Su Fei

Cracking Cancelable Fingerprint Template of Ratha

Cancelable biometrics may be a good approach to address the security and privacy concerns on biometric authentication. It uses some parameterized transforms to convert an original biometric template into a new version for authentication. The security of cancelable biometrics lies on noninvertibility of the transformed template, that is, the transforms should be noninvertible so that the original template can not be recovered. One way to achieve the noninvertibilty is through the use of many-to-one transforms. The idea of Ratha¿s scheme of generating fingerprint templates just depends on this. However, it is revealed in this paper that the form of the transforms and the parameters chosen in his implementation weaken the many-to-one property. This results in the possible recovery of original minutiae from one transformed template.

Encrypted Fuzzy Vault Based on Fingerprint

Biometrics is the only factor that is directly linked with the distinguishing characteristic of an individual and has been widely applied to identity authentication, biometrics-based key management system may be expected to be a powerful competitor in the future. A popular technique of such a system is the fuzzy vault scheme. In this paper, a new scheme is proposed, which referred to as encrypted fuzzy vault scheme. The fingerprint-based implementation also is presented. In locking phase, a secret key is encrypted by the key derived from a set of random data. Then these data are encoded on the fingerprint minutiae. At last, the minutiae are encrypted by the private list. By these ways, the construction of the encoding polynomial is decoupled from the size of the secret key and less storage is required, but the higher level of security is achieved.