Stewart C. Myers

DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE BORROWING

Abstract Many corporate assets, particularly growth opportunities, can be viewed as call options. The value of such ‘real options’ depends on discretionary future investment by the firm. Issuing risky debt reduces the present market value of a firm holding real options by inducing a suboptimal investment strategy or by forcing the firm and its creditors to bear the costs of avoiding the suboptimal strategy. The paper predicts that corporate borrowing is inversely related to the proportion of market value accounted for by real options. It also rationalizes other aspects of corporate borrowing behavior, for example the practice of matching maturities of assets and debt liabilities.

Testing static tradeoff against pecking order models of capital structure

This paper tests traditional capital structure models against the alternative of a pecking order model of corporate financing. The basic pecking order model, which predicts external debt financing driven by the internal financial deficit, has much greater time-series explanatory power than a static tradeoff model, which predicts that each firm adjusts gradually toward an optimal debt ratio. We show that our tests have the power to reject the pecking order against alternative tradeoff hypotheses. The statistical power of some usual tests of the tradeoff model is virtually nil.

Problems in the Theory of Optimal Capital Structure

This paper considers several related problems in the theory of optimal capital structure for corporations. It is divided into four sections, which may be briefly summarized as follows.1. Modigliani and Miller (MM) proposed that under the assumption of perfect markets and in the absence of taxes on corporate income, the total market value of the firm is unaffected by leverage. They showed that the leverage irrelevance proposition holds for “non-growth†firms when all investors agree in their estimates of the expected amount and the risk of each firms future earnings. In section I, we show that this conclusion is not affected by growth trends or heterogeneous investor expectations. However, our analysis uncovers several additional assumptions which must be made explicitly for MMs Proposition I to hold. These additional assumptions pertain to the effects of leverage on the firms future financing needs and future investment decisions. The generalized state-preference framework used for this demonstration is retained for subsequent discussion.

The Application of Finance Theory to Public Utility Rate Cases

The purpose of this paper is to formulate the implications of finance theory for rate of return regulation. A variety of problems in finance and the law and economics of regulation are reviewed. Also, a regulatory procedure based on finance theory is proposed for practical use.

A Time-State-Preference Model of Security Valuation

Determining the market values of streams of future returns is a task common to many sorts of economic analysis. The literature on this subject is extensive at all levels of abstraction. However, most work has not taken uncertainty into account in a meaningful way.

A Discounted Cash Flow Approach to Property-Liability Insurance Rate Regulation

This chapter begins by considering how a fair system of rate regulation—fair to both policyholders and insurance-company stockholders—would work. This question is usually answered by defining a fair rate of return. However, fairness can be more clearly and generally defined in terms of present value.

Regulating the United States Railroads: The Effects of Sunk Costs and Asymmetric Risk

The Surface Transportation Board (STB) applies the theory of contestable markets to regulate dominant railroad freight movements. The STB bases its determination whether railroad revenues are excessive if they would be more than sufficient to support investment in a hypothetical stand-alone railroad designed to handle the at-issue traffic efficiently. The STB regulatory approach does not take correct account of the importance of sunk costs and irreversible investments in the railroad industry. We estimate how large the mistakes can be by applying a real options approach that takes into account the effect of sunk costs, irreversible investment, and asymmetric returns.

Regulatory risk : economic principles and applications to natural gas pipelines and other industries

1. Introduction. 2. The Theory of Regulatory Risk. 3. Regulatory Risk: Objections to the Theory. 4. Sources of Asymmetric Risk in Regulated Industries. 5. Risk of the Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Industry: Summary. 6. Recent Trends in the Interstate Gas Pipeline Industy. 7. Two Views of Pipeline Risk. 8. Risk Analysis for Natural Gas Pipelines. 9. Two Fundamental Questions. Appendix A: Risks that Affect the Cost of Capital. Appendix B: Summary of Recent History of the Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Industry. Bibliography. Index.

A Simple Model of Firm Behavior Under Regulation and Uncertainty

This paper is an analysis of how a firm behaves in the face of uncertainty about demand and cost conditions and a known constraint on the rate of return it is allowed to earn. Under these conditions it is improbable that regulation could force a monopoly to make competitive investment and output decisions. This discouraging result is due to uncertainty per se and not to the phenomena discussed by Averch and Johnson.

The Dynamics of Investment, Payout and Debt

We present a dynamic agency model of investment, borrowing and payout decisions by a mature corporation operating in perfect financial markets. Risk-averse managers implement an inter-temporal strategy that maximizes their lifetime utility of managerial rents. They under-invest and smooth payout and rents. Debt is the shock-absorber for operating income and investment. Managers do not rebalance capital structure, so shocks to debt levels persist. Managers implement precautionary savings by paying down debt, even when interest is tax-deductible. We generate empirical predictions that differ from conventional agency models and from dynamic models based on financing frictions.