Tamir Moustafa

Rule By Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes

1. Introduction Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa 2. Of judges and generals: security courts under authoritarian regimes in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile Anthony Pereira 3. Administrative law and judicial control of agents in authoritarian regimes Tom Ginsburg 4. Singapore: the exception that proves rules matter Gordon Silverstein 5. Judicial independence in authoritarian regimes: insights from Chile Lisa Hilbink 6. Law and resistance in authoritarian states: the Egyptian case Tamir Moustafa and Simon Fraser 7. Courts out of context: the authoritarian sources of judicial failure in Chile (1973-90) and Argentina (1976-83) Robert Barros 8. An authoritarian enclave? The supreme court in Mexicos emerging democracy Beatriz Magaloni 9. The institutional diffusion of courts in China: evidence from survey data Pierre Landry 10. Building judicial independence in semi-democracies: Uganda and Tanzania Jennifer Widner 11. Judicial power in authoritarian states: the Russian experience Peter Solomon 12. Courts in a semi-democratic/authoritarian regime: the judicialization of Turkish and Iranian politics Hootan Shambayati 13. Judicial systems and economic development Hilton Root and Karen May 14. Courts in authoritarian regimes Martin Shapiro.

Conflict and Cooperation between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt

Al-Azhar, traditionally Egypt’s most respected and influential center for Islamic study, adopted an increasingly bold platform opposing Egyptian government policy throughout the mid-1990s. Al-Azhar defied government policy on a variety of sensitive issues, including population control, the practice of clitoridectomy, and censorship rights. Moreover, al-Azhar directly challenged the government in high-profile forums such as the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo in September of 1994. This open opposition was remarkable in light of the tremendous capacity that the Egyptian government has shown in the past to manipulate and control al-Azhar. Over the past century, and particularly since the 1952 Free Oficers’ coup, the Egyptian government virtually incorporated al-Azhar as an arm of the state through purges and control over Azhar finances, and by gaining the power to appoint al-Azhar’s key leadership. Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Husni Mubarak all benefited from this dominance over al-Azhar by securing fatwas legitimating their policies. Given this overwhelming leverage, what can explain al-Azhar’s increased opposition to the government throughout the mid-1990s?

Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes: Introduction: The Functions of Courts in Authoritarian Politics

Two decades ago, Martin Shapiro urged public law scholars to expand their horizons and begin studying “any public law other than constitutional law, any court other than the Supreme Court, any public lawmaker other then the judge, and any country other than the United States” (Shapiro 1989). Shapiro recognized that American public law scholarship stood at the margins of political science because it did not adequately engage the broad questions in the field0. Perhaps more importantly, Shapiro recognized that judicial institutions had become important political players in a number of countries and that a “judicialization of politics” was on the advance across much of the world. Since Shapiros first call for more comparative scholarship, there has been an explosion in the judicial politics literature focused on a variety of regions and themes, including the role of courts in democratizing countries, the relationship between law and social movements, and the judicialization of international politics. However, there has been relatively little research on the dynamics of judicial politics in non-democracies. This gap in the literature is likely the result of a long-standing presumption among many political scientists that courts in authoritarian regimes serve as mere pawns of their rulers, and that they therefore lack any independent influence in political life. Yet, as many of the contributors to this volume have demonstrated elsewhere (Barros 2002, Hilbink 2007, Moustafa 2007, Pereira 2005, Solomon 1996), the empirical reality in many authoritarian regimes cuts against this conventional wisdom.

The Islamist Trend in Egyptian Law

The past four decades have witnessed profound transformations in the Egyptian legal system and in the Egyptian legal profession. Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution now enshrines Islamic jurisprudence as the principle source of law, thus establishing an important symbolic marker at the heart of the state and opening avenues for Islamist activists to press litigation campaigns in the courts. Additionally, the Islamist trend gained prominence within the legal profession, a development that is particularly striking given the long and illustrious history of the Lawyers Syndicate as a bastion of liberalism. Despite these significant shifts, however, Islamist litigation has achieved only limited legal victories. This article traces the political and socio-economic variables that underlie the Islamist trend in Egyptian law, and examines the impact of Islamist litigation in the Egyptian courts.

Is the Rule of Law an Antidote for Religious Tension? The Promise and Peril of Judicializing Religious Freedom

Although “rule of law” is often regarded as a solution for religious conflict, this article analyzes the role of legal processes and institutions in hardening boundaries and sharpening antagonisms among religious communities. Using case studies from Sri Lanka, India, Malaysia, and Pakistan, we highlight four specific mechanisms through which legal procedures, structures, and instruments can further polarize already existing religious conflicts. These mechanisms include the procedural requirements and choreography of litigation (Sri Lanka), the strategic use of legal language and court judgments by political and socioreligious groups (India), the activities of partisan activists who mobilize around litigation (Malaysia), and the exploitation of “public order” laws in contexts framed by antagonism targeting religious minorities (Pakistan).

Law in the Egyptian Revolt

Among the protest movements sweeping the region in the Arab awakening of 2011, the Egyptian revolt is the movement that is perhaps most defi ned by a struggle over the Constitution and the rule of law more generally. I argue that this intense focus on law and legal institutions is a legacy of the prominent role that law played in maintaining authoritarian rule in Mubarak’s Egypt. Just as law and legal institutions were the principal mechanisms undergirding authoritarian rule, opposition activists know that democracy can only emerge through comprehensive legal reform. This article examines the struggle for constitutional power in three periods – before, during, and after the Egyptian revolt of 2011.