Steven Laureys

Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State

We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to demonstrate preserved conscious awareness in a patient fulfilling the criteria for a diagnosis of vegetative state. When asked to imagine playing tennis or moving around her home, the patient activated predicted cortical areas in a manner indistinguishable from that of healthy volunteers.

Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disorders of Consciousness

BACKGROUND The differential diagnosis of disorders of consciousness is challenging. The rate of misdiagnosis is approximately 40%, and new methods are required to complement bedside testing, particularly if the patients capacity to show behavioral signs of awareness is diminished. METHODS At two major referral centers in Cambridge, United Kingdom, and Liege, Belgium, we performed a study involving 54 patients with disorders of consciousness. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) to assess each patients ability to generate willful, neuroanatomically specific, blood-oxygenation-level-dependent responses during two established mental-imagery tasks. A technique was then developed to determine whether such tasks could be used to communicate yes-or-no answers to simple questions. RESULTS Of the 54 patients enrolled in the study, 5 were able to willfully modulate their brain activity. In three of these patients, additional bedside testing revealed some sign of awareness, but in the other two patients, no voluntary behavior could be detected by means of clinical assessment. One patient was able to use our technique to answer yes or no to questions during functional MRI; however, it remained impossible to establish any form of communication at the bedside. CONCLUSIONS These results show that a small proportion of patients in a vegetative or minimally conscious state have brain activation reflecting some awareness and cognition. Careful clinical examination will result in reclassification of the state of consciousness in some of these patients. This technique may be useful in establishing basic communication with patients who appear to be unresponsive.

Brain function in coma, vegetative state, and related disorders

We review the nosological criteria and functional neuroanatomical basis for brain death, coma, vegetative state, minimally conscious state, and the locked-in state. Functional neuroimaging is providing new insights into cerebral activity in patients with severe brain damage. Measurements of cerebral metabolism and brain activations in response to sensory stimuli with PET, fMRI, and electrophysiological methods can provide information on the presence, degree, and location of any residual brain function. However, use of these techniques in people with severe brain damage is methodologically complex and needs careful quantitative analysis and interpretation. In addition, ethical frameworks to guide research in these patients must be further developed. At present, clinical examinations identify nosological distinctions needed for accurate diagnosis and prognosis. Neuroimaging techniques remain important tools for clinical research that will extend our understanding of the underlying mechanisms of these disorders.

Are spatial memories strengthened in the human hippocampus during slow wave sleep

In rats, the firing sequences observed in hippocampal ensembles during spatial learning are replayed during subsequent sleep, suggesting a role for posttraining sleep periods in the offline processing of spatial memories. Here, using regional cerebral blood flow measurements, we show that, in humans, hippocampal areas that are activated during route learning in a virtual town are likewise activated during subsequent slow wave sleep. Most importantly, we found that the amount of hippocampal activity expressed during slow wave sleep positively correlates with the improvement of performance in route retrieval on the next day. These findings suggest that learning-dependent modulation in hippocampal activity during human sleep reflects the offline processing of recent episodic and spatial memory traces, which eventually leads to the plastic changes underlying the subsequent improvement in performance.

Experience-dependent changes in cerebral activation during human Rem sleep

The function of rapid-eye-movement (REM) sleep is still unknown. One prevailing hypothesis suggests that REM sleep is important in processing memory traces. Here, using positron emission tomography (PET) and regional cerebral blood flow measurements, we show that waking experience influences regional brain activity during subsequent sleep. Several brain areas activated during the execution of a serial reaction time task during wakefulness were significantly more active during REM sleep in subjects previously trained on the task than in non-trained subjects. These results support the hypothesis that memory traces are processed during REM sleep in humans.

Baseline brain activity fluctuations predict somatosensory perception in humans.

In perceptual experiments, within-individual fluctuations in perception are observed across multiple presentations of the same stimuli, a phenomenon that remains only partially understood. Here, by means of thulium–yttrium/aluminum–garnet laser and event-related functional MRI, we tested whether variability in perception of identical stimuli relates to differences in prestimulus, baseline brain activity. Results indicate a positive relationship between conscious perception of low-intensity somatosensory stimuli and immediately preceding levels of baseline activity in medial thalamus and the lateral frontoparietal network, respectively, which are thought to relate to vigilance and “external monitoring.” Conversely, there was a negative correlation between subsequent reporting of conscious perception and baseline activity in a set of regions encompassing posterior cingulate/precuneus and temporoparietal cortices, possibly relating to introspection and self-oriented processes. At nociceptive levels of stimulation, pain-intensity ratings positively correlated with baseline fluctuations in anterior cingulate cortex in an area known to be involved in the affective dimension of pain. These results suggest that baseline brain-activity fluctuations may profoundly modify our conscious perception of the external world.

Self-referential reflective activity and its relationship with rest: a PET study.

This study used positron emission tomography (PET) to identify the brain substrate of self-referential reflective activity and to investigate its relationship with brain areas that are active during the resting state. Thirteen healthy volunteers performed reflective tasks pertaining to three different matters (the self, another person, and social issues) while they were scanned. Rest scans were also acquired, in which subjects were asked to simply relax and not think in a systematic way. The mental activity experienced during each scan was assessed with rating scales. The results showed that, although self-referential thoughts were most frequent during the self-referential task, some self-referential reflective activity also occurred during rest. Compared to rest, performing the reflective tasks was associated with increased blood flow in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, the left anterior middle temporal gyrus, the temporal pole bilaterally, and the right cerebellum; there was a decrease of blood flow in right prefrontal regions and in medial and right lateral parietal regions. In addition, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) (1) was more active during the self-referential reflective task than during the other two reflective tasks, (2) showed common activation during rest and the self-referential task, and (3) showed a correlation between cerebral metabolism and the amount of self-referential processing. It is suggested that the VMPFC is crucial for representing knowledge pertaining to the self and that this is an important function of the resting state.

Cytology and functionally correlated circuits of human posterior cingulate areas.

Human posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and retrosplenial cortex (RSC) form the posterior cingulate gyrus, however, monkey connection and human imaging studies suggest that PCC area 23 is not uniform and atlases mislocate RSC. We histologically assessed these regions in 6 postmortem cases, plotted a flat map, and characterized differences in dorsal (d) and ventral (v) area 23. Subsequently, functional connectivity of histologically guided regions of interest (ROI) were assessed in 163 [(18)F]fluorodeoxyglucose human cases with PET. Compared to area d23, area v23 had a higher density and larger pyramids in layers II, IIIc, and Vb and more intermediate neurofilament-expressing neurons in layer Va. Coregisrtration of each case to standard coordinates showed that the ventral branch of the splenial sulci coincided with the border between d/v PCC at -5.4 +/- 0.17 cm from the vertical plane and +1.97 +/- 0.08 cm from the bi-commissural line. Correlation analysis of glucose metabolism using histologically guided ROIs suggested important circuit differences including dorsal and ventral visual stream inputs, interactions between the vPCC and subgenual cingulate cortex, and preferential relations between dPCC and the cingulate motor region. The RSC, in contrast, had restricted correlated activity with pericallosal cortex and thalamus. Visual information may be processed with an orbitofrontal link for synthesis of signals to drive premotor activity through dPCC. Review of the literature in terms of a PCC duality suggests that interactions of dPCC, including area 23d, orient the body in space via the cingulate motor areas, while vPCC interacts with subgenual cortex to process self-relevant emotional and non-emotional information and objects and self-reflection.

Breakdown of within- and between-network Resting State Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Connectivity during Propofol-induced Loss of Consciousness

Background:Mechanisms of anesthesia-induced loss of consciousness remain poorly understood. Resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging allows investigating whole-brain connectivity changes during pharmacological modulation of the level of consciousness. Methods:Low-frequency spontaneous blood oxygen level-dependent fluctuations were measured in 19 healthy volunteers during wakefulness, mild sedation, deep sedation with clinical unconsciousness, and subsequent recovery of consciousness. Results:Propofol-induced decrease in consciousness linearly correlates with decreased corticocortical and thalamocortical connectivity in frontoparietal networks (i.e., default- and executive-control networks). Furthermore, during propofol-induced unconsciousness, a negative correlation was identified between thalamic and cortical activity in these networks. Finally, negative correlations between default network and lateral frontoparietal cortices activity, present during wakefulness, decreased proportionally to propofol-induced loss of consciousness. In contrast, connectivity was globally preserved in low-level sensory cortices, (i.e., in auditory and visual networks across sedation stages). This was paired with preserved thalamocortical connectivity in these networks. Rather, waning of consciousness was associated with a loss of cross-modal interactions between visual and auditory networks. Conclusions:Our results shed light on the functional significance of spontaneous brain activity fluctuations observed in functional magnetic resonance imaging. They suggest that propofol-induced unconsciousness could be linked to a breakdown of cerebral temporal architecture that modifies both within- and between-network connectivity and thus prevents communication between low-level sensory and higher-order frontoparietal cortices, thought to be necessary for perception of external stimuli. They emphasize the importance of thalamocortical connectivity in higher-order cognitive brain networks in the genesis of conscious perception.

