Tali Sharot
University College London
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Featured researches published by Tali Sharot.
Nature | 2007
Tali Sharot; Alison M. Riccardi; Candace M. Raio; Elizabeth A. Phelps
Humans expect positive events in the future even when there is no evidence to support such expectations. For example, people expect to live longer and be healthier than average, they underestimate their likelihood of getting a divorce, and overestimate their prospects for success on the job market. We examined how the brain generates this pervasive optimism bias. Here we report that this tendency was related specifically to enhanced activation in the amygdala and in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex when imagining positive future events relative to negative ones, suggesting a key role for areas involved in monitoring emotional salience in mediating the optimism bias. These are the same regions that show irregularities in depression, which has been related to pessimism. Across individuals, activity in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex was correlated with trait optimism. The current study highlights how the brain may generate the tendency to engage in the projection of positive future events, suggesting that the effective integration and regulation of emotional and autobiographical information supports the projection of positive future events in healthy individuals, and is related to optimism.
Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience | 2004
Tali Sharot; Elizabeth A. Phelps
Emotion may influence memory both by altering attention and perception during encoding and by affecting memory retention. To date, studies have focused on the enhancement of memory consolidation by arousal. However, they have failed to rule out a role for attention. To specifically link memory enhancement of arousing material to modulation of memory retention, we examined recognition of neutral and arousing words at two time points and under conditions that manipulate attention during encoding. Participants were briefly presented with an arousing or neutral word at the periphery, while fixating on a central word. Recognition of peripheral words was assessed either immediately or after 24 h. Whereas recognition of neutral words became worse over time, recognition of arousing words remained the same and was better than neutral word recognition at delay. The results indicate that arousal supports slower forgetting even when the difference in attentional resources allocated to stimuli is minimized.
Current Biology | 2011
Tali Sharot
Summary The ability to anticipate is a hallmark of cognition. Inferences about what will occur in the future are critical to decision making, enabling us to prepare our actions so as to avoid harm and gain reward. Given the importance of these future projections, one might expect the brain to possess accurate, unbiased foresight. Humans, however, exhibit a pervasive and surprising bias: when it comes to predicting what will happen to us tomorrow, next week, or fifty years from now, we overestimate the likelihood of positive events, and underestimate the likelihood of negative events. For example, we underrate our chances of getting divorced, being in a car accident, or suffering from cancer. We also expect to live longer than objective measures would warrant, overestimate our success in the job market, and believe that our children will be especially talented. This phenomenon is known as the optimism bias, and it is one of the most consistent, prevalent, and robust biases documented in psychology and behavioral economics.
Cognition | 2008
Tali Sharot; Andrew P. Yonelinas
Emotion has been suggested to slow forgetting via a mechanism that enhances memory consolidation. Here, we investigate whether this time dependent process influences the subjective experience of recollection as well as the ability to retrieve specific contextual details of the study event. To do so we examined recognition for emotional and neutral pictures at two retention intervals and collected remember/know reports and reports about the task that had been performed with the item during encoding. Recollective experience was enhanced for emotional compared to neutral photos after a 24-h delay, but not immediately after encoding. In contrast, memory for the task performed during encoding did not differ between emotional and neutral photos at either time point. The findings indicate that emotion slows the effects of forgetting on the recollective experience associated with studied events, without necessarily slowing the forgetting of specific contextual details of those events.
Current Directions in Psychological Science | 2008
Elizabeth A. Phelps; Tali Sharot
A growing body of evidence suggests emotion boosts memory accuracy to an extent but affects the subjective sense of recollection even more. The result is vivid memories for emotional events that are held with confidence but that may be surprisingly inaccurate in their details. We examine the neural circuitry underlying emotions impact on memory and the subjective sense of recollection to provide insight into this puzzling phenomenon. This research suggests that for emotional stimuli the quality and strength of memory for a few details may mediate judgments of recollection, whereas for neutral stimuli the quantity of contextual details may be more important. Finally, we speculate that the enhanced subjective sense of recollection with emotion, in the absence of absolute veridicality, may have evolved to enable fast and unambiguous decision making in emotional situations.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America | 2007
Tali Sharot; Elizabeth A. Martorella; Mauricio R. Delgado; Elizabeth A. Phelps
Brown and Kulik [Brown R, Kulik J (1977) Cognition 5:73–99] introduced the term “flashbulb memory” to describe the recall of shocking, consequential events such as hearing news of a presidential assassination. They proposed that the vivid detail of such memories results from the action of a unique neural mechanism. In the present study of personal recollections of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) in New York City, we combine behavioral and brain imaging techniques, with two goals: (i) to explore the neural basis of such memories and (ii) to clarify the characteristics of the emotional events that may give rise to them. Three years after the terrorist attacks, participants were asked to retrieve memories of 9/11, as well as memories of personally selected control events from 2001. At the time of the attacks, some participants were in Downtown Manhattan, close to the World Trade Center; others were in Midtown, a few miles away. The Downtown participants exhibited selective activation of the amygdala as they recalled events from 9/11, but not while they recalled control events. This was not the case for the Midtown participants. Moreover, only the Downtown participants reported emotionally enhanced recollective experiences while recalling events from 9/11, as compared with control events. These results suggest that close personal experience may be critical in engaging the neural mechanisms that underlie the emotional modulation of memory and thus in producing the vivid recollections to which the term flashbulb memory is often applied.
