Taishi Sugiyama

Must developing countries commit quantified targets? Time flexibility and equity in climate change mitigation

Abstract Equity and efficiency dimensions of global time flexibility in GHG emission reduction are analyzed with an integrated assessment model. Global time flexibility is justifiable to some extent as found in previous studies by Wigley et al. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily serve as a rationale to delay emission reduction commitment and efforts of developed countries as they suggested. The time flexibility can be saved for developing countries, and it must be so in equity consideration; early reduction by developed countries eases burden of developing countries in both time and emission quantity dimensions. This equity-oriented argument is robust against time and spatial efficiency consideration, since the apparent benefits that might accrue to developed countries from delaying reductions will by no means be transferred to far distant future developing countries for mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. The analysis thus support entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol without participation of key low income developing countries such as China and India with legally binding quantified targets in the First Commitment Period from 2008 to 2012.

Capping the Cost of Compliance with the Kyoto Protocol and Recycling Revenues into Land-Use Projects

There is the concern among some countries that compliance costs with commitments under the Kyoto Protocol may be unacceptably high. There is also the concern that technical difficulties with the inclusion of land use, land-use change, and forestry activities in non-Annex I countries might lead to an effective exclusion of such activities from consideration under the Protocol. This paper is proposing a mechanism that addresses both these concerns. In essence, it is suggested that parties should be able to purchase fixed-price offset certificates if they feel they cannot achieve compliance through other means alone, such as by improved energy efficiency, increased use of renewable energy, or use of the flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol. These offset certificates would act as a price cap for the cost of compliance for any party to the Protocol. Revenues from purchase of the offset certificates would be directed to forest-based activities in non-Annex I countries such as forest protection that may carry multiple benefits including enhancing net carbon sequestration.

Enforcement or Management: Two Schools of Thought in the Institutional Design of the Kyoto Regime

The international negotiations on climate change continue to prepare for the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). If the political momentum behind this treaty is to be maintained, fundamental change may be needed. To this effect, a distinction is made between the Enforcement School and the Management School in designing a compliance regime for implementing the Kyoto Protocol. The distinction is important because without it, one school of thought tends to naively negate the elements of the other. Recognizing the logical chain of reasoning in both approaches will benefit the (re)design of the Protocol by streamlining activities and establishing a better regime. The reasoning of both schools of thought is analysed. Firstly, there are those who advocate stringent enforcement, favour sanctions to achieve compliance and dismiss all discretionary elements. Further, when its supporters see that the Protocols targets are ambitious, they favour international market mechanisms, universal and simple rules to implement these, with national emission trading as a domestic policy option. Questions frequently addressed to this school ask whether national environmental numerical targets are enforceable by the democratic process, and whether economy-wide emission trading is politically and institutionally feasible. In contrast, those who advocate facilitative and cooperative compliance support another logic: no sanctions for noncompliance, discretionary elements in the hands of the Parties, incremental change in traditional environmental domestic policy instruments. Questions frequently asked of them include whether Parties would make efforts in the absence of sanctions and whether these would be cost-effective. While the ideas of the Enforcement School have a successful record in some issue areas including domestic SOx regulation in United States, the Kyoto Regime is too young to be burdened with these notions. Past experiences of multilateral environmental agreements suggest that the Kyoto regime should be designed in line with the ideas of the Management School, at least for its fledgling stage, including the First Commitment Period.

From modelling theory to policy: lessons from the LCS project

The Low-Carbon Society (LCS) research project (Strachan et al., 2008) is to be congratulated for providing a rich, useful source of models to inform and precipitate discussion of policy options for moving towards a low-carbon society. This commentary explores additional considerations that warrant inclusion in any policy discussion: the feasibility of political will and leadership, the limitations of technical feasibility, and clarity about what ‘the price of carbon’ means. Difficulties exist with establishing carbon prices due to differences in energy prices between countries and the distinction between baseline (existing policies) and additional parts. An alternative may be to place more emphasis on the energy price for mitigation, along with other indicators (energy efficiency, carbon intensity, renewable power diffusion) for comparison. A policy is proposed, based on the energy price combined with an emphasis on accelerating technological innovation and overcoming barriers to the adoption of energy efficiency measures.

CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM FOR POWER INFRASTRUCTURES FOR CHINA'S SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

What is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)? The establishment of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a significant achievement in the political negotiations on the implementation of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). CDM is stipulated in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol (KP), where assisting developing country Parties in achieving sustainable development is explicitly listed as a purpose in parallel with the others. Developed country Parties are to be assisted in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment (QELRC) under Article 3 by acquiring Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) accrued from the CDM. This win-win mechanism reflects two arguments: the responsibility of developed countries for past greenhouse gas emissions, and the legitimate priority needs of developing countries for their social and economic development and poverty eradication. It should be kept in mind, therefore, that when formulating the strategic policy of the CDM, one important principle to be followed is that CDM projects must be compatible with and supportive of national environments and sustainable development priorities and strategies of developing country Parties.

STRATEGIC VALUE OF CARBON RECOVERY AND STORAGE TECHNOLOGY: POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIMENSION

Many technological economy studies promise that energy conservation, renewable, nuclear, and carbon recovery storage technologies will be major technological options to mitigate climate change. While these studies do not differentiate the technological options from economic costs, political decision making should be based on the much broader context of political and administrative feasibility. Indeed, there are always formidable difficulties in design, agreement, and implementation of global climate policy. One of the major causes of the difficulties is the abundance of low-price fossil fuel. Restricting their use is politically and administratively difficult, since such a policy means to suppress parts of society that depend on fossil fuel use, leading to strong political resistance that affects national and international policy. The intrinsic strategic value of carbon dioxide recovery and storage technology is that this allows each society to continue using fossil fuel in exchange for adopting new equipment, with compensation where appropriate. The CO2 recovery and storage technology gives climate policy the chance to be in harmony with existing fossil fuel dependent social structures, engaging in fossil fuels rather than confining it. Political feasibility is weakened by saying “Do not burn fossil fuel, confine it” but improved by “You may burn fossil fuel, but recover and store CO2”.