Susumu Ohnuma

Do Self-sanctioning and Outsider Intervention Instill Trust in the Information Disclosure Process?

This study explored two questions: 1) what kind of method for instilling trust is evaluated to be important by the general public and 2) who is considered as a legitimate third party, when administrators and organizations go through an information disclosure process. We hypothesized that voluntary declaration of self‐sanctions, before an issue becomes public, would be important in instilling trust as well as the intervention of outsiders. Further, we explored which groups were evaluated as acceptable third parties. In a social survey conducted in the Kanto district of Japan, 621 responses (24.8% response rate) were obtained using a two stage systematic stratified random sampling method and mail‐out procedure. Results showed that declaration of self‐sanctions was seen as most important in instilling trust, but with involvement of an outsider also seen as important. An analysis of possible trusted third parties showed that academics and citizens interested in the issue were considered as most appropriate ‘outsiders’, while politicians, governor/mayor and administrative officials were considered less appropriate. Finally, cluster analysis showed that mass media was included within the same cluster as the political group.

Even Unreliable Information Disclosure Makes People Cooperate in a Social Dilemma: Development of the “Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game”

This study explores whether information disclosure can cause cooperation in a social dilemma, even when people can disseminate false information. In the past, illegal dumping increased in Japan despite the strengthening of penalties and surveillance laws, due to practical limitations in monitoring and surveillance. To resolve this, the tracking sheet used to trace the trading and processing of the waste must be traceable, in order to detect illegal dumping. This means that manifests must be written precisely in order to be effective, but if maintaining a tracking log has some function other than surveillance, this may not be the case. To examine this issue, we used the “Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping game” (Ohnuma S, Kitakaji Y. Simure-syon ando geimingu (Stud Simul Gaming) 17(1):5–16, 2007) which simulates the disposal of industrial waste and is structured as a social dilemma with asymmetry of information. In this study we utilized two conditions: a disclosure and a control (need not disclose) condition. Under the disclosure condition, players had to enter the amount of commission or disposal in the landfill but did not have to fill in the correct amount. Although other players could read the report, they did not know who performed illegal dumping or how much they contributed. Therefore, this disclosure did not have an effective surveillance function and could not help detect noncooperation. However, the results showed that the amount of illegal dumping was reduced, and information about payoffs was actually shared more in the disclosure condition than in the control condition. Moreover, players collected and shared their information more in the disclosure condition than in the control condition. The study thus indicates that the function of disclosure is not surveillance, but information sharing which is essential for voluntary cooperation.

Environmental Commons Game: Is the Free Rider a “Bad Apple”?

The Environmental Commons Game simulates “The Tragedy of Commons” (Hardin 1968), in which gradual pollution of environment caused by egotistic behaviors reduces player profit. This game has been developed on the basis of Baba (1986). Players are required to maximize their assets as a manager of a factory in the game. They have three choices in how to use their assets: investment, purification, and saving. The more assets they spend on investment, the more they get in the next phase, and the more polluted the environment becomes. On the other hand, the more assets they spend on purification, the more purified the environment becomes in the next phase, and the more their assets are reduced. As the environment gets polluted, the profit rate to investment becomes worse. Accordingly, players have to purify the environment to keep the high profit rate. However, the profit rate affects all players, which means that if a player expects other players to cooperate, he/she can benefit. Thus, the structure of the game complies with the traditional definition of the commons dilemma (Fig. 1). This game enables us to analyze the processes of building a consensus for the benefit of each player, while at the same time maintaining the environment. The Environmental Commons Game should help players find a solution for daily environmental problems such as the illegal disposal of garbage. After experiencing the Environmental Commons Game, players should realize both the importance and difficulty of mutual cooperation, and thus should consider how to achieve mutual cooperation.