Susan Schneider

LOT, CTM, and the Elephant in the Room

According to the language of thought (LOT) approach and the related computational theory of mind (CTM), thinking is the processing of symbols in an inner mental language that is distinct from any public language. Herein, I explore a deep problem at the heart of the LOT/CTM program—it has yet to provide a plausible conception of a mental symbol.

Rethinking the language of thought

In this piece, we overview the language of thought (LOT) program, a currently influential theory of the computational nature of thought. We focus on LOTs stance on concepts, computation in the central system, and mental symbols. We emphasize certain longstanding problems arising for the LOT approach, suggesting resolutions to these problems. Many of the solutions involve departures from the standard LOT program, i.e., the LOT program as developed by Jerry Fodor. We close by identifying avenues for future work. WIREs Cogn Sci 2012, 3:153-162. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1155 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

Conceptual atomism rethought.

Focusing on Macherys claim that concepts play entirely different roles in philosophy and psychology, I explain how one well-known philosophical theory of concepts, Conceptual Atomism (CA), when properly understood, takes into account both kinds of roles.

What is the significance of the intuition that laws of nature govern?1

Recently, proponents of Humean Supervenience have challenged the plausibility of the intuition that the laws of nature ‘govern’, or guide, the evolution of events in the universe. Certain influential thought experiments authored by John Carroll, Michael Tooley, and others, rely strongly on such intuitions. These thought experiments are generally regarded as playing a central role in the lawhood debate, suggesting that the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis view of the laws of nature, and the related doctrine of the Humean Supervenience of laws, are false. In this paper, I take on these recent challenges, arguing that the intuition that the laws govern should be taken seriously. Still, I find the recent discussions insightful, in certain ways. Employing some ideas from one of the critics (Barry Loewer), I draw some non-standard conclusions about the significance of the thought experiments to the lawhood debate.