Tara Smith

Tolerance & Forgiveness: Virtues or Vices?

This paper explores the relationship between tolerance, forgiveness, and justice. Contrary to prevailing wisdom, it argues that tolerance and forgiveness are not independent virtues vying with justice for our allegiance, but that they fall under justice’s imperative to judge other people objectively and treat them as they deserve. Misguided extensions of tolerance and forgiveness imperil the very values that ethics is designed to promote. Thus tolerance and forgiveness are neither virtues nor vices; they are appropriate only when authorised by justice. The paper clarifies the common confusion of tolerance with respect for individuals’ rights, and argues that forgiveness is not a supererogatory act of generosity, but is sometimes morally required.

The Practice of Pride

Pride has been denounced as one of the seven deadly sins and praised as the crown of the virtues. Perhaps because of the difficulty of navigating between these appraisals, pride has not been paid very much attention by ethicists. Moreover, pride is so familiar as a feeling that the suggestion that it could be a virtue may seem misplaced.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT IN OBJECTIVE MORALITY: DISTINGUISHING OBJECTIVE FROM INTRINSIC VALUE

This essay contends that the debate between subjectivism and objectivism in ethics is better understood as a dispute among three alternatives: subjectivism, objectivism, and intrinsicism. Ayn Rand has identified intrinsicism – the belief that certain things are good “in, by, and of” themselves – as the doctrine that is actually operative in many defenses of moral objectivity. What intrinsicism fails to appreciate, however, is the significant role of the subject, the person to whom and for whom anything can be valuable. Objective value, in Rands view, is relational. Its existence depends on contributions of both external reality and human consciousness. Values are not reducible to psychological states, as in subjectivism, but nor are they independent of them, as in intrinsicism. Objectivity in ethics is attained neither through revelation of the intrinsic property of goodness nor through the subjects creation of goodness, but through a rational procedure of evaluation that is governed by the method of objectivity. This essay is in three parts, explaining Rands view of exactly what intrinsicism is; elaborating on her view of the nature of moral objectivity; and highlighting certain features that make plain the differences between an intrinsicist and an objectivist account of value.

On deriving rights to goods from rights to freedom

This paper examines a particular type of argument often employed to defend welfare rights. This argument contends that welfare rights are a necessary supplement to liberty rights because rights to freedom become hollow when their bearers are not able to take advantage of their freedom. Rights to be provided with certain goods are thus a natural outgrowth of a genuine concern to protect freedom.I argue that this reasoning suffers from two fatal flaws. First, it rests on an erroneous notion of what it is to have a right, neglecting the fact that the exact source of a persons inability to exercise a right is crucial to determining whether that right is being respected. Second, the argument equivocates as to the “freedom” that rights are intended to protect, sometimes confusing freedom with ability, sometimes confusing not being free with not having other desired things, and sometimes confusing what a person is able to do with what a person is entitled to do.

On a Pedestal—Sport as an Arena for Admiration

ABSTRACT In philosophical analyses of the value of sport, a relatively unheralded feature is the opportunity that sport offers for admiration. While we readily salute many of the things that people admire (the amazing catch, the sensational comeback), we do not sufficiently appreciate that admiration itself is a positive good that is beneficial to the admirer. At a time when much in the world around us seems distinctly unadmirable and when admiration itself is often dismissed as naïve, athletic achievements and the qualities that propel them present palpable counter-evidence to our darker conclusions. Shining a spotlight on sports’ displays of human beings doing difficult things can pay healthy dividends, as admiration fuels aspiration. The paper proceeds in four stages. It first explains what admiration is and then identifies the kinds of things that sport distinctly offers, to admire. The heart of it demonstrates the value of athletic admiration, tracing how this contributes to a flourishing life in three principal ways: through the role-modeling that it offers, the action that it encourages and the feelings that it fosters. Finally, the paper considers four possible objections, which serves both to clarify and to fortify its central contention.