Susan Adele Caskey

A Survey of Bioscience Research and Biosafety and Biosecurity Practices in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East

In the past decade, the United States (U.S.) has enacted extensive federal legislation to regulate the possession, use, and transfer of dangerous microorganisms and toxins. Yet, few international laboratories have implemented similar safeguards. Limited data are available concerning the types of biological agents researched in non-U.S. laboratories and the biosafety and biosecurity practices employed to maintain those agents. To start addressing these knowledge gaps, an online survey was administered by BioInformatics, LLC in 2005 to 765 life scientists from 81 countries in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. Survey results revealed that participants are actively engaged in research with a wide variety of biological agents. Moreover, analysis of the biosafety and biosecurity data revealed several interesting findings; these findings are summarized into three major themes: biosafety is more prevalent than biosecurity, simple practices and techniques predominate, and perceptions of risk vary regionally. This survey provided unique insight into the variety of dangerous microorganisms and their toxins studied worldwide and uncovered a consistent weakness in laboratory biosafety and biosecurity. Because many of these facilities are located in volatile areas of the world, these findings indicate a potentially significant risk, and future actions are warranted to improve the safe and secure handling of biological agents internationally.

Biosafety Risk Assessment Methodology

Laboratories that work with biological agents need to manage their safety risks to persons working the laboratories and the human and animal community in the surrounding areas. Accepted biosafety best practices and international guidance span a wide variety of biosafety risk mitigation measures, which can be categorized as engineering controls, procedural and administrative controls, and the use of personal protective equipment. The determination of which mitigation measures should be used to address the specific laboratory risks should be dependent upon a risk assessment. Ideally, a risk assessment should be conducted in a manner which is standardized and systematic allowing it to be repeatable and comparable. A risk assessment should clearly define the risk being assessed and avoid over complication.

Laboratory Biosecurity: A Survey of the U.S. Bioscience Community

Laboratory biosecurity practices, or measures to prevent the theft or sabotage of biological research materials, must coexist with biosafety. Within the United States, laboratory biosecurity, for a list of select agents, has been regulated through several Codes of Federal Regulation. In 2004 and 2005, Sandia National Laboratories conducted a survey of the U.S. bioscience community in conjunction with Reed Research Group, to assess the extent biosecurity is implemented in laboratories and the relationship between biosecurity and biosafety and good laboratory practices in regulated select and non-select agent laboratories. This paper describes the results of this survey.