Subramanian Balachander

Reciprocal Spillover Effects: A Strategic Benefit of Brand Extensions

A commonly advanced rationale for the proliferation of brand extensions is companies’ motivation to leverage the equity in established brands, thereby developing profitable products relatively easily. A more interesting strategic argument for brand extensions that has been advanced is that extensions would favorably affect the image of the parent brand and thereby influence its choice. In this research, the authors investigate the existence of such reciprocal spillover effects emanating from the advertising of a brand extension. The authors use scanner panel data and study spillover effects of advertising on brand choice. They develop implications for brand and product line management.

Warranty Signalling and Reputation

In this paper, we present a signalling-based explanation for the empirical phenomenon that a longer warranty may be offered by a product with lower quality. Our explanation hinges on differences in consumer knowledge about reliability of established and newer products. In a product market where a new entrant competes with an established product, we show that signalling behavior leads to an outcome where the less reliable product may carry the longer warranty.

Research Note---Competitive Bundling and Counterbundling with Generalist and Specialist Firms

Bundling, which is the practice of selling two or more products or services in a package, is a pervasive marketing practice and is often used as a strategic competitive tool. However, there has not been enough consideration of competitive bundling situations in which exit of a competitor is not a concern. In this paper, we address this issue by identifying conditions under which strategic competitors may or may not resort to bundling when competitor exit considerations are absent. We study competition between a multiproduct generalist firm and two single-product specialist firms in two product categories, one of which has undifferentiated products and the other has differentiated products. In our model, the specialist firms can form an alliance to bundle their products in competing with the generalist firm. In contrast to the previous literature, we find that concurrent bundling by competitors, if it occurs in equilibrium, is profitable. We also find that when one competitor bundles and the other does not, the bundling firm gains a greater share of customers and makes a higher profit. However, when conditions favor counterbundling by a competitor, such counterbundling helps the competitor retain its customers. Finally, we note that under other market conditions, concurrent bundling by competitors escalates price competition to the extent that retaining customers through bundling is not profitable. In such a case, we show that strategic competitors are better off having asymmetric product lines with one competitor bundling and the other selling unbundled.

Order of Entry and the Moderating Role of Comparison Brands in Brand Extension Evaluation

The current research proposes that order of entry moderates the impact of fit on brand extension evaluation. We conceptualize a model in which new brands enter the market dynamically, driving consumers to engage in differential processing as a function of pioneer and follower evaluation scenarios. We posit that consumers rely on singular evaluative processing in pioneer contexts and comparative evaluation in follower contexts, producing unique moderating effects based on the existence of comparison brands. Experimental results indicate that follower brands can actually benefit from comparison with pioneering brands that have a relatively lower fit with the extension category.

An Empirical Analysis of Scarcity Strategies in the Automobile Industry

Recent product introductions such as the Xbox 360, Sony Playstation 2, and PT Cruiser have been characterized by shortage of these products. Some experts have suggested that such scarcity can be a deliberate strategy for making the product more desirable. In this paper, we empirically examine the relationship between introductory inventory levels and consumer preference in the U.S. automobile industry and show that relative scarcity of a car at the time of introduction is associated with higher consumer preference for the product. Furthermore, we perform an empirical test of alternative theories about the rationale for introductory product scarcity. Specifically, we consider two theories of supplier-induced scarcity, namely the buying frenzy theory and the signaling theory, and an alternative theory that suggests that demand uncertainty causes introductory product scarcity. We find more support for the signaling theory of supplier-induced scarcity than the buying frenzy theory or the demand uncertainty theory in our analysis of the automobile market.

Why Bundle Discounts Can Be a Profitable Alternative to Competing on Price Promotions

Price promotions and bundling have been two of the most widely used marketing tools in industry practice. Past literature has assumed that firms respond to price promotions by promoting a product in the same category. In this paper, we extend this literature as well as the bundling literature by considering the possibility that a firm may respond to a competitors price promotions by also offering a cross-buying or bundling discount. Using a game-theoretic model, we show that bundle discounts can help increase profits in a competitive market by creating endogenous loyalty, thereby reducing the intensity of promotional competition. We also find that bundle discounts can be used as an effective defensive marketing tool to prevent customer defection to the competition.

Quantity Discounts, Manufacturer and Channel Profit Maximization: Impact of Retailer Heterogeneity

In this paper, we investigate if a manufacturer can simultaneously maximize own and channel profit with any quantity-based pricing policy, including a quantity-discount policy, when selling through heterogeneous retailers. We show that the manufacturers best possible pricing policy, when retailers self-select quantities, is a quantity discount. However, this policy does not maximize channel profit. Driven by the manufacturers inclination to reduce the quantity sold through a high-cost or low-demand retailer, this result holds whether or not retailers compete. We discuss implications of our analysis for the manufacturer.

Increasing Quality Sequence: When Is It an Optimal Product Introduction Strategy?

In this paper, we analyze the optimal introduction timing of a sellers products targeted at segments that differ in their willingness to pay for quality. Past studies suggest that an introduction sequence of a high-quality product followed by a lower-quality version of the product may mitigate the cannibalization effects of the low-quality product on profits from the high-quality product. We show that if customers who value quality more possess an outside option such as a substitute product, as may be the case with replacement buyers, a seller may find it optimal to follow a low-quality product with a higher-quality one, the latter being targeted at replacement buyers. Furthermore, the ability of the seller to commit to future qualities accentuates the sequential increase in quality in the presence of such buyers. Thus, we show that conditions other than uncertainty or technological improvements occurring over time may justify a seller adopting a strategy of sequentially increasing quality. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing.