Sususmu Cato

Long-Run Effects of Foreign Penetration on Privatization Policies

This paper investigates the long-run effect of foreign penetration in product markets on privatization policies. We find that the optimal degree of privatization is increasing in foreign penetration. This result is in sharp contrast to the existing short-run result that it is decreasing. Our result suggests that from a long-run viewpoint, the country with a more open market should promote the privatization of public enterprises, even though this reduces welfare in the short run.

Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings

The aim of the present paper is to provide an axiomatic analysis of incomplete social judgments. In particular, we clarify the underlying power structure of Arrovian collective choice rules when social preferences are allowed to be incomplete. We propose the concept of quasi-decisiveness and investigate the properties of the collection of quasi-decisive sets associated with an Arrovian collective choice rule. In the course of this, we offer a series of applications.

Long-Run Effects of Tax Policies in a Mixed Market

The purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic treatment of tax policies in mixed markets with endogenous entry. We consider three types of tax-subsidy policies: a simple unit subsidy, an entry-license tax, and a policy mixture of the two instruments. Under the unit-subsidy policy, in contrast to the results of the short-run analysis with exogenous entry, the optimal subsidy level in a mixed market is not higher than that in a private market, and privatization affects welfare. Under the entry-license-tax policy, the optimal entry-tax level in a mixed market is lower than that in a private market. Finally, we show that the privatization neutrality theorem holds under a two-part tax-subsidy policy: the first-best outcome is achieved in both mixed and private markets, and the optimal tax-subsidy rate is the same across the two regimes.

Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems

Since Kenneth Arrow showed the general possibility theorem, a number of social choice theorists have provided alternative proofs of it. In a recent article, Geanakoplos (Econ Theory 26:211–215, 2005) has constructed a new proof of the theorem. The present article provides alternative proofs of various Arrovian impossibility results from the 1960s to the 1970s by utilizing Geanakoplos’s method. We prove semi-order impossibility theorems, the quasi-transitive veto theorem, the quasi-transitive dictatorship theorem, the triple acyclic veto theorem, and the impossibility theorem without the Pareto principle.

Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis

This article provides a systematic analysis of social choice theory without the Pareto principle, by revisiting the method of Murakami Yasusuke. This article consists of two parts. The first part investigates the relationship between rationality of social preference and the axioms that make a collective choice rule either Paretian or anti-Paretian. In the second part, the results in the first part are applied to obtain impossibility results under various rationality requirements of social preference, such as S-consistency, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, and acyclicity.

Optimal Privatisation and Trade Policies with Endogenous Market Structure

type=main xml:id=ecor12189-abs-0001> This study investigates the short-run and long-run relationships of trade and privatisation policies. In both the short run and the long run, the optimal degree of privatisation is increasing in the import tariff rate. The optimal tariff rate is strictly positive in the short run but can be non-positive in the long run. Thus, the long-run analysis yields contrasting implications on trade policy in mixed oligopolies.

Collective choice rules and collective rationality: a unified method of characterizations

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between collective rationality and permissible collective choice rules using a unified approach inspired by Bossert and Suzumura (J Econ Theory 138:311–320, 2008). We consider collective choice rules satisfying four axioms: unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality. A number of new classes of collective choice rules as well as the Pareto and Pareto extension rules are characterized under various concepts of collective rationality: acyclicity, transitivity, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, and the interval order property. Further, new concepts of collective rationality, K-term acyclicity and K-term consistency, are proposed and the corresponding characterizations are provided.

Remarks on Suzumura consistent collective choice rules

Suzumura consistency is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a weak-order extension. This paper provides some remarks on collective choice rules that generate Suzumura consistent social preferences. We examine the properties of such collective choice rules by introducing a procedural condition on collective choice rules. As applications of the procedural condition, we first investigate the decisive structure of a Paretian collective choice rule, and then consider the assignment of individual rights. In our analysis, the concept of semi-decisiveness works effectively.

Szpilrajn, Arrow and Suzumura: Concise Proofs of Extension Theorems and an Extension

This paper extends the classical extension theorem established by Edward Szpilrajn (Fundamenta Mathematicae, 16, pp. 386–389, 1930). Szpilrajns theorem states that every quasi‐ordering has an ordering extension. Because of its usefulness in various themes of economics, it has been applied by many researchers. Important generalizations have been presented by two authors, Kenneth Arrow and Kotaro Suzumura, among others. First, we provide concise proofs of four extension theorems by Szpilrajn, Arrow and Suzumura. We then show an extension of their extension theorems.

Privatization Policy and Cost‐Reducing Investment by the Private Sector

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how privatization affects the cost‐reducing investment by the private sector. We compare the private sectors investment levels between mixed oligopoly and pure oligopoly. We show that privatization increases the cost‐reducing investment when the market demand is sufficiently large, while it reduces the cost‐reducing investment when the market demand is sufficiently small. Our results imply that the impact of privatization on the private sectors technological efficiency strongly depends on the market environment. Moreover, we examine several extensions.