Tanmoyee Banerjee

OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT AND ANTI‐COPYING STRATEGIES TO COUNTER COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT*

In this paper we study the mix of anti-copying investment strategies by an incumbent firm and the enforcement policies of a government that consists of monitoring and penalizing the copier to address the issue of commercial piracy. If monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti-copying investment does not guarantee the prevention of copying. If not monitoring is socially optimal then the subgame perfect equilibrium anti-copying investment may guarantee the prevention of copying.

What Factors Play a Role in Empowering Women? A Study of SHG Members from India:

Abstract Self-employment holds the key to continuity of employment. Self-employed members of self-help groups (SHGs) fare better than their wage-earning counterparts when it comes to continuity of employment. These were some of the findings of a study based on two rounds of primary surveys—one in 2005 and the other in 2009—of the same set of SHG members from the North 24 Parganas district of West Bengal in India. The study dwelt on the factors influencing the different indicators of women empowerment among the members of 26 matured all-woman SHGs. It also isolated the socioeconomic demographic factors influencing the joint probability of a group member being both empowered and employed. The study concluded that training significantly influences various dimensions of empowerment, and the trained group members are more likely to be both empowered as well as employed.

An Analysis on the Impact of Employment Generation Policies on Rural Women in West Bengal, India

Based on a primary survey carried out in 2009, 24 Parganas (North), West Bengal, India, this chapter tries to evaluate the effects of various policy interventions on the employment status of the rural women and income level and different family expenditures of corresponding households. The study considers the impact of two different policies: Sawarnajayanti Gram Swarojgar Yojana (SGSY) and Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). Applying propensity score matching, the study observes that SGSY participation had a positive significant impact on family food expenditure and employment status of rural women, whereas MGNREGA does not have any such impact. However, impact of these policies on household income and monthly savings and consumption expenditure shows that SGSY had positive but insignificant impact, but MGNREGA again did not register any such impact.

Optimal Entry Mode for Multinationals with Possibility of Technology Diffusion

The chapter tries to evaluate the optimal entry mode of a multinational company (MNC) that is choosing among export, fragmented production structure with assembly-line foreign direct investment (FDI) in a less-developed country (LDC) or complete production in an LDC with FDI. The results show that if the intellectual property rights (IPR) restriction is strong and the plant installation cost in an LDC is below a certain critical level, then the MNC chooses complete LDC production with FDI over assembly-line FDI, where the model assumes that a fake producer can copy the product if complete production takes place in the LDC. In such a situation, the government will choose to protect IPR only under some sufficient conditions; otherwise, no monitoring is the optimal strategy of the government and the MNC will choose the strategy of fragmented production structure and assembly-line FDI will take place in the LDC.

SUBCONTRACTING, RENEGOTIATION OF CONTRACT AND QUALITY PROVISION

In a principal-agent framework under moral hazard, when the monopolist can pass on the liability of any defect of the product to the subcontractors, and cannot credibly commit to a high level of investment, he actually chooses a low investment level and supplies a low quality product if the product replacement cost is below a critical level. However, under contract renegotiation, when the monopolist is taking the entire risk of replacing the defective product, he will profitably choose high investment level and serves high quality product. But the results show that the monopolist will choose to renegotiate the contract only for limited values of product replacement cost, even if renegotiation is socially optimal.

Does Political Identity Matter in Rural Borrowing? Evidence from a Field Survey

This study is based on a primary survey conducted over two consecutive years in two villages in the North 24 Parganas district of West Bengal, India. West Bengal has the unique feature of being under a single coalition government for the last 30 years. In this context, we examine the effect of different socioeconomic, political and demographic borrower characteristics on the probability of taking a loan from formal sources and the size of such loans taken. We find that political identity significantly affects the borrowers’ access to the formal loan market. Other factors that are significant in characterising the formal borrowers are occupational categories, landholding and religious status.

Export, Assembly-Line FDI or FDI with the Possibility of Technology Diffusion: Optimal Entry Mode for Multinationals

The paper tries to evaluate the optimal entry mode of a Multinational Company that is choosing among export, fragmented production structure with assembly-line FDI in LDC or complete production in LDC with FDI. The results show that if the plant installation cost is sufficiently high then the firm will find it profitable to export the finished product to the LDC market and the Government will not exercise any IPR restriction. If plant installation cost is below a certain critical level the MNC chooses complete LDC production with FDI over assembly-line FDI if the IPR restriction is strong, where the model assumes that a fake producer can copy the product if complete production takes place in LDC. In such a situation government will choose to protect IPR if government earning exceeds the cost of IPR protection, otherwise no monitoring is the optimal strategy of the government and MNC will choose the strategy of fragmented production structure and assembly-line FDI will take place in LDC.