Sylvain Auroux

Why is there no ‘true’ philosophy of linguistics?

Publisher Summary This chapter examines whether there is no true philosophy of linguistics. Three phrases are in frequent use when speaking of the relationship between philosophy and language: philosophy of language, linguistic philosophy, and philosophy of linguistics. The last of these phrases presents no ambiguity, whereas the former two do. A true philosophy of linguistics would be the study of the practice where propositions (scientific assertions) in the field of linguistics refer to some kind of normative inquiry of reality. Thereafter, the only possible and relevant philosophy of language should be a philosophy of linguistics. It may be difficult to determine whether or not a given assertion generates any positive knowledge in the field of linguistics. Recognizing that the root of all linguistic positive knowledge stems from the axiom that every language as such shares all the essential properties that make up language is unavoidable. Consequently, Derrida devised a new argument based on the so-called nominal predications exhibited by a variety of languages. In such languages a valid predication may be expressed by Noun + Noun without any verbal element. This allowed the demonstration of virtually anything that one wishes to, using the modicums of language. Therefore, a philosophical moratorium on such fallacies becomes necessary. Moreover, the profusion of technical linguistic terms has turned out to be not so much an effect of refined observational or theoretical sophistication but rather a consequence of the unrestrained forging of pseudo-concepts. Therefore, linguistics is exceptionally rich in near-synonyms, referring to basically identical notions, and whose only purpose is to specify ones adhesion to some linguistic lobby or other.

Current issues in eighteenth-century linguistic historiography

1. For about twenty years the history of the sciences of language, by which expression we mean all theoretical practices having language as their object, has become an active field, cultivated by specialized scholars. This fact is undoubtedly due to the present day development of the linguistic disciplines. Within this field, the eighteenth century, in particular, has been studied, as is shown by the bibliography given at the end, which includes only recent books and does not take into account the more than two hundre6 articles which have also appeared (see Aarsleff, 1975, 1979; Auroux et al., 1982, pp. 146-171; Porset in Joly and Stefanini, 1977, pp. 11-95; Schlieben-Lange, 1983, pp. 127-141, and also Droixhe, 1978, pp. 417430). This activity has produced a certain number of results and aroused several specific discussions. The themes dealt with in the articles presented here have been chosen on the grounds of these recent developments and of their interest for philosophical discussion. In this introduction we intend to place them within the context of these discussions and somehow to give a brief survey of the research

The Analytic and the Synthetic as Linguistic Topics

The Analytic/Synthetic distinction did not originate in Kant, but in Port-Royals logical theory. The key for the doctrine is the explicite recognition of two different kinds of relative clauses, e.g. explicative and determinative. In the middle eighteenth century the distinction becomes a topic within the grammars. Although we can find by grammarians different criteria for the distinction, these criteria (for which we can find medieval sources) are for the main predictable from the original theory of ideas, which was presented in Port-Royals logical writings. The topic of the two relative clauses (somewhat broader than the analytic/synthetic distinction) can be used to give empirical criteria for analyticity and also for revisiting Quines criticism of the topic. Analyticity yet appears as a master piece of classical linguistic philosophy and not as being the empty dogma of modern empiricism.

LES LIMITES DE LA GRAMMAIRE

Neste artigo, o autor perpassa o pensamento humano sobre a linguagem - suanatureza, estrutura e funcionamento - e aponta, em cada modelo linguistico, seus limites. Comisso, conclui que, qualquer que seja a gramatica por eles construida, em determinadomomento, ela se mostrara inadequada para explicar fenomenos produzidos pelos sujeitosfalantes, fazendo-se, assim, necessario pensar uma outra gramatica que seja capaz de explicalos,determinando, pois, a elaboracao de um novo modelo.

Why is there no ‘true’ philosophy of linguistics?*

Publisher Summary This chapter examines whether there is no true philosophy of linguistics. Three phrases are in frequent use when speaking of the relationship between philosophy and language: philosophy of language, linguistic philosophy, and philosophy of linguistics. The last of these phrases presents no ambiguity, whereas the former two do. A true philosophy of linguistics would be the study of the practice where propositions (scientific assertions) in the field of linguistics refer to some kind of normative inquiry of reality. Thereafter, the only possible and relevant philosophy of language should be a philosophy of linguistics. It may be difficult to determine whether or not a given assertion generates any positive knowledge in the field of linguistics. Recognizing that the root of all linguistic positive knowledge stems from the axiom that every language as such shares all the essential properties that make up language is unavoidable. Consequently, Derrida devised a new argument based on the so-called nominal predications exhibited by a variety of languages. In such languages a valid predication may be expressed by Noun + Noun without any verbal element. This allowed the demonstration of virtually anything that one wishes to, using the modicums of language. Therefore, a philosophical moratorium on such fallacies becomes necessary. Moreover, the profusion of technical linguistic terms has turned out to be not so much an effect of refined observational or theoretical sophistication but rather a consequence of the unrestrained forging of pseudo-concepts. Therefore, linguistics is exceptionally rich in near-synonyms, referring to basically identical notions, and whose only purpose is to specify ones adhesion to some linguistic lobby or other.

La vague condillacienne

La vague condillacienne (S. Auroux) The author draws a graph of the successive editions of Condillacs works on logic and compares these editions with the various editions of the main treatises of logic.