Sverre Lodgaard

No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons

International law and no-first-use Although there is no treaty specifically outlawing nuclear weapons, a number of international lawyers question the legality of the use of these weapons .2 One can envisage the following situations in which nuclear weapons might well be resorted to: (a) in a surprise pre-emptive attack aimed at disarming the adversary by eliminating his strategic nuclear potential; (b) in the course of escalating hostilities started with conventional weapons; and (c) as a reprisal for nuclear attack. The first situation, usually referred to as ’first strike’, is covered by the fundamental rule of international law, enshrined in the UN Charter, which prohibits aggression, irrespective of the type of weapon used. The third situation normally applies to an act performed in response to a preceding illegality. Such an act, even if illegal per se, is usually considered to be in order, as long as it is proportionate in scale. It is the second situation which is usually referred to as ’first use’, and which applies to the employment of nuclear weapons in war in retaliation for the use of conventional weapons, that is the most controversial, because it involves the right to self-defence. The question is whether, and to what extent, this right is limited under international law.

Norway — the Not So Reluctant Ally

The article examines the Norwegian policies of peacetime arms restraint, in particular base policy and nuclear policy. Officially, these policies are presented as unilateral arms control measures. Two alternative interpretations are emphasized by the present authors. First, the base and nuclear policies are the result of political compromises at the domestic level. Second, they are largely based on military convenience. A few issues from the field of nuclear weapons are examined in depth, notably: (1) nuclear weapons in transit in Norwegian harbours, and (2) military navigation and communi cation stations on Norwegian soil.

Vertical and Horizontal Proliferation in the Middle East/Persian Gulf

its resolve throughout the world. While in the North the East-West conflict is disappearing, the Navy remains a crucial instrument of US foreign policy in the South. By invading Kuwait, Iraq in fact did much to legitimize the continued existence of a large Navy. Major naval combatants routinely carry nuclear weapons. Therefore, projection of naval forces almost automatically becomes an act of vertical proliferation. Should such forces be sent to an area already threatened by horizontal proliferatiun, a dangerous interaction between vertical and horizontal

Global Security and Disarmament: Regional Approaches

* This article was presented at the Second United Nations Kyoto Conference on Disarmament issues, May 1991. The paper will also be printed in United Nations Topical Papers on Disarmament, No. 8 (Fall 1991). ** Sverre Lodgaard is Director of the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo. 1. Integration There is growing recognition that in two respects mankind faces a common fate: in relation to the threat of nuclear war on the

Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons: Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear Weapon States

at the same time tolerating the retention of these same weapons by a few, has given rise to controversies relating to the balance of rights and obligations of the parties. Indeed, in renouncing the nuclear weapon option under the NTP, the non-nuclear weapon states have assumed the main burden of obligation, while the nuclear weapon states, in undertaking not to disseminate the weapons, have sacrificed little if anything. To attenuate this asymmetry somewhat, the nuclear weapon powers pledged themselves, under a UN Security Council resolution 1 ~ , to provide immediate assistance, in accordance with the UN Charter, to nonnuclear weapon states which became ’a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons [were being] used’. However, these so-called positive security assurances are devoid of practical significance, mainly because they relate to a possible action only when a threat of nuclear attack has been made, or the attack has actually occurred; moreover, immediate active intervention, as envisaged by the resolution, is deemed unacI

Focus on: Arms Race in Europe

momentum already by the middle of the 1970s. At that time, the United States embarked on a policy of delimitation vis a vis the Soviet Union and its allies, and consolidation of the Western international system under its own leadership. A weakening of the US position due to Vietnam, the fall of the dollar, and Watergate accounted for part of the shift. The Middle East crisis, the energy problems, the rise of the European Communities as a serious rival in economic and political affairs, and the increasing global activities of the Soviet Union contributed to it as well.’ In 1975, the SovietAmerican trade agreement failed to materialize, and upon signature of the Helsinki

The Functions of SALT

Drawing on evidence produced during the 7 years of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), we here try to summarize the main effects of the talks concerning: arms build-up, strategic stability, crisis stability, detente, the focus of superpower relations, legitimation of the arms race, strategic supremacy vis-à-vis the rest of the world, and international status quo. The strategic relationship seems plagued by growing uncertainty and instability because of surging R&D efforts. Improved capabilities and doctrines for nuclear warfighting open up prospects for dangerous adventures in times of crises. Detente and peaceful cooperation to some extent have had to yield to intensified nuclear rearmament. In this paper, we try to outline the role of SALT in bringing about these trends, which clearly make strategic arms limitation more difficult. To the extent that it has contributed to them, SALT has sown the seeds of its own deadlock. This is not to say that SALT has come to an end. The superpowers probably see a long- term benefit from talking to each other to promote common interests under shifting circum stances, such as the preservation of strategic supremacy over the rest of the world and main tenance and maximization of influence and control in the face of third party challengers. There can be an element of harmony in the confrontation and competition between them. Permanent talks make it easier to take care of common interests in unspectacular ways than do ad hoc contacts — especially if the interests are largely considered illegitimate by the rest of the international community.

On the Relationship between East-West Economic Cooperation and Political Change in Eastern Europe

This paper deals with the relationship between East-West economic cooperation and political change in Eastern Europe. Obviously, economic cooperation across East-West borders depends on political dispositions on both sides. In turn, the cooperation triggers and interferes with economic and political change in the West as well as in the East. There are important feed-back mechanisms involved which we are going to discuss at some length. However, we restrict the discussion to the Eastern European part of the problem complex. In the first section, we shall compare the economic and industrial cooperation developing at present with past Soviet behavior in the field of foreign economic relations, analysing its future prospects on that background. We then turn to a discussion of more general regime characteristics, particularly of the main political groups and constellations that make themselves felt in Eastern Europe, in an effort to assess the political acceptance of and motivation for expanded cooperation westwards, and the receptivity to Western influence inherent in and transmitted through economic cooperation. In the following section, economic cooperation is seen in the broader context of East-West interaction, focusing upon the nature of Western influence and the methods used. Finally, we sum up our findings and draw conclusions with regard to the future of East-West economic cooperation.

Industrial Cooperation, Consumption Patterns, and Division of Labor in the East-West Setting:

The globalization of international economy continues. In recent years, economic relations of some scope have been established also between socialist and developed capitalist economies. Such links go in various directions. On the socialist side, the socialist countries in Asia are involved as well as the European CMEA area; while on the capitalist side, Japan and the USA as well as Western Europe are involved. East-West relations in Europe are today largely an integral part of the global economic system. This means that any analysis of them should be considered within the wider framework of relations between the developed capitalist areas of the world and the communist countries China included. Secondly, the less developed countries of the world are also parameters in the formation of these relations, although influence is greater in the opposite direction. A special type of linkage consists in various kinds of joint ventures between capitalist and socialist actors aiming at markets in the Third World. The effects of East-West economic and industrial cooperation for less developed countries will, however, not be discussed here.

Naval Arms Control in the North — Some Specific Proposals

1. Deterrence vs. Crisis Stability There are two main ways of avoiding war by military means. One is by deterrence, the other by crisis stability. In part, they are compatible, in part incompatible. If there is a threat of calculated aggression, deterrence is a sine qua non. If there is a risk of inadvertent drift into war, then strengthening crisis stability is an equally obvious remedy. If there is a fear of both situations, means should be sought to alleviate both; or, if this is not feasible, to alleviate one without aggravating the other. This is no easy, straightforward task: in particular, some classic deterrence modes notably deterrence by threat of retaliation are