Tamer G. Amin

Conceptual Metaphor Meets Conceptual Change

This paper argues that the metaphorical representation of concepts and the appropriation of language-based construals can be hypothesized as additional sources of conceptual change alongside those previously proposed. Analyses of construals implicit in the lay and scientific use of the noun energy from the perspective of the theory of conceptual metaphor are summarized. The experientially grounded metaphorical construals identified in both uses help conceptualize the shift from the concrete, naïve to the abstract, scientific understanding of energy. The case of the concept of energy motivates the more general hypothesis that an important part of learning a highly abstract (even mathematical) concept is the appropriation of experientially grounded metaphorical construals implicit in scientific discourse. Pedagogical implications of this proposal are discussed.

Exploring the Use of Conceptual Metaphors in Solving Problems on Entropy

A growing body of research has examined the experiential grounding of scientific thought and the role of experiential intuitive knowledge in science learning. Meanwhile, research in cognitive linguistics has identified many conceptual metaphors (CMs), metaphorical mappings between abstract concepts and experiential source domains, implicit in everyday and scientific language. However, the contributions of CMs to scientific understanding and reasoning are still not clear. This study explores the roles that CMs play in scientific problem-solving through a detailed analysis of two physical chemistry PhD students solving problems on entropy. We report evidence in support of three claims: a range of CMs are used in problem-solving enabling flexible, experiential construals of abstract scientific concepts; CMs are coordinated with one another and other resources supporting the alignment of qualitative and quantitative reasoning; use of CMs grounds abstract reasoning in a “narrative” discourse incorporating conceptions of paths, agents, and movement. We conclude that CMs should be added to the set of intuitive resources others have suggested contribute to expertise in science. This proposal is consistent with two assumptions: that cognition is embodied and that internal cognitive structures and processes interact with semiotic systems. The implications of the findings for learning and instruction are discussed.

Conceptual Metaphor and Embodied Cognition in Science Learning: Introduction to Special Issue.

Conceptual metaphor and embodied cognition in science learning : Introduction to special issue

Computer-based Interactions for Conceptual Change in Science

Science learning has been characterized as the construction of conceptual structures, as the appreciation of the nature of scientific knowledge, and as participation in scientific practices. Research has primarily been carried out in each of these domains separately. There is a growing body of research that addresses the interaction between these components. In this paper we seek to add to this literature by integrating our ideas with that of other researchers to begin an initial formulation of a multifaceted framework for studying physics learning using computer-based conceptual models. In this framework we distinguish two aspects of conceptual restructuring: understanding computer models and internalizing these models as a way to construe the physical world. We argue that two different types of interaction (symmetric and asymmetric) support these different kinds of restructuring. We conclude that achieving deep changes in conceptualization requires consideration of conceptualization as a component of practice.

Conceptual Metaphor and the Study of Conceptual Change: Research Synthesis and Future Directions.

Many of the goals of research on conceptual metaphor in science education overlap with the goals of research on conceptual change. The relevance of a conceptual metaphor perspective to the study of conceptual change has already been discussed. However, a substantial body of literature on conceptual metaphor in science education has now emerged. This work has not yet been synthesized or related explicitly to the goals of conceptual change research. This paper first presents a broad sketch of the study of conceptual change, characterizing the goals of this body of work, its contributions to date, and identifying open questions. Next, the literature on conceptual metaphor in science education is reviewed against this background. The review clarifies the natural theoretical connections between the conceptual metaphor perspective and the phenomenon of conceptual change. It then examines the contributions made by the literature on conceptual metaphor in science education to the goals of research on conceptual change—namely, characterizing student conceptions, identifying obstacles to learning, understanding the process of conceptual change, and designing productive pedagogical strategies that could achieve conceptual change. The paper concludes with a discussion of further avenues for research into conceptual change, suggested by adopting a conceptual metaphor perspective.

Varying Use of Conceptual Metaphors across Levels of Expertise in Thermodynamics.

Many studies have previously focused on how people with different levels of expertise solve physics problems. In early work, focus was on characterising differences between experts and novices and a key finding was the central role that propositionally expressed principles and laws play in expert, but not novice, problem-solving. A more recent line of research has focused on characterising continuity between experts and novices at the level of non-propositional knowledge structures and processes such as image-schemas, imagistic simulation and analogical reasoning. This study contributes to an emerging literature addressing the coordination of both propositional and non-propositional knowledge structures and processes in the development of expertise. Specifically, in this paper, we compare problem-solving across two levels of expertise—undergraduate students of chemistry and Ph.D. students in physical chemistry—identifying differences in how conceptual metaphors (CMs) are used (or not) to coordinate propositional and non-propositional knowledge structures in the context of solving problems on entropy. It is hypothesised that the acquisition of expertise involves learning to coordinate the use of CMs to interpret propositional (linguistic and mathematical) knowledge and apply it to specific problem situations. Moreover, we suggest that with increasing expertise, the use of CMs involves a greater degree of subjective engagement with physical entities and processes. Implications for research on learning and instructional practice are discussed.

