Sudesh Mujumdar

Effects of indirect taxation in a mixed oligopoly

Abstract In a mixed oligopoly, an increase in tax (ad valorem or specific) does not change total output, but increases the output of the public firm and the tax revenue. Also, privatization may increase both tax revenue and welfare.

Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot duopoly

Abstract This paper examines the nature of optimal managerial incentives in the context of a duopoly marked by competition between the firms managers in a dynamic production environment. If the marginal cost of production falls moderately over time or remains unchanged, there exists an equilibrium where one owner requires her manager to maximize profit, whereas the rival-owner requires her manager to maximize sales revenue. The profit-maximizing manager turns his firm into a Stackelberg-leader, while the sales-revenue-maximizing manager turns his firm into a Stackelberg-follower. Further, the profit-maximizing manager may generate a larger firm profit relative to the sales-revenue-maximizing manager.

Using cointegration analysis for modeling marketing interactions in dynamic environments: methodological issues and an empirical illustration

Abstract The authors argue that cointegration analysis is an intriguing development for analyzing marketing interactions in dynamic environments. Methodologically, the use of cointegration analysis requires statistical tests to determine whether this technique is appropriate for the system under investigation and, if it is appropriate, other statistical tests are needed to interpret the results. The authors collate a set of statistical tests and techniques to advance a comprehensive methodological framework that utilizes cointegration analysis to examine marketing interactions in dynamic environments. The framework is useful for analyzing marketing parameter functions with time-varying coefficients to investigate the relationship between market performance (e.g., sales, market share), marketing effort (e.g., advertising, sales promotion), and environmental conditions (e.g., market growth, inflation). The authors illustrate the utility of the framework for the famous case of Lydia Pinkham Medicine Company (LPMC).

Lobbying: Buying and utilizing access

This paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literatures standard assumption that money buys policies. Our model - in which influence-seeking requires both money to buy access and managerial time to utilize access - offers three significant benefits. First, it counters criticism that the money-buys-policies assumption is at odds with reality. Second, its much stronger lobbying incentives weaken the free-rider problem and raise incentives for lobby formation. Third, the model yields testable hypotheses on: the determinants of lobbying incentives; the number of lobbying firms in an industry; and the impact on industry lobbying by the size distribution of firms, contribution limits on firms, world price changes, and the ability to adjust labor employment.

Will S(He) Sabotage Me? Team-Dynamic Effects of Compensation Schemes

This paper contributes theoretically and empirically to understanding the nature of interdependence among team-members under different schemes of compensating team-members. Theoretically, the device of a Proportional compensation scheme is designed to uncover the innate nature of interdependence. Empirically, data from an Experiment reveal that: 1) Assistance is the innate nature of interdependence; 2) Sabotage is the preferred mode of interdependence under the Bonus scheme, and assistance under the Egalitarian scheme; 3) Females engage in sabotage at a significantly higher rate in the Egalitarian scheme - which is actually designed to incentive assistance – and to a lesser degree in the Proportional scheme compared to males; and 4) Incentivizing assistance does not pay off.