A Theoretically Based Index of Consciousness Independent of Sensory Processing and Behavior

A theory-derived index of consciousness, which quantifies the complexity of the brain’s response to a stimulus, measures the level of consciousness in awake, sleeping, anesthetized, and brain-damaged subjects. Quantifying the Unquantifiable Manipulation of consciousness is an everyday medical trick—think anesthesia—but physicians have only the crudest of tools to detect when a person is not aware. The usual question or physical stimulus does not always provide reliable reactions, and a more precise index is needed to avoid, for example, the conclusion that people who have locked-in syndrome (in which they are aware but cannot respond) are unconscious. Here, Casali et al. have extended their previous work on electrical correlates of consciousness to define an electroencephalographic-derived index of human consciousness [the perturbational complexity index (PCI)] that reflects the information content of the brain’s response to a magnetic stimulus. The PCI could allow tracking of consciousness in individual patients. The authors used data already collected from previous experiments, in which they had stimulated people’s brains with transcranial magnetic stimulation. By calculating the likely brain regional sources of the signals and then comparing the unique information in each, the authors derived PCI values. The values ranged from 0.44 to 0.67 in 32 awake healthy people, but fell to 0.18 to 0.28 during nonrapid eye movement (NREM) sleep. Then, to see whether a completely different way of inducing unconsciousness had the same effect on PCI, the authors assessed data from patients given various amounts of the anesthetics midazolam, xenon, and propofol. These agents too caused low “unconscious” values for the PCI: midazolam deep sedation, 0.23 to 0.31; propofol, 0.13 to 0.30; and xenon, 0.12 to 0.31. However, what about patients who suffer brain damage and who exhibit various levels of consciousness by conventional assessment methods? In these people, consciousness varies widely, as does the underlying damage from stroke or trauma. Here, too, the authors found promising results in those who had emerged from coma but were in a vegetative state or minimally conscious state, or exhibited locked-in syndrome. The PCI values from these patients clearly reflected the state of their consciousness, with the six patients in a vegetative state clearly unconscious (0.19 to 0.31), the two with locked-in syndrome clearly aware (0.51 to 0.62), and those in a minimally conscious state showing intermediate values (0.32 to 0.49). The validity of PCI for clinical application will need to be assessed in prospective trials, but it has the advantage of being derived from a simple noninvasive measurement. The new index reported by Casali et al. appears to be a robust measure that distinguishes conscious from unconscious states well enough to be used on an individual basis, a prerequisite for deployment in the clinic. One challenging aspect of the clinical assessment of brain-injured, unresponsive patients is the lack of an objective measure of consciousness that is independent of the subject’s ability to interact with the external environment. Theoretical considerations suggest that consciousness depends on the brain’s ability to support complex activity patterns that are, at once, distributed among interacting cortical areas (integrated) and differentiated in space and time (information-rich). We introduce and test a theory-driven index of the level of consciousness called the perturbational complexity index (PCI). PCI is calculated by (i) perturbing the cortex with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to engage distributed interactions in the brain (integration) and (ii) compressing the spatiotemporal pattern of these electrocortical responses to measure their algorithmic complexity (information). We test PCI on a large data set of TMS-evoked potentials recorded in healthy subjects during wakefulness, dreaming, nonrapid eye movement sleep, and different levels of sedation induced by anesthetic agents (midazolam, xenon, and propofol), as well as in patients who had emerged from coma (vegetative state, minimally conscious state, and locked-in syndrome). PCI reliably discriminated the level of consciousness in single individuals during wakefulness, sleep, and anesthesia, as well as in patients who had emerged from coma and recovered a minimal level of consciousness. PCI can potentially be used for objective determination of the level of consciousness at the bedside.