Tapani Riekki
University of Helsinki
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Featured researches published by Tapani Riekki.
Schizophrenia Research | 2012
Tuukka T. Raij; Tapani Riekki; Riitta Hari
BACKGROUND Poor insight is a central characteristic of psychosis and schizophrenia. Accumulating evidence indicates that cortical midline structures (CMS) and frontopolar cortex (FPC), both of which are associated with insight-related processing in healthy subjects, are among the most affected brain structures in schizophrenia. However, the hypothesis that direct associations between function of these brain regions and poor insight in schizophrenia exist has not been tested previously. METHODS We studied 21 patients with schizophrenia and 17 healthy control subjects with structural and functional magnetic resonance imaging during a clinical insight task and a comparable control task. We assessed the level of insight, depression, positive and negative symptoms, and neurocognitive function, then adjusted correlation between insight and insight-task-related brain activation for potential confounders. Voxel-based morphometry was used to compare brain volumes between groups. RESULTS Insight correlated strongly with the activation of the CMS and the FPC during the clinical insight tasks, independently of potential confounders. The CMS activation was stronger during the insight task than during the control task in patients. The functional correlates of insight matched the distribution of cortical volume reduction in the patient group. CONCLUSIONS These findings suggest a link between known regional brain abnormalities and the manifestation of poor insight in schizophrenia. The contribution of CMS to insight may be related to self-referential processing and that of FPC to the integration of multiple cognitive processes that are necessary for accurate evaluation of ones mental illness.
Social Neuroscience | 2014
Tapani Riekki; Marjaana Lindeman; Tuukka T. Raij
A host of research has attempted to explain why some believe in the supernatural and some do not. One suggested explanation for commonly held supernatural beliefs is that they are a by-product of theory of mind (ToM) processing. However, this does not explain why skeptics with intact ToM processes do not believe. We employed fMRI to investigate activation differences in ToM-related brain circuitries between supernatural believers (N = 12) and skeptics (N = 11) while they watched 2D animations of geometric objects moving intentionally or randomly and rated the intentionality of the animations. The ToM-related circuitries in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) were localized by contrasting intention-rating-related and control-rating-related brain activation. Compared with the skeptics, the supernatural believers rated the random movements as more intentional and had stronger activation of the ToM-related circuitries during the animation with random movement. The strength of the ToM-related activation covaried with the intentionality ratings. These findings provide evidence that differences in ToM-related activations are associated with supernatural believers’ tendency to interpret random phenomena in mental terms. Thus, differences in ToM processing may contribute to differences between believing and unbelieving.
NeuroImage: Clinical | 2012
Tuukka T. Raij; Tapani Riekki
Neuronal underpinnings of auditory verbal hallucination remain poorly understood. One suggested mechanism is brain activation that is similar to verbal imagery but occurs without the proper activation of the neuronal systems that are required to tag the origins of verbal imagery in ones mind. Such neuronal systems involve the supplementary motor area. The supplementary motor area has been associated with awareness of intention to make a hand movement, but whether this region is related to the sense of ownership of ones verbal thought remains poorly known. We hypothesized that the supplementary motor area is related to the distinction between ones own mental processing (auditory verbal imagery) and similar processing that is attributed to non-self author (auditory verbal hallucination). To test this hypothesis, we asked patients to signal the onset and offset of their auditory verbal hallucinations during functional magnetic resonance imaging. During non-hallucination periods, we asked the same patients to imagine the hallucination they had previously experienced. In addition, healthy control subjects signaled the onset and offset of self-paced imagery of similar voices. Both hallucinations and the imagery of hallucinations were associated with similar activation strengths of the fronto-temporal language-related circuitries, but the supplementary motor area was activated more strongly during the imagery than during hallucination. These findings suggest that auditory verbal hallucination resembles verbal imagery in language processing, but without the involvement of the supplementary motor area, which may subserve the sense of ownership of ones own verbal imagery.
Journal of Cognition and Culture | 2011
Marjaana Lindeman; Tapani Riekki; Bruce M. Hood
Adults identified as believers and sceptics based on self-reports from a supernatural beliefs scale were assessed on two measures of inhibition; the Stroop Color‐Word Task and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST). Both groups were of equal educational status and background. However, believers made significantly more errors than sceptics on all subscales of the WCST but were equivalent in performance on the Stroop measure. This finding is consistent with the idea that supernatural beliefs in adults are related to some types of inhibitory control.
Advances in Cognitive Psychology | 2013
Tapani Riekki; Marjaana Lindeman; Jari Lipsanen
We examined lay people’s conceptions about the relationship between mind and body and their correlates. In Study 1, a web survey (N = 850) of reflective dualistic, emergentistic, and monistic perceptions of the mind-body relationship, afterlife beliefs (i.e., common sense dualism), religiosity, paranormal beliefs, and ontological confusions about physical, biological, and psychological phenomena was conducted. In Study 2 (N = 73), we examined implicit ontological confusions and their relations to afterlife beliefs, paranormal beliefs, and religiosity. Correlation and regression analyses showed that reflective dualism, afterlife beliefs, paranormal beliefs, and religiosity were strongly and positively related and that reflective dualism and afterlife beliefs mediated the relationship between ontological confusions and religious and paranormal beliefs. The results elucidate the contention that dualism is a manifestation of universal cognitive processes related to intuitions about physical, biological, and psychological phenomena by showing that especially individuals who confuse the distinctive attributes of these phenomena tend to set the mind apart from the body.
