Tamon Asonuma

Choices of Optimal Monetary Policy Instruments Under the Floating and the Basket-Peg Regimes

This paper determines whether adopting the basket-peg rather than the floating regime is optimal for emerging market countries. Under the basket-peg regime, there is a trade-off between practical usefulness and welfare losses associated with capital movements across countries. We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for small open economies to derive a simple basket weight rule. Although this is suboptimal, we find it practical and easy to implement. With calibration using Singaporean and Thai data for 1997Q3–2006Q2 and comparison among cumulative losses associated with the policy instrument rules, we show that a commitment to the basket weight rule is superior to other instrument rules under the floating regime for small, open emerging market countries like Singapore and Thailand.

Serial default and debt renegotiation

Emerging countries that have defaulted on their debt repayment obligations in the past are more likely to default again in the future than are non-defaulters even with the same debt-to-GDP ratio. This paper explains this stylized fact within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework by explicitly modeling renegotiations between a defaulting country and its creditors. The quantitative analysis of the model reveals that the equilibrium probability of default for a given debt-to-GDP level is weakly increasing with the number of past defaults, consistent with empirical observations. The equilibrium of the model also accords with an additional observed fact: a country for which default terms require less than a 100 percent recovery rate tends to pay a higher rate of return (relative to a risk-free rate) on subsequently issued debt than do defaulting countries that agree to a full recovery rate.

Sovereign defaults, external debt and real exchange rate dynamics

Emerging countries experience real exchange rate depreciations around defaults. In this paper, we examine this observed pattern empirically and through the lens of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. The theoretical model explicitly incorporates bond issuances in local and foreign currencies, and endogenous determination of real exchange rate and default risk. Our quantitative analysis, using the case of Argentina�s default in 2001, replicates the link between real exchange rate depreciation and default probability around defaults and moments of the real exchange rate that match the data. Prior to default, interactions of real exchange rate depreciation, originated from a sequence of low tradable goods shocks with the sovereign�s large share of foreign currency debt, trigger defaults. In post-default periods, the resulting output costs and loss of market access due to default lead to further real exchange rate depreciation.

Dynamic Transition of Exchange Rate Regime in China

The paper considers the optimal transition path for Chinas exchange rate regime. How can China successfully make the shift from the current dollar peg regime to a more desirable regime, whether a basket peg or a floating regime? To answer this question, we develop a dynamic small open economy general equilibrium model. We construct four transition policies based on a basket peg or a floating regime and compare the welfare gains of these policies relative to maintaining the dollar peg regime. Two main results are derived from the quantitative analysis using Chinese data from 1999Q1 to 2010Q4. First, following a gradual adjustment to a basket peg regime is the most appropriate path for China to take, with minimal welfare losses associated with the shift in the exchange rate regime. Second, a sudden shift to the basket peg is the second best solution, and is superior to a sudden shift to floating because the monetary authority can efficiently determine optimal weights to attach to currencies in the basket to achieve policy goals once they adopt a basket peg regime.

Dynamic Analysis of Exchange Rate Regimes: Policy Implications for Emerging Countries in Asia

This paper discusses desirable exchange rate regimes and how countries can shift from their current regimes to these regimes over the medium term. We demonstrate the superiority of a basket-peg regime with the basket weight rule over a floating regime with the interest rate rule or the money supply rule in small open economies, during periods when volatility of exchange rates is moderate. Countries which currently have fixed exchange rates would be better moving toward either a basket-peg or a floating regime over the medium term. A shift to a basket-peg regime is preferred when exchange rate fluctuations are large.

Is Banks’ Home Bias Good or Bad for Public Debt Sustainability?

Motivated by the recent increase in domestic banks’ holdings of domestic sovereign debt (i.e., home bias) in the European periphery, this paper analyzes implications of banks’ home bias for the sovereign’s debt sustainability. The main findings, based on a sample of advanced (AM) and emerging market (EM) economies, suggest that home bias generally reduces the cost of borrowing for AMs and EMs when debt levels are moderate to high. A worsening of market sentiments appears to diminish the favorable impact of home bias on cost of borrowing particularly for EMs. In addition, for AMs and EMs, higher home bias is associated with higher debt levels, and less responsive fiscal policy. The findings suggest that home bias indeed matters for debt sustainability: Home bias may provide fiscal breathing space, but delays in fiscal consolidation may actually delay problems until debt reaches dangerously high levels.

Welfare Effects of Monetary Integration; The Common Monetary Area and Beyond

This paper proposes a quantitative assessment of the welfare effects arising from the Common Monetary Area (CMA) and an array of broader grouping among Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries. Model simulations suggest that (i) participating in the CMA benefits all members; (ii) joining the CMA individually is beneficial for all SADC members except Angola, Mauritius and Tanzania; (iii) creating a symmetric CMA-wide monetary union with a regional central bank carries some costs in terms of foregone anti-inflationary credibility; and (iv) SADC-wide symmetric monetary union continues to be beneficial for all except Mauritius, although the gains for existing CMA members are likely to be limited.

Serial Sovereign Defaults and Debt Restructurings

Emerging countries that have defaulted on their debt repayment obligations in the past are more likely to default again in the future than are non-defaulters even with the same external debt-to-GDP ratio. These countries actually have repeated defaults or restructurings in short periods. This paper explains these stylized facts within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework by explicitly modeling renegotiations between a defaulting country and its creditors. The quantitative analysis of the model reveals that the equilibrium probability of default for a given debt-to-GDP level is weakly increasing with the number of past defaults. The model also accords with an additional fact: lower recovery rates (high NPV haircuts) are associated with increases in spreads at renegotiation.

Sovereign Debt Restructurings in Belize; Achievements and Challenges Ahead

This paper examines the causes, processes, and outcomes of the two Belize sovereign debt restructurings in 2006–07 and in 2012–13 that occurred outside of an IMF-supported program. It finds that the motivation for the two debt restructurings differed, as the former was driven by external liquidity concerns while the latter was motivated by a substantial increase in the coupon rates and future fiscal solvency concerns. Despite differential treatment between residents and non-residents, both 2006–07 and 2012–13 debt exchanges were executed through collaborative engagement, due in part to the existence of a broad-based creditor committee and the authorities’ effective communication strategy. However, while providing temporary liquidity relief, neither of the debt restructurings properly addressed long-term debt sustainability concerns. Going forward, the success of the 2012–13 debt restructuring will still depend on the country’s ability to strengthen fiscal efforts and public debt management framework.

Sovereign Bond Prices, Haircuts and Maturity

Rejecting a common assumption in the sovereign debt literature, we document that creditor losses (“haircuts”) during sovereign restructuring episodes are asymmetric across debt instruments. We code a comprehensive dataset on instrument-specific haircuts for 28 debt restructurings with private creditors in 1999–2015 and find that haircuts on shorter-term debt are larger than those on debt of longer maturity. In a standard asset pricing model, we show that increasing short-run default risk in the run-up to a restructuring episode can explain the stylized fact. The data confirms the predicted relation between perceived default risk, bond prices, and haircuts by maturity.