Svenn Lindskold

Rate of participation and expertise as factors influencing leader choice.

Seventy-two female subjects were placed in four-person problem-solving groups. A confederate in each group was identified as either expert or inexpert, made expert or inexpert contributions, and either talked a lot or relatively little. The problem was made high or low in ambiguity. It was hypothesized that, as previous studies have shown, a high rate of participation would influence choice of the confederate as leader in the inexpert condition but that talkativeness would not be influential in the expert condition. The results supported the hypothesis. The characteristics of the confederate were somewhat less influential when the problem was low in ambiguity. The results were discussed in terms of what talkativeness may signify to other group members. When talkativeness is not resisted by the group it is tentative evidence that the talker is perceived as an appropriate, qualified, and legitimate leader.

The effects of opportunity costs and target compliance on the behavior of a threatening source

Abstract Subjects were given options to send threats to a simulated target in a modified Prisoners Dilemma. Manipulated variables included three levels of opportunity costs for threat enforcement and three levels of compliance by the target. Results showed that the sending of threats was deterred when the costs were greater than the anticipated gains from target compliance. However, threat enforcement was not affected by costs, indicating that once a commitment was made by sending a threat, enforcement costs had already been taken into account. No effects of target compliance were found.

The effects of conflict intensity and promisor credibility on a target’s behavior

Noncontingent promises of varying credibility were made to Ss in conditions of high and low conflict intensity established by manipulating the payoff values in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) payoff matrix. Highly credible promises produced more cooperation on the message trials than did low credibility promises. Ss concealed their choice intentions more when credibility was low. Greater overall cooperation, trust, and repentence were displayed when the conflict intensity was low. Conflict intensity interacted with credibility on the proportion of forgiveness shown. Females were more repentent than males when promise conditions were compared to controls.

Power, Influence, and Behavioral Compliance

Social psychologists have traditionally been concerned with problems of social conflict, power, influence, and persuasion. Yet, when one looks for systematic theory and evidence regarding the determinants of behavioral compliance to rules, norms, or influence attempts, few prescriptions can be garnered by the practical man of affairs for developing policy in matters of law and order. In a day when shouts of black power, student protests, and antiwar demonstrations reverberate through the legitimate institutions of the country and when violence commissions report the degree of disorder existing in the urban centers of America, lack of social scientific evidence upon which to base policy is a disquieting comment upon the relevance of social scientific research.

Relative costs and reactions to threats

A 3 by 3 by 2 design was employed in which 72 male Ss were assigned across three levels of a linearly transformed Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) pay off matrix, three levels of punishment magnitude, and two levels of threat credibility. Occasional threats of a loss of points were sent by a simulated player during 150 PDG trials. Unanticipated effects of both matrices and punishment magnitude were obtained on overall cooperation. An effect of matrices was obtained on compliance to threats. Postimpressions of the simulated source were that the 10% credible threatener was perceived as strongly potent, while the highly credible source was considered mildly impotent.

The ethical shift in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game1,2

Twenty three-man groups made of ROTC cadets were compared with 20 individuals when playing against a “dummy” strategy of 50% cooperation over 50 trials of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. The 20 triads were further divided into two conditions: one with 10 equal status triads, the other with 10 triads comprised of unit commanders with two of their principal subordinates. Results showed groups to be less “trustworthy” than individuals; this was interpreted to be an “ethical shift.” There were no significant differences between triad types.