Susanne Pech

Optimum taxation of bequests in a model with initial wealth

We formulate an optimal�?taxation model where parents leave bequests to their descendants for altruistic reasons. In contrast to the standard model, individuals differ not only in earning abilities, but also in initial (inherited) wealth. In this model, a redistributive motive for an inheritance tax – which is equivalent to a uniform tax on all expenditures – arises, given that initial wealth increases with earning abilities. The introduction of the inheritance tax either increases intertemporal social welfare or has an ambiguous effect, depending on whether the external effect related to altruism is accounted for in the social objective.

Optimum Taxation of Life Annuities

The market for private life annuities is characterised by adverse selection; that is, contracts offer lower than fair payoffs to individuals with low life expectancy. Moreover, longevity and income have been found to be positively correlated. We formulate an optimum income taxation model that incorporates these facts and discuss the conditions under which a linear tax on annuity payoffs, which raises more revenues from long-living individuals than from short-living, can serve as an instrument for redistribution. Further, we consider a nonlinear tax on annuity payoffs, and find that it can be employed to correct the distortion of the rate of return caused by asymmetric information.

Adverse Selection in the Annuity Market When Payoffs Vary Over the Time of Retirement

This paper investigates the effect of adverse selection and price competition on the private annuity market in a model with two retirement periods. In this framework annuity companies can offer contracts with different payoffs over the periods of retirement. Varying the time structure of the payoffs affects annuity demand and welfare of individuals with low and high life expectancy in different ways. By this, annuity purchasers can be separated according to their survival probabilities. Our main finding is that a Nash-Cournot equilibrium may not exist; if one exists, it will be a separating equilibrium. On the other hand, even if a separating equilibrium does not exist, a Wilson pooling equilibrium exists.

Optimal taxation of wealth transfers when bequests are motivated by joy of giving

Abstract Inherited wealth creates a second distinguishing characteristic of individuals, in addition to earning abilities. We incorporate this fact into a model of optimal labor-income taxation, with bequests motivated by joy of giving. We find that taxes on bequests or on inheritances allow further redistribution if, in the parent generation, initial wealth and earning abilities are positively related. However, these taxes distort the bequest decision and thus, the overall effect on social welfare is ambiguous. On the other hand, a tax on all expenditures of a generation (a uniform tax on consumption plus bequests) has the same redistributive effect as an inheritance tax but does not distort the bequest decision.