Talia Bar

Defensive Publications in an R&D Race

This paper considers a multistage dynamic R&D race in which the competitors strategically publish research findings. Publications change the prior art, thus affecting patentability. Firms publish when they are behind in the race and their rival is close to winning it. Publication sets back both competitors and gives the follower a chance to catch up. Publications prolong the race. Firms are more likely to publish the more patient they are, and the higher their probability of success. Asymmetry between the firms generates additional incentives to publish such as protecting profits from a previous patent and increasing a strong firms probability of winning. When firms face a joint decision on publications and the intensity of research, publications substitute investment.

CHILDREN, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND LAND: IN THE LONG RUN AND SHORT RUN

The paper uses an overlapping generations model to examine the effects of an increase in a households land ownership on child labor. Consistent with previous studies, it is found that small increases in land lead to increased child labor. However, as land continues to increase child labor declines. Further, even when an increase in land ownership causes an immediate rise in child labor, there are contexts where long-run child labor (that is aggregated over progenies) declines.

Putting Grades in Context

Concerns over grade inflation and disparities in grading practices have led institutions of higher education in the United States to adopt various grading reforms. An element common to several reforms is providing information on the distribution of grades in different courses. The main aims of such “grades in context” policies are to make grades more informative to transcript readers and to curb grade inflation. We provide a simple model to demonstrate that such policies can have complex effects on patterns of student course enrollment. These effects may lower the informativeness of some transcripts, increase the average grade, and lower welfare.

Quest for Knowledge and Pursuit of Grades: Information, Course Selection, and Grade Inflation

This paper exploits a unique natural experiment — Cornell University’s 1996 decision to publish course median grades online to examine the effect of grade information on course selection and grade inflation. We model students’ course selection as dependent on their tastes, abilities, and expected grades. The model yields three testable hypotheses: (1) students will tend to be drawn to leniently graded courses once exposed to grade information; (2) the most talented students will be less drawn to leniently graded courses than their peers; (3) the change in students’ behavior will contribute to grade inflation. Examining a large dataset that covers the period 1990-2004 our study provides evidence consistent with these predictions.

Patent Validity Challenges and The America Invents Act

Patent reexamination or patent review systems can lower the cost of challenging patent validity and help improve patent quality. We empirically investigate post-grant patent validity challenges at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, and how the 2011 America Invents Act affected them. We compare the inter partes reexamination with the inter partes review procedure that replaced it after the reform. To identify the effect of the policy changes, we exploit the fact that patents filed before the act passed, but granted after the new inter partes review system took effect, are not eligible for reexamination in the old system. We find that more patent challenges end with a patentee win after the policy change. Still, at least one patent claim is canceled in more than 60% of the cases. Challenged patents issued to small entities more often had at least one claim canceled compared to other patents.

Project Selection: Commitment and Competition

We examine project selection decisions of firms constrained in the number of projects they can handle at once. A new project opportunity arises every period. Taking on a project requires a commitment of uncertain duration, preventing the firm from selecting another project in subsequent periods until the commitment ends. In our dynamic game, when two firms are free of commitment, they move sequentially in random order. Symmetric pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria always exist. In equilibrium, the first mover strategically rejects some projects that are then selected by the second mover, even when the value of the project is the same for both firms. A monopolist rejects more projects, and adopts ones of higher average quality compared to the duopolist. Duopolists select too few projects compared to their jointly optimal behavior. We extend the model to allow for externalities, asymmetry, and n>2 firms.

Choosing Certifiers: Evidence from the British Retail Consortium Food Safety Standard

Standards play a vital role in promoting food safety, and in many countries third‐party certification bodies carry out audits to determine if food manufacturers comply with a particular standard. Using data from the British Retail Consortium global standards program, we study manufacturers’ choices of certification bodies. We take a certification bodys share of high audit grades in the months preceding an audit as a measure of perceived leniency, and find that manufacturers are more likely to choose certification bodies that they perceive to be more lenient. Manufactures are also more likely to choose geographically closer certification bodies, and to return to the same certifier that audited their site in the previous year.