Steven Lee

Double effect, double intention, and asymmetric warfare

Modern warfare cannot be conducted without civilians being killed. In order to reconcile this fact with the principle of discrimination in just war theory, the principle is applied through the doctrine of double effect. But this doctrine is morally inadequate because it is too permissive regarding the risk to civilians. For this reason, Michael Walzer has suggested that the doctrine be supplemented with what he calls the idea of double intention: combatants are not only to refrain from intending to harm civilians; they are also to take precautions to reduce risk to civilians, even at the expense of increasing risk to themselves. The article develops the idea of double intention by addressing two questions: What does it mean to intend to reduce civilian risk, and how much should civilian risk be reduced? The results of this discussion are then used to consider a moral issue that arises in technologically asymmetric warfare, namely, the extent to which the use of precision-guided munitions, which allow more accurate targeting, can by itself bear the moral burden imposed by the principle of discrimination.

The Nature and Value of Privacy

Privacy is an important value in liberal societies. While the importance of privacy, in some form, is not in dispute, there is considerable disagreement about the scope of privacy and its relation to other values. Part of the reason for the controversy is lack of a common understanding about the precise nature and value of privacy. In this paper, I offer some thoughts on both issues.

The Ethics of Cyberattack

The internet has made it possible to do damage at a distance by the use of networked computers. A deliberate act doing such damage may be referred to as a cyberattack. My concern in this essay is the ethics or morality of cyberattack as a part of war. The morality of war or military attacks in general is judged in terms of just war theory, which examines war in its two aspects, the morality of going to war (jus ad bellum) and the morality of conduct in war (jus in bello). I examine the morality of cyberattacks in each of these areas. My conclusion is that, while the use of cyberattacks is a novel form of conflict in many ways, its ethical dimensions can for the most part be understood in terms of the traditional categories of just war theory. There remains, however, an important aspect of cyberattack that may carry us beyond the limits of traditional just war thinking about war.

Is Justice Possible Under Welfare State Capitalism

Our current economic regime, welfare state capitalism (WSC), according to John Rawls, is unable to realize his two principles of justice. WSC is a system in which productive property (capital) is largely controlled by a relatively small number of individuals. He proposes as an alternative that could realize justice property owning democracy (POD), where productive property (capital) would be more equally distributed among citizens. I criticize his argument on two grounds. First, Rawls is likely mistaken when he argues that justice cannot be realized under WSC. Second, there is good reason to think that POD is neither a coherent notion nor a plausible alternative.

Hate Speech in the Marketplace of Ideas

In this paper, I consider the issue of restrictions on hate speech in the context of the argument for free expression based on the idea that the realm of public communication is a “marketplace of ideas.” What is the nature of the analogy with the economic marketplace implied by this phrase? Can maximizing the prospects for attaining truth in the realm of public communication (if this is its proper goal) be fruitfully compared with maximizing preference satisfaction in the economic market? And, does the analogy prove too much, in that arguments for government interference in economic markets based on the existence of “market imperfections” might be taken to justify analogous interference in the case of speech? Can hate speech be understood as analogous to a market imperfection?

Technological possibility and public policy

Space colonies are easily imagined in a variety of social forms that can be used to highlight questions of social philosophy. Because of their exceptional dependence on technology they are particularly suitable for investigating philosophical questions pertaining to the development and use of technology and reliance on it. Space colonies also serve as models in terms of which to explore broader questions of social justice and the ethical dimensions of public policy issues. For example, we ask ‘‘Is it morally justified for a government to embark on a policy of rapidly colinizing space given the resources this would require?’’ We conclude that the actual benefits are likely to be much less than anticipated. Regardless of the possible benefits, a public policy for devoting present resources to house many people in space is a policy of not devoting such massive resources to other more pressing problems confronting this generation of humanity. The idea should not be adopted as policy.

Coercion Abroad for the Protection of Rights

Coercion is necessary to protect rights, including human rights. Protecting rights requires a political organization that respects and promotes respect for the rights of all members of society. Many rights must often be coercively enforced if respect for them is to be generally expected. There must be a power that not only respects but also protects the rights of citizens by requiring all citizens to respect them, prohibiting citizens from taking actions that would violate them, and punishing citizens who fail to honor these prohibitions. While there are forms of coercion that do not involve physical force, force seems necessary for any widespread and effective coercive system for protecting rights, including human rights, given that individuals are often moved by various considerations to violate them. In this essay, I will discuss coercion that involves physical force (and the threat of such) and consider the agent of coercion to be the state.

Reflections on the Moral Debate over the Strategic Defense Initiative

The moral debate over the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) has run its course in a surprisingly short period of time. The debate began less than six years ago when President Reagan initiated the SDI by setting forth a noble moral vision for the role of strategic defenses. The end of the debate has been signaled by the recent news report that the Pentagon is now promoting the SDI for its capacity to destroy Soviet satellites.1 This concludes the moral debate on an unfortunate note. The history of the SDI is a tale of moral decline. Because the debate, if not the program itself, is at an end, this is an appropriate time to reflect on what it has taught us. There are three lessons to be drawn from the moral debate. The first is the somewhat surprising lesson that morality counts in the area of military policy. The second lesson is less surprising. It is that the fundamental moral problem posed by nuclear weapons remains intractable. The third lesson is that, despite claims to the contrary, there is nothing morally special about the SDI defenses in comparison with other strategic weapons systems.

Morality and Nuclear Deterrence

to bring morality into deep conflict with itself, with the result that morality is unable to guide action in the area of nuclear weapons policy. An examination of the morality of nuclear weapons policy is, thus, not only a study of nuclear weapons from the moral point of view, but is also a study of morality in the light of the advent of nuclear weapons. The conflict is exhibited in a moral antinomy generated by the policy of nuclear deterrence. This antinomy is composed of two moral arguments, one morally prohibiting a policy of nuclear deterrence and the other morally requiring it.