Takero Doi

Herd behavior of Japanese economists

Suppose competent economists obtain common information on business forecasts, and incompetent economists obtain independent information. If no one knows who is able, young economists mimic others because a forecast different from others indicated inability when it proves wrong. An older economist, however, can infer his ability from past information. Those who got useful information stop herding to signal their ability when economists are heterogeneous. All economists herd together when economists are homogenous and the merit from signaling is small. The empirical results suggests that Japanese economists are more homogenous than American.

Japanese fiscal reform: fiscal reconstruction and fiscal policy

This paper evaluates the recent movement of Japanese fiscal reform. We first summarize fiscal policy in 1990s. Then, we investigate several relevant topics of fiscal policy such as the macroeconomic impact of government debt and the ustainability problem. We then consider dynamic properties of fiscal reconstruction process by analyzing the dynamic game among various interest groups. This paper points out that the long-run structural reform is more important than the short-run Keynesian policy in Japan.

The System and Role of Local Bonds Permits in Japan

In the 1990s, local public finance in Japan largely depended on the issue of bonds for revenue, because of a slowdown of economic growth and a decrease in tax revenue.1 Local bonds cumulatively increased as follows: by the end of FY 2000 they had reached around 180 trillion yen, 35% of GDP, about 1.8 times as large as the total local expenditures (about 100 trillion yen), and about 2.5 times as large as in FY 1990. Local Bonds and other borrowings that will be redeemed by local governments are shown in Figure 1.

Is Abe's Fiscal Policy Ricardian? What Does the Fiscal Theory of Prices Mean for Japan?

The second arrow of Abenomics is flexible fiscal policy. However, it does not mean just fiscal stimulus as the Abe administration decided on the fiscal consolidation target of achieving a primary surplus by fiscal year 2020. Improving the primary balance implies making government debt more sustainable. Although the consumption tax rate was raised from 5% to 8% in April 2014, the Abe administration has decided twice to postpone increasing the consumption tax from 8% to 10%. In addition, a fiscal stimulus package was implemented. We use a Fiscal Stance Index to examine fiscal policy from the viewpoint of fiscal sustainability and a Markov switching model to examine fiscal policy from the viewpoint of the fiscal theory of the price level, and find that the Abes fiscal stance is not Ricardian.

Poverty traps with Local Allocation Tax grants in Japan

This essay investigates poverty traps related to Local Allocation Tax (LAT) grants in Japan. LAT grants, which are transfers of funds from the central government to local governments, make efforts for enhancing regional economic growth, due to the calculation of the LAT grants. Using a simple dynamic model, we show that LAT grants lower regional income and are a disincentive to localities to increase their estimated tax revenue. Using panel Granger (non-)causality tests, we find empirical support for asserting that there are poverty traps due to the LAT grants in Japan.

Tax Policy under the “Generational Election System”

This chapter investigates the effects of introducing the “generational election system” proposed by Ihori and Doi (1998). The generational election system (or the election district by generation) consists of election districts divided by not only region but also generation. In industrial countries, intergenerational conflicts of interest are large at present. In particular, the older generation has more political power because of aging and fewer children. In an electoral system that consists of election districts divided only by region, conflicts of interest among regions can be dealt with in the Congress, but intergenerational conflicts are buried in each district because the opinions of older people dominate those of younger people. Therefore, this chapter analyzes the effects of introducing the generational election system using an overlapping generations model. The results of the voting equilibrium show that the preferred policy of the younger generation can be better represented in the generational election system compared with the current majoritarian system. Furthermore, the selected policy does not depend on the turnout rate of the younger generation. These results suggest that introducing the generational election system benefits both the younger and future generations.