Susan Moffitt

Policy and Practice: The Dilemma

The relations between policy and practice embody a dilemma. Policies aim to solve problems, yet the key problem solvers are those who have the problem. Governments devise instruments to encourage implementation, but they help only if used well by those with the problem, whose capability is often weak. The realization of policy in practice thus depends on the fit between capabilities that support implementation and aims. The more aims outstrip capabilities, the less likely is effective implementation. When Title 1 of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act began, capabilities were modest: the programs instruments were limited, and neither practitioners nor workers in the environment knew much about school improvement. Yet Title 1 became a viable program in the 1970s because its aims were defined in ways that were achievable, given the capability that was possible. Title 1 later was made the chief lever for national standards‐based reform policies, but capability was far from what would be required to eliminate the achievement gap, and the revised Title 1 did not contain means to vastly increase capability. Thus an effort to promote ambitious instruction led to reduced standards of success.

Promoting Agency Reputation through Public Advice: Advisory Committee Use in the FDA

When do government agencies invite public review for their policy decisions, and when do they maintain secrecy? Scholarship has long focused on procedures elected officials impose on bureaucrats to induce transparency and to encourage democratic participation in agency work. Yet, models of elected officials’ decisions largely overlook bureaucrats’ preferences and choices for public participation. Building on theories of bureaucratic reputation, I argue bureaucrats actively pursue publicity and public participation for tasks that risk implementation failure. I test these claims through models of FDA advisory committee agenda setting and subsequent policy implementation from 1985 to 2006. Consistent with bureaucratic reputation hypotheses, the FDA seeks public advice for its riskiest tasks. Such advice is associated with a lower probability of subsequent Congressional oversight and with a greater probability of subsequent agency information campaigns. Publicity, this suggests, complements secrecy as a source of bureaucratic power.