Comprehensive Psychiatry | 2014
Tuukka T. Raij; Jyrki Korkeila; Kaisla Joutsenniemi; Samuli I. Saarni; Tapani Riekki
BACKGROUND [corrected] Personal characteristics contribute to whether negative attitudes in society are internalized as deteriorating self-stigma. Studies in healthy subjects suggest that resilience is associated with the regulation of amygdala activation by the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), but little is known about the factors that contribute to individual stigma resistance in psychiatric patients. METHODS We assessed stigma (by measuring association strengths between social inferiority and schizophrenia by an implicit association test) in 20 patients with schizophrenia and in 16 age- and sex-matched healthy control subjects. The brain activation strengths were measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging during evaluation of schizophrenia-related statements and of control statements. RESULTS Association strengths between social inferiority and schizophrenia were inversely related to the strength of the activation of the rostro-ventral mPFC. This inverse correlation survived adjustment for global functioning, depression symptom scores, and insight. Activation of the rostro-ventral mPFC was negatively correlated with activation of the amygdala. The association strengths between social inferiority and schizophrenia correlated with the compromised performance in a Stroop task, which is a measure of cognitive regulation. DISCUSSION Our findings suggest that individual stigma resistance is associated with emotion regulation. These findings may help to understand better stigma resistance and thereby aid the development of patient interventions that add to the public anti-stigma work in reducing devastating effects of stigma.
Human Brain Mapping | 2017
Tuukka T. Raij; Tapani Riekki
Spontaneous thinking, an action to produce, consider, integrate, and reason through mental representations, is central to our daily experience and has been suggested to serve crucial adaptive purposes. Such thinking occurs among other experiences during mind wandering that is associated with activation of the default mode network among other brain circuitries. Whether and how such brain activation is linked to the experience of spontaneous thinking per se remains poorly known. We studied 51 healthy subjects using a comprehensive experience‐sampling paradigm during 3T functional magnetic resonance imaging. In comparison with fixation, the experiences of spontaneous thinking and spontaneous perception were related to activation of wide‐spread brain circuitries, including the cortical midline structures, the anterior cingulate cortex and the visual cortex. In direct comparison of the spontaneous thinking versus spontaneous perception, activation was observed in the anterior dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Modality congruence of spontaneous‐experience‐related brain activation was suggested by several findings, including association of the lingual gyrus with visual in comparison with non‐verbal–non‐visual thinking. In the context of current literature, these findings suggest that the cortical midline structures are involved in the integrative core substrate of spontaneous thinking that is coupled with other brain systems depending on the characteristics of thinking. Furthermore, involvement of the anterior dorsomedial prefrontal cortex suggests the control of high‐order abstract functions to characterize spontaneous thinking per se. Hum Brain Mapp 38:3277–3288, 2017.
Social Neuroscience | 2018
Tapani Riekki; Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen; Marjaana Lindeman
ABSTRACT Using the empathizing-systemizing theory as our framework, we investigated how people with high self-reported empathizing (having good social skills and being interested in people) and systemizing (being interested in physical things and processes) differ in the social information processing of emotionally negative photographs of people during “spontaneous watching” and emotional and cognitive empathy tasks. Empathizers evaluated the pictures as more emotionally touching and the reactions in the photographs more understandable than the systemizers. Compared to the empathizers, systemizers had stronger activations in the posterior cingulate cortex, an area related to cognitive empathy, as well as in the left superior temporal gyrus and middle frontal gyrus when watching emotional photographs spontaneously. During guided emotional and cognitive empathy tasks, these differences disappeared. However, during the emotional empathy task, higher systemizing was associated with weaker activation of the right inferior frontal gyrus /insula. Furthermore, during emotional and cognitive empathy tasks, empathizing was related to increased activations of the amygdala which were in turn related to higher behavioral ratings of emotional and cognitive empathy. The results suggest that empathizers and systemizers engage in social information processing differently: systemizers in more cognitive terms and empathizers with stronger automatic emotional reactions.
Nature Human Behaviour | 2018
Will M. Gervais; Dimitris Xygalatas; Ryan McKay; Michiel van Elk; Emma E. Buchtel; Mark Aveyard; Sarah R. Schiavone; Ilan Dar-Nimrod; Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen; Tapani Riekki; Eva Kundtová Klocová; Jonathan E. Ramsay; Joseph Bulbulia
In the version of this Letter originally published, the following sentence was mistakenly omitted from the Acknowledgements section: T.R. and A.M.S.-H. were supported by a grant from the Academy of Finland (265518).
Applied Cognitive Psychology | 2013
Tapani Riekki; Marjaana Lindeman; Marja Aleneff; Anni Halme; Antti Nuortimo