Susan H. Williams

Constituting equality : gender equality and comparative constitutional law

Introduction: comparative constitutional law, gender equality, and constitutional design Susan H. Williams Part I. Structure: 1. Gender quotas in politics - a constitutional challenge Drude Dahlerup and Lenita Freidenvall 2. Equality, representation, and challenge to hierarchy: justifying electoral quotas for women Susan H. Williams Part II. Rights: 3. More than rights Helen Irving 4. Perfectionism and fundamentalism in the application of the German abortion law Mary Anne Case 5. Moral authority in English and American abortion law Joanna Erdman Part III. Cultural/Religious Rights and Gender Equality: 6. Must feminists support entrenchment of sex equality? Lessons from Quebec Beverly Baines 7. Deconstructing the east/west binary: substantive equality and Islamic marriage in a comparative dialogue Pascale Fournier 8. Conflicting agendas? Womens rights and customary law in African constitutional reform Aili Marie Tripp 9. Gender equality and the rule of law in Liberia: statutory law, customary law, and the status of women Felicia Coleman Part IV. Constitutional Incorporation of International Law: 10. Constitutional incorporation of international and comparative human rights laws: the Colombian constitutional court decision c-355/2006 Veronica Undurraga and Rebecca Cook 11. Guatemalan transnational feminists: how their search for constitutional equality interplays with international law Christiana Ochoa Part V. Women in the Process of Constitution Making: 12. Women in the constitution drafting process in Burma Thin Thin Aung 13. Founding mothers for a Palestinian constitution? Adrien Wing Conclusion: gender equality and the idea of a constitution: entrenchment, jurisdiction, and interpretation Vicki Jackson.

The Uses of Myth: A Response to Professor Bassett

In his essay, Professor Bassett traces the roots of the “myth of the nomad,” a myth which was used to justify the dispossession and destruction of Native Americans by colonial settlers. Bassetts primary focus is on a careful exposition of the sources and uses of the myth. The historical evidence he presents is persuasive and interesting, and his analysis is often thought-provoking. I find myself, however, in some disagreement with Bassett over the function this type of work serves. While Bassett recognizes that “[w]e are all creators of myths,” he insists that we should “bring to light” the myths in the law and expose their “insidious uses[s].” As Bassett observes, the first-year property course offers numerous opportunities for the unmasking of such myths. Bassett seems to suggest that we view his fascinating essay as one such attempt to “demythologize the law.” It is not possible, nor would it be desirable, to “demythologize” the law. The law is constructed upon, and often even constituted by, myths. The effort to eliminate those myths would produce legal concepts that were far less human, and probably no more humane. Our task, as both teachers and scholars, should be to recognize and evaluate the myths we use, but not necessarily to abandon them. Bassetts essay offers a fine beginning for this project of understanding.