Susanna Siegel

How does visual phenomenology constrain object-seeing?

I argue that there are phenomenological constraints on what it is to see an object, and that these are overlooked by some theories that offer allegedly sufficient causal and counterfactual conditions on object-seeing.

Do we see more than we can access

One of Blocks conclusions, motivated by partial-report superiority experiments, is that there is phenomenally conscious information that is not cognitively accessible. We argue that this conclusion is not supported by the data.

Attention and perceptual adaptation.

Clark advertises the predictive coding (PC) framework as applying to a wide range of phenomena, including attention. We argue that for many attentional phenomena, the predictive coding picture either makes false predictions, or else it offers no distinctive explanation of those phenomena, thereby reducing its explanatory power.

The Structure of Episodic Memory: Ganeri's ‘Mental Time Travel and Attention’*

ABSTRACT We offer a framework for assessing what the structure of episodic memory might be, if one accepts a Buddhist denial of persisting or even momentary selves. Our paper is a response to Jonardon Ganeris [2018] ‘Mental Time Travel and Attention’, and we focus on his exploration of Buddhaghosas ideas about memory. In particular, we distinguish between memory perspectives on the past and memory relations that may or may not be successfully borne to the past. We also critically examine 3 ways of trying to cash out what is distinctive about episodic memory: (1) episodic memory as mental time travel, (2) episodic memory as reliving of the past, and (3) episodic memory as reflective attention to the past.