Sven Walter

The Supervenience Argument, Overdetermination, and Causal Drainage: Assessing Kim's Master Argument

This paper examines Jaegwon Kims Supervenience Argument (SA) against nonreductive physicalism, concentrating on Kims response to two of the most important objections against the SA: First, the Overdetermination Argument, according to which Kim has no convincing argument against the possibility that mental causation might be a case of genuine or systematic overdetermination; second, the Generalization Argument, according to which the SA would entail that causation at any level gives way to causation at the next lower level, thereby leading to an untenable all-encompassing epiphenomenalism. It is argued that as of yet, Kim has failed to develop a coherent overall position, since various moves he makes in response to these criticisms are strangely at odds with other parts of his philosophical position.

Emotions beyond brain and body

The emerging consensus in the philosophy of cognition is that cognition is situated, i.e., dependent upon or co-constituted by the body, the environment, and/or the embodied interaction with it. But what about emotions? If the brain alone cannot do much thinking, can the brain alone do some emoting? If not, what else is needed? Do (some) emotions (sometimes) cross an individuals boundary? If so, what kinds of supra-individual systems can be bearers of affective states, and why? And does that make emotions “embedded” or “extended” in the sense cognition is said to be embedded and extended? Section 2 shows why it is important to understand in which sense body, environment, and our embodied interaction with the world contribute to our affective life. Section 3 introduces some key concepts of the debate about situated cognition. Section 4 draws attention to an important disanalogy between cognition and emotion with regard to the role of the body. Section 5 shows under which conditions a contribution by the environment results in non-trivial cases of “embedded” emotions. Section 6 is concerned with affective phenomena that seem to cross the organismic boundaries of an individual, in particular with the idea that emotions are “extended” or “distributed.”

Cognitive extension: the parity argument, functionalism, and the mark of the cognitive

During the past decade, the so-called “hypothesis of cognitive extension,” according to which the material vehicles of some cognitive processes are spatially distributed over the brain and the extracranial parts of the body and the world, has received lots of attention, both favourable and unfavourable. The debate has largely focussed on three related issues: (1) the role of parity considerations, (2) the role of functionalism, and (3) the importance of a mark of the cognitive. This paper critically assesses these issues and their interconnections. Section 1 provides a brief introduction. Section 2 argues that some of the most prominent objections against the appeal to parity considerations fail. Section 3 shows that such considerations are nevertheless unsuitable as an argument for cognitive extension. First, the actual argumentative burden is carried by an underlying commitment to functionalism, not by the parity considerations themselves. Second, in the absence of an independently motivated mark of the cognitive, the argument based on parity considerations does not get off the ground, but given such a mark, it is superfluous. Section 4 argues that a similar dilemma arises for the attempt to defend cognitive extension by a general appeal to functionalism. Unless it can be independently settled what it is for a process to be cognitive, functionalism itself will be undermined by the possibility of cognitive extension. Like parity considerations, functionalism is thus either unable to support cognitive extension or superfluous. Hence, nothing short of the specification of an appropriate mark of the cognitive that can be fulfilled not only by intracranial but also by extended processes will do as an argument for cognitive extension.

Willusionism, epiphenomenalism, and the feeling of conscious will

While epiphenomenalism—i.e., the claim that the mental is a causally otiose byproduct of physical processes that does not itself cause anything—is hardly ever mentioned in philosophical discussions of free will, it has recently come to play a crucial role in the scientific attack on free will led by neuroscientists and psychologists. This paper is concerned with the connection between epiphenomenalism and the claim that free will is an illusion, in particular with the connection between epiphenomenalism and willusionism, i.e., with the thesis that there is empirical evidence for a thoroughgoing skepticism with regard to free will that is based on the claim that mental states are epiphenomena. The paper discusses four arguments for willusionism that in some form or other appeal to epiphenomenalism and argues that three of them can be discarded relatively easily. The fourth one, based on Daniel Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation and his claim that free will is an illusion because the feeling of conscious will is epiphenomenal with regard to the corresponding voluntary actions, is dealt with in more detail. The overall verdict is negative: there is no empirical evidence for any kind of epiphenomenalism that would warrant the claim that free will is an illusion. Whatever it is that makes free will the object of contention between neuroscience and philosophy, epiphenomenalism provides no reason to think that free will is an illusion.

