Sujit Chakravorti

Theory of Credit Card Networks: A Survey of the Literature

Credit cards provide benefits to consumers and merchants not provided by other payment instruments as evidenced by their explosive growth in the number and value of transactions over the last 20 years. Recently, credit card networks have come under scrutiny from regulators and antitrust authorities around the world. The costs and benefits of credit cards to network participants are discussed. Focusing on interrelated bilateral transactions, several theoretical models have been constructed to study the implications of several business practices of credit card networks. The results and implications of these economic models along with future research topics are discussed.

Platform competition in two-sided markets: the case of payment networks

In this article, we construct a model to study competing payment networks, where networks offer differentiated products in terms of benefits to consumers and merchants. We study market equilibria for a variety of market structures: duopolistic competition and cartel, symmetric and asymmetric networks, and alternative assumptions about multihoming and consumer preferences. We find that competition unambiguously increases consumer and merchant welfare. We extend this analysis to competition among payment networks providing different payment instruments and find similar results.

Consumer Choice and Merchant Acceptance of Payment Media

We study the ability of banks and merchants to influence the consumers payment instrument choice. Consumers participate in payment card networks to insure themselves against three types of shocks| income, theft, and their merchant match. Merchants choose which payment instruments to accept based on their production costs and increased profit opportunities. Our key results can be summarized as follows. The structure of prices is determined by the level of the banks cost to provide payment services including the level of aggregate credit loss, the probability of theft, and the timing of income flows. We also identify equilibria where the bank finds it profitable to offer one or both payment cards. Our model predicts that when merchants are restricted to charging a uniform price for goods that they sell, the bank benefits while consumers and merchants are worse off. Finally, we compare welfare-maximizing price structures to those that result from the banks profit-maximizing price structure.

Why Has Stored Value Not Caught On

Why have general-purpose stored-value cards been unsuccessful in penetrating the U.S. market? Three necessary conditions for a payment instrument to be successful are discussed: consumers and merchants need to be convinced of its advantages over existing payment alternatives for at least some types of transactions; payment providers must convince consumers and merchants simultaneously of its benefits to achieve critical mass; and assure them that adequate safety and security measures have been implemented. This article discusses the credit card industry’s success in meeting these necessary conditions and general-purpose stored-value issuers’ failure to meet them to date.

A Study of the Interrelated Bilateral Transactions in Credit Card Networks

Over the last decade, consumers have tripled their use of credit cards as more merchants have increased their acceptance of them. This increase suggests that incentives in todays marketplace favor greater credit card use by consumers and acceptance by merchants. In this paper, we study the set of interrelated bilateral transactions in credit card networks. First, we survey the recent theoretical papers using this approach and find that there is a lack of consensus regarding the optimal set of pricing policies. Second, we explore each of these interrelated transactions emphasizing common market practices and the underlying regulatory and legal framework. Third, we analyze the impact of certain credit card market practices on competing payment instruments such as debit cards.

Managerial Incentives and Financial Contagion

This paper proposes a framework to examine the comovements of asset prices with seemingly unrelated fundamentals, as an outcome of the optimal portfolio strategies of large institutional fund managers. In emerging markets, the dominant presence of dedicated fund managers whose compensation is linked to the outperformance of their portfolio relative to a benchmark index, and of global fund managers whose compensation is linked to the absolute returns of their portfolios, leads to portfolio decisions that result in systematic interactions between asset prices even in the absence of asymmetric information. The model endogenously determines the optimal amount of cash holdings or leverage, the incidence of relative value versus macro hedge fund strategies, and how prices can systematically deviate from the long-term fundamental value for long periods of time, with limits to the arbitrage of this differential. Managerial compensation contracts, while optimal at a firm level, may lead to inefficiencies at the macroeconomic level. We identify conditions when a negative shock to one emerging market affects another market negatively.

Debit Card and Cash Usage: A Cross-Country Analysis

During the last decade, debit card transactions grew rapidly in most advanced countries. While check usage declined and has almost disappeared in some countries, the stock of currency in circulation has not declined as fast. We use panel estimation techniques to analyze the change in transactional demand for cash resulting from greater usage of debit cards in 13 countries from 1988 to 2003. We are able to disentangle cash’s store of value function from its payment function by separating cash into three denomination categories. We find that the demand for low denomination notes and coins decreases as debit card usage increases because merchants need to make less change for customer purchases. On the other hand, the demand for high denomination notes is generally less affected suggesting that these denomination notes are also used for non-transactional purposes.

Digitization of Retail Payment

The rapid proliferation of electronic payment media continues to change the way consumers shop and merchants sell goods and services. Many policymakers and economists agree that the digitization of payments is socially beneficial. However, there is considerable debate regarding the optimal pricing of these payment services. Payment markets are complex with many participants engaging in a series of interrelated bilateral relations and transactions. In this article, we survey the recent payment literature, identify the main economic bottlenecks, and study their implications for public policy.

Why Do Banks Reward Their Customers to Use Their Credit Cards

Using a unique administrative level dataset from a large and diverse U.S. financial institution, we test the impact of rewards on credit card spending and debt. Specifically, we study the impact of cash-back rewards on individuals before and during their enrollment in the program. We find that with an average cash-back reward of

Pricing in Retail Payment Systems: A Public Policy Perspective on Pricing of Payment Cards

25, spending and debt increases by