analysis is to forecast cash flows over time and discount these cash flows at the appropriate required rate-of-return, where the required rate-of-return is based on the systematic risk of these cash flows. The NPV is the difference between the present value of the expected future cash inflows and the present value of the expected cost outflows. When the NPV is zero or positive, the project is accepted. When the NPV is negative, the project is rejected.

Effects of Noise on Optimal Exercise Decisions: The Case of Risky Debt Secured by Renewable Lease Income

This paper considers the valuation and default exercise policy of risky coupon debt that is secured by a lease-encumbered noisy real asset. For parameter values used in our analysis, asset value noise is shown to reduce the value of waiting to default. Moreover, the borrower is shown to delay default exercise until the noisy signal of asset value is far into-the-money. This latter finding provides an information-based explanation for the apparent under-exercise of the mortgage default option that has been observed in the literature. An implication of this finding is that, if the claimholder recognizes that noise exists, but the empiricist—who is trying to compare observed exercise policy with that predicted by a noiseless model of asset prices—does not, a “sub-optimal” exercise policy may be inferred when in fact the policy is rational given the information available. This explanation is consistent with evidence from mortgage default studies as to why the observed default exercise boundary is lower than that predicted by standard theoretical option-based models.