Converging Perspectives on Conceptual Change: Mapping an Emerging Paradigm in the Learning Sciences

We take a systems-level perspective on concepts and conceptual change focusing on ecosystems and human-nature relationships. There is considerable diversity in cognitive orientations to nature. Our research works through multiple cultural and methodological lenses to investigate folk theories and epistemological orientations (practices guiding what is worthy of attention, observation and explanation) with respect to the natural world. We start from the position that concepts take their meanings from relations with other concepts within frameworks for organizing knowledge, from folk theories to broad cultural epistemologies. On this view, conceptual change is a change in relations within such systems of meaning. This stance informs our research investigating how cultural epistemologies interact with conceptual change at multiple levels, from social and ecological processes of child-parent engagement with their environments, to cultural models and artifacts that structure conceptual domains, to the scientific practices that allow us to investigate these very questions.It has been known for several decades now that, while certain misconceptions can be easily overcome through proper instruction, other misconceptions seem to persist even after instruction that specifically targets naïve ideas (Chi, 2005; Confrey, 1990; Reiner, Chi, & Resnick, 1988). What makes these latter misconceptions so robust? It has been theorized that at the root of these robust misconceptions is an ontological miscategorization of a concept, and hence an ontological shift is necessary in order to overcome the robust misconception (Chi, 2005; Chi & Slotta, 1993). Keil (1979) defined an intuitive ontology as “one’s conception of the basic categories of existence, of what sorts of things there are” (p. 1). More specifically, Keil (1983) describes the concept of predicability, which concerns the language predicates (i.e., verbs and adjectives) that can be sensibly combined with terms (i.e., nouns). According to Keil, two categories are ontologically distinct when the predicates of one category cannot be sensibly combined with the terms of another category. Nonetheless, learners have been observed to combine the predicates of one ontological category with the terms of a different, ontologically distinct category. For example, learners have been observed to confuse the assignment of terms to the ontologies of entities and processes (Chi, Slotta, & De Leeuw, 1994). When a concept is perceived as having an entity ontology, appropriate predicates include attributes such as mass, size, weight, and color. A human being is an entity, for example. In contrast, processes are events that occur over time, and hence predicates which pertain to time are appropriate. The biological evolution of human beings is an example of a process. When students encounter a concept they are not familiar with, they conceive of that concept with an ontology, such as an entity or a process. In doing so, they proceed to think of the concept as having the kind of predicates consistent with the perceived ontology. If a concept 3

Articulating Knowledge-in-Pieces with Other Theories of Conceptual Change

Research on conceptual change can, arguably, be traced back to the 1970s as two particularly significant developments converged [Amin, Smith, & Wiser, 2014]. Within developmental psychology, the Piagetian domain-general stage view of development was being replaced by an account of knowledge growth in specific domains. Within science education, research was revealing that learners’ misconceptions persisted despite substantial formal instruction in science. We are now a few decades on and a great deal is demanded of a theory (or theories) of conceptual change. We need to make sense of rich data emerging from empirical research with infants and toddlers so that we can characterize the starting point of a child’s knowledge growth. We need to explain why some concepts are learned very quickly, while others seem to be difficult and take more time. We need to know why, when learned, some concepts have fairly broad effects on a learner’s knowledge in the relevant domain, while learning others can be less significant. We need to explain why some alternative conceptions are shared by many learners, across different contexts, whereas others seem to be more idiosyncratic. We need to describe the resources learners have to draw on to learn new scientific ideas. We need to understand the mechanisms that drive knowledge growth of different kinds. We also need to use our empirically based theoretical understanding of concept learning to come up with effective teaching strategies and to design curricula that can meet ambitious and yet realistic scientific literacy goals. In other words, we demand a great deal of a theory (or theories) of conceptual change. It is within this context that I would like to comment on Andy diSessa’s engaging article, evaluating the extent to which three different theories of conceptual change can make sense of a particular learning event.

Constraining Knowledge Building: The Limitations of ‘Progressive Discourse’

In her article, Chwee Beng Lee [this issue] seeks a productive synthesis of the conceptual change [e.g., Sinatra & Pintrich, 2003; Vosniadou, 2008a] and knowledge building [e.g., Bereiter, 1994; Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1996; Scardamalia & Bereiter, 2006] literatures. She begins by noting fundamental points of overlap between the two lines of work. Just as concepts in conceptual change research are often seen as embedded in larger knowledge structures (e.g., naïve theories of the world), ideas in knowledge building approaches are seen as interconnected with a number of others. Both approaches reject a view of knowledge acquisition as simply attempts to eliminate isolated naïve beliefs (or misconceptions) and replacing them with accepted knowledge. Instead, both are committed to viewing the process of knowledge acquisition as a constructive process of evaluating and then revising naïve concepts/ideas, with the result being concepts that begin to approximate scientific concepts (from a conceptual change perspective) or idea improvement (from a knowledge building perspective). Moreover, Lee notes that conceptual change researchers are increasingly broadening their examination of mechanisms of change beyond internal, cognitive processes to encompass affective and motivational factors, as well as the role of the material and social contexts of learning. Similarly, proponents of knowledge building view idea improvement as fundamentally a social process: ideas are treated as public contributions (conceptual artifacts) to a community’s collective knowledge. Finally, both approaches acknowledge the impact of the learner’s metacognitive awareness and understanding of knowledge, sources of knowledge and the mechanisms whereby knowledge advances, on the process of knowledge acquisition itself.