Susan Easton

Sentencing and punishment : the quest for justice

PART A: SENTENCING PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1. Introduction: New Penology and New Policies 2. Just Constraints 3. Just Deserts: From the Criminal Justice Act 1991 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 4. Utility and Deterrence 5. Risk and Danger 6. Making Amends 7. Dealing with Minors: Continuity and Change PART B: PUNISHING OFFENDERS 8. Fair Impact? 9. Punishing Youth 10. Just Punishment in the Community 11. Justice in the Modern Prison 12. Equality and Difference in the Experience of Imprisonment CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Protecting Prisoners: The Impact of International Human Rights Law on the Treatment of Prisoners in the United Kingdom

This article considers the impact of international human rights law and standards on the protection of prisoners in the UK, with specific reference to the European Convention on Human Rights, incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998. Although prisoners do benefit from the protection of the Convention within prison, the scope of these rights will be limited by the needs of the prison administration as well as the political climate and the public’s attitude toward prisoners. The conflicts between these variables are addressed. Respect for prisoners’ rights, it is argued, may contribute to raised prison standards and to good order in prison.

Feminist Perspectives on the Human Rights Act: Two Cheers for Incorporation

This paper considers feministperspectives on the Human Rights Act. Itdiscusses the reasons why many feminists aresceptical regarding the impact the Act willhave on womens lives, including theimplications for anti-discrimination law,problems with the framework of rights in theEuropean Convention and deeper difficulties facingfeminism in negotiating rights discourse. Whileacknowledging these problems, it is argued thatthere are grounds for a more positiveinterpretation of incorporation. Questions arethen raised about the nature and scope of rightsand the role of the state in challenging genderinequality.

Punishing Sex Offenders: discrimination or justifiable treatment?

This paper considers whether recent legislation increasing the surveillance and control of sex offenders constitutes discrimination. Recent provisions, including the Sex Offenders Act 1997, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 are reviewed. The question of whether sex offenders have been unfairly selected for special treatment is considered as well as the issue of whether the provisions are rightly characterised as punitive.

The Debate on the Right to Silence

While the modern law of evidence has focused on the suspect as the key source of evidence, in fact this is a relatively recent development. Until the early 1990s the privilege against self-incrimination was firmly enshrined in the law of evidence. The privilege is used in a broad sense to cover immunity from being compelled to answer questions put by the police or other bodies, or in court, that may incriminate the speaker. It has also in the past included protection from adverse comment by judges on the failure to give evidence at trial or to answer questions in interrogation.

Suspects and ‘ Suspect Communities’

We saw in Chapters 5 and 6 the problems experienced by vulnerable individuals in interrogation and the need to ensure an interrogation process that is able to deal with suggestible individuals and to reduce the risk of false confessions. But there may also be issues affecting particular communities that may have implications for their relationships with the police. Attention has focused on the sectarian and religious conflicts in Northern Ireland and on the particular issues faced by black and minority ethnic groups in England and Wales, as well as on particular religious groups post 9/11.

The Legal Framework of Interrogation

The detention, treatment and questioning of suspects is governed by Code C of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the recording of interviews by Codes E and F. PACE came into force on 1 January 1986 and replaced the former Judges’ Rules. Since then the Act and Codes have been revised several times and reviewed in 2002 by the Home Office and again in 2007. Originally there were four Codes; there are now eight. The PACE Codes were revised in 2012 in response to recommendations arising from IPCC investigations and these changes came into effect on 10 July 2012.

The Influence of International Human Rights Standards on the Treatment of Suspects

The contribution of international human rights law to the treatment of suspects, including the right not to be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and the privilege against self-incrimination is assessed in this chapter. These rights are enshrined in international human rights law and have been deployed in the context of international criminal trials. The principal focus will be on European Convention jurisprudence which has become much more important since the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998.

The Body as Evidence

The body may be used in evidence in a number of ways, through samples of bodily fluids, blood, urine, semen as well as fingerprints and DNA evidence. Exterior marks, such as tattoos, scars or signs of physical injury, may also be used in evidence, as well as footprints, and it is likely that greater use will be made of biometric identifications of irises in the future. The use of the body as a source of evidence has become more important with technological and scientific advances, notably DNA profiling. However, the use of bodily samples as evidence raises a number of issues, namely the relationship between the privilege against self-incrimination and bodily samples, issues of privacy and bodily integrity, and the equality of arms principle.

The Impact of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994

The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 was based on the recommendations of the CLRC Report and on the provisions in the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order. The effect of ss 34–37 of the Act is to allow the court or jury to draw adverse inferences from silence as appear proper in the circumstances specified in the Act. Section 38, however, makes it clear that the accused cannot be convicted on the basis of silence alone, that is, on the basis of an inference drawn under ss 34–37, but there must be other evidence against him. The provisions also stipulate that adverse inferences may be drawn so the jury may decide not to draw inferences regardless of the circumstances. The Act limited the right to silence both in court and during interrogation and these changes will be discussed before considering their implications and impact.