Science | 2011
Micah G. Edelson; Tali Sharot; R. J. Dolan; Yadin Dudai
Firmly held memory representations in the brain can be altered by social influence. Human memory is strikingly susceptible to social influences, yet we know little about the underlying mechanisms. We examined how socially induced memory errors are generated in the brain by studying the memory of individuals exposed to recollections of others. Participants exhibited a strong tendency to conform to erroneous recollections of the group, producing both long-lasting and temporary errors, even when their initial memory was strong and accurate. Functional brain imaging revealed that social influence modified the neuronal representation of memory. Specifically, a particular brain signature of enhanced amygdala activity and enhanced amygdala-hippocampus connectivity predicted long-lasting but not temporary memory alterations. Our findings reveal how social manipulation can alter memory and extend the known functions of the amygdala to encompass socially mediated memory distortions.
Current Biology | 2012
Tali Sharot; Marc Guitart-Masip; Christoph W. Korn; Rumana Chowdhury; R. J. Dolan
Summary When predicting financial profits [1], relationship outcomes [2], longevity [3], or professional success [4], people habitually underestimate the likelihood of future negative events (for review see [5]). This well-known bias, termed unrealistic optimism [6], is observed across age [7], culture [8], and species [9] and has a significant societal impact on domains ranging from financial markets to health and well being. However, it is unknown how neuromodulatory systems impact on the generation of optimistically biased beliefs. This question assumes great importance in light of evidence that common neuropsychiatric disorders, such as depression, are characterized by pessimism [10, 11]. Here, we show that administration of a drug that enhances dopaminergic function (dihydroxy-L-phenylalanine; L-DOPA) increases an optimism bias. This effect is due to L-DOPA impairing the ability to update belief in response to undesirable information about the future. These findings provide the first evidence that the neuromodulator dopamine impacts on belief formation by reducing negative expectations regarding the future.
Psychological Science | 2010
Tali Sharot; Cristina M. Velasquez; R. J. Dolan
Psychologists have long asserted that making a choice changes a person’s preferences. Recently, critics of this view have argued that choosing simply reveals preexisting preferences, and that all studies claiming that choice shapes preferences suffer from a fundamental methodological flaw. Here we address this question directly by dissociating preexisting preferences from decision making. We studied participants who rated different vacation destinations both before and after making a blind choice that could not be guided by preexisting preferences. As an additional control, we elicited ratings in a condition in which a computer made the decision for the participants. We found that preferences were altered after participants made a blind choice, but not after a computer dictated the decision. The results suggest that just as preferences form choices, choices shape preferences.
Psychological Medicine | 2014
Christoph W. Korn; Tali Sharot; Henrik Walter; Hauke R. Heekeren; R. J. Dolan
Background When challenged with information about the future, healthy participants show an optimistically biased updating pattern, taking desirable information more into account than undesirable information. However, it is unknown how patients suffering from major depressive disorder (MDD), who express pervasive pessimistic beliefs, update their beliefs when receiving information about their future. Here we tested whether an optimistically biased information processing pattern found in healthy individuals is absent in MDD patients. Method MDD patients (n = 18; 13 medicated; eight with co-morbid anxiety disorder) and healthy controls (n = 19) estimated their personal probability of experiencing 70 adverse life events. After each estimate participants were presented with the average probability of the event occurring to a person living in the same sociocultural environment. This information could be desirable (i.e. average probability better than expected) or undesirable (i.e. average probability worse than expected). To assess how desirable versus undesirable information influenced beliefs, participants estimated their personal probability of experiencing the 70 events a second time. Results Healthy controls showed an optimistic bias in updating, that is they changed their beliefs more toward desirable versus undesirable information. Overall, this optimistic bias was absent in MDD patients. Symptom severity correlated with biased updating: more severely depressed individuals showed a more pessimistic updating pattern. Furthermore, MDD patients estimated the probability of experiencing adverse life events as higher than healthy controls. Conclusions Our findings raise the intriguing possibility that optimistically biased updating of expectations about ones personal future is associated with mental health.