Belief integration in action: A defense of extended beliefs

Daniel Weiskopf has recently raised an apparently powerful objection against the so-called “extended mind thesis” with regard to beliefs. His argument is that since alleged cases of “extended beliefs” lack a characteristic feature of beliefs properly so called (newly acquired beliefs are usually integrated with already existing beliefs rapidly, automatically and unconsciously), they do not count as genuine beliefs properly so called. We defend the extended mind thesis by arguing that Weiskopf is wrong. First, we suggest an alternative account of informational integration that is compatible with externally stored beliefs’ being beliefs properly so called, emphasizes the crucial role action plays for cognition, and stresses the embodied and situationally embedded nature of human cognizers. Second, we argue that even if informational integration were usually rapid, automatic, and unconscious, this would not be an essential feature of beliefs. Third, we argue that even if rapid, automatic, and unconscious informational integration were characteristic of our commonsense conception of beliefs, externally stored “beliefs” would still be sufficiently similar to beliefs properly so called for them to be grouped together for all practical and scientific purposes.

Supersizing the Mind

Cognitivism holds that minds are disembodied, representational symbol processing input/output devices located entirely within our heads. Clark and Chalmers (1998) suggested a radical alternative—the ‘‘Hypothesis of Extended Cognition’’ (HEC). An external object may be part of (the vehicles of) an agent’s cognitive processes if it fulfills the following ‘‘Parity Principle’’: ‘‘if, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is . . . part of the cognitive process’’ (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 8). Since some external objects fulfill this requirement, they argued, some of our cognitive processes transcend the boundaries of skin and skull. HEC has been amply criticized by defenders of a ‘‘brainbound’’ or ‘‘organismbound’’ approach to cognition. Andy Clark’s Supersizing the Mind is its most recent and most thorough defense. Clark’s book is an elaboration of the original hypothesis, a response to critics, and a continuation of Clark’s conceptual work on embodied, embedded and situated cognitive science. Supersizing the Mind has ten chapters. Part I reviews a vast collection of empirical studies (from robotics to cognitive psychology), showing how much the execution of cognitive skills actually depends upon the agent’s body and environment (chapters 1–3), and argues that the body, by incorporating rather than merely using external tools, can extend beyond the organism’s boundary. Chapters 2–4 introduce HEC by arguing that the idea of incorporation rather than mere use also applies to cognition. Part II (chapters 5–7) responds to some objections, including Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa’s (2001, 2008) charges that Clark has no proper account of the cognitive and is committing a ‘‘coupling-constitution fallacy,’’ and Robert Rupert’s (2004) claim that there is no sensible reason to move from mere tool use to incorporation. Part III (chapters 8–10) contrasts Clark’s position with ‘‘radical embodiment’’ approaches (e.g., Alva Noë and Kevin O’Regan’s (2001) sensory-motor approach which ties perceptual experience to a specific kind of embodiment). Here Clark continues his

Strukturen kognitiver Systeme

Die Kognitionswissenschaft ist ein integratives Forschungsprogramm, das eine empirisch wie begrifflich umfassende transdisziplinare Untersuchung jener kognitiven Leistungen anstrebt, die komplexe naturliche bzw. kunstliche Systeme — z. B. Menschen, andere Tiere, Computersimulationen oder Roboter — befahigen, durch intelligentes Verhalten Probleme verschiedenster Art moglichst effizient zu losen. In den Beitragen von Teil III geht es insbesondere um die Frage, wie ein System strukturiert sein muss, um kognitive Leistungen wie Wahrnehmen, Erinnern, Lernen, Schlussfolgern, Planen, Entscheiden, Kategorisieren, Sprechen usw. (s. Teil IV) erbringen und so intelligentes Verhalten zeigen zu konnen: Welche Teile eines Systems oder seiner Umwelt tragen zu seinem intelligenten Verhalten bei und auf welche Weise? Was ist die Natur jener materiellen Prozesse, die den kognitiven Leistungen eines Systems zugrunde liegen?

Teildisziplinen der Kognitionswissenschaft

Die Anthropologie ist die Wissenschaft vom Menschen. Sie fachert sich in geistes- und naturwissenschaftlich orientierte Disziplinen auf, wobei fur die Kognitionswissenschaft hauptsachlich die Sozial- und Kulturanthropologie (in Deutschland meist als ›Ethnologie‹ bezeichnet) — und deren Unterdisziplin Kognitionsethnologie (s. Kap. II. A.2) — sowie v. a. naturwissenschaftlich ausgerichtete interdisziplinare Ansatze wie die evolutionare Anthropologie (s. Kap. II. A.1) relevant sind. Obwohl die Sozial- und Kulturanthropologie eine der Grundungsdisziplinen der Kognitionswissenschaft ist und mit daran beteiligt war, im Rahmen der sog. kognitiven Wende den Behaviorismus als dominantes Forschungsparadigma abzulosen, zeigten sich in den Jahren danach gewisse Entfremdungstendenzen — Boden (2006, 515) spricht gar von einer »missing discipline«. Sehr allgemein gesprochen befasst sich die Sozial- und Kulturanthropologie damit, kulturell variierende Weltordnungen, Deutungsstrukturen und soziale Handlungsmuster zu verstehen, zu erklaren und miteinander zu vergleichen.