Stuart Dorsey

PENSION PORTABILITY AND LABOR MARKET EFFICIENCY: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature evaluating the labor market effects of policies to enhance pension portability. One perspective is that reducing the cost of job change will result in a more efficient allocation of workers. In contrast, long-term employment contract models suggest that incentives established by nonportable pensions may enhance efficiency by discouraging quits when there are job-specific productivity gains. No empirical studies have produced estimates conclusively showing that workers covered by pensions are more productive than other workers. Various indirect evidence, however—for example, on the relationship between pensions and wages, the pattern of pension coverage across workers and jobs, and the effect of pensions on layoffs—is consistent with pension-related productivity gains.

The problem isn't age : work and older Americans

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Union-Nonunion Differences in Pension Fund Investments and Earnings

The authors use IRS data to compare the composition, risk, and rate of return to union pension investments with those of nonunion pension funds. They find almost no differences between single-employer union and single-employer nonunion funds. Collectively bargained, multiemployer funds, however, held less risky portfolios than either union or nonunion single-employer funds. Multi-employer funds averaged a lower risk-adjusted rate of return for 1977–80, but performed as well as nonunion investments from 1981 to 1986. Thus, little evidence is found that “social investing,” most likely to occur in multi-employer funds, has increased the risk or consistently reduced the returns of union